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Abstract  
The study addresses resilience and vulnerability in relation to natural disaster. It is mainly an 
empirical study which draws on experience from the process of coping and recovery from the 
1999 flood disaster in central Vietnam. As the conditions for coping and recovery varies 
between geographical and socio-economic contexts, the study looks at five villages in two 
districts, covering low land, hill land and mountain areas. Interviews and discussions with 
households and representatives of local organisations and local government have been 
conducted in the two districts of Hai Lang and A Luoi from 2000 to 2004. The study is 
multidisciplinary drawing on several disciplines from the social sciences.  
 
The Vietnamese context provides an example of a high level of social resilience. The concept 
is used to signify the capacity of households and communities to ‘bounce back’ after a shock, 
and also the capacity to adapt in order to be more resilient in anticipation of future shocks. 
The study looks at the roles of local government, local organisations and households in 
disaster response and finds that the strong relationships between these actors provides 
conditions for collective action to address the acute needs of the population. Although the 
level of resilience in general is high, there are several ways in which people are vulnerable. 
Constraints to recovery included production difficulties due to continued heavy rains, disease 
of livestock, limited access to land, reduced labour capacity due to health problems as well as 
the limitations of the social security system. Differences in capacity to recover became 
apparent over time, which emphasises the importance of the time perspective when looking at 
resilience and vulnerability. Vietnamese society is changing from a situation where the state 
had a high degree of responsibility for production and livelihoods, to a market economy in 
which risk is increasingly borne by the household rather than the collective. This gives rise to 
new types of vulnerability, which require new types of mechanisms for social protection.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The water rose very fast. At midnight our house collapsed. We managed to hold on 
to the stack of rice straw by the fence until morning when my brother rescued us. 
The water was very cold, and there was wind and high waves. We lost our 4 pigs, 50 
chickens and our buffalo. 3.5 tons of rice got wet and cannot be used. 2 beds broke 
and other things floated away. Mr. Bau, Van Tri village, Hai Lang district. 
 
November 2nd 1999 a tropical storm came in over central Vietnam and unleashed 
2300 mm of rain in 4 days (Duong 2000). Most of the rain fell at the head of 
watersheds in the mountain chain bordering with Laos, causing the rivers to rise 
with enormous force. At the same time the storm raised the sea level and stopped the 
rivers from draining into the sea. In the mountains, the river pulled away large 
chunks of the riverbanks, bridges and houses close to the river and uprooting trees. 
When the water reached the low land the force was still sufficient to pull away 
houses and bridges. During the evening and night the water rose to the roofs of 
many houses. As the water rose quickly and it was dark, people could not evacuate 
themselves and their belongings to higher areas.  
 
The 1999 floods in central Vietnam were a shock to the people in the seven 
provinces affected. The people I spoke to had not experienced anything like it 
before. It has been called the 'flood of the century' and was given great attention in 
Vietnam. Massive support was mobilised for relief and recovery and large 
investments have been made as part of attention to disaster mitigation.  
 
1.1 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to study how the Vietnamese society and households 
responded to and coped with the disastrous floods of 1999. I am interested in the 
different socio-economic conditions that influence recovery and its impact for 
different groups of people.  
 
Southeast Asia is an area prone to natural disasters. Every year Vietnam is hit by a 
number of tropical storms, which cause more or less severe damage. Central 
Vietnam is an area that is especially exposed. Every year there is loss of lives due to 
storms. Historically, this has always been the case. The Vietnamese society has 
always given high priority to protection against floods (Luttrell 2001). Storms are 
perceived by people in Vietnam to have become more frequent and serious during 
the past decades, and increasing policy attention is being given to disaster 
mitigation. This study draws on the experience from the disaster response to the 
1999 floods and the discussion around disaster mitigation and reduction of 
vulnerability to future floods.  
   12 
The research presented here has been conducted in two districts; Hải Lăng district in 
Quảng Trị province, which is primarily a low land, coastal district, but which also 
stretches into hill land area; and A Lưới district in Thưa Thiên Huế province, which 
is a mountainous district. The experience of households in four communes in these 
two districts is examined during the time period 2000-2004. Households and staff of 
local organisations and local government were interviewed on their experiences in 
relation to the floods and the recovery process. The research looks at household 
access to resources for coping and recovery, community measures of relief and 
rehabilitation, government support and the institutional conditions that influence 
distribution of resources. Vulnerability and resilience of different groups under 
different socio-economic and geographical conditions are discussed, as well as the 
development issues that arise from the experience of coping with the flood crisis. 
 
The anthropologist Eric Wolf alerts us to how "the arrangements of a society 
become most visible when challenged by a crisis" (cited in Miller 2003). By 
studying how people and society cope with and handle a disaster, we get insights in 
the organisation, strengths and weaknesses of Vietnamese society. The study of 
vulnerability and resilience in the context of natural disaster sheds light on social 
cohesion, the balance between household and collective responsibility for managing 
hardship and how the household capacity to cope with difficulties relates to and 
depends on both geographical context and institutional conditions. 
 
The title of the thesis: ‘Resilient society – vulnerable people’ indicates that the 
Vietnamese society is organisationally relatively well equipped to handle crises 
situations. Local governments and local organisations responded quickly by 
supporting people in need with food and necessities and by rehabilitating damaged 
property. The capacity and response of society however differs in relation to 
different groups of people. It will be argued that, while the response of the 
government and communities work well for the majority, there are groups of 
households who due to various reasons fall outside of the institutional structures for 
recovery. Many poor households are particularly vulnerable to floods because the 
conditions that make people poor are similar to those that constrain recovery. Such 
issues include health, access to land, access to markets as well as an insufficient 
social security system. This would require the combination of poverty reduction and 
disaster response. 
 
Vietnam is in a process of transition from an economy where the state at all levels 
had a high degree of responsibility for production and livelihoods of people, to a 
market economy in which risk is increasingly borne by the individual rather than the 
collective. This gives rise to new types of vulnerability, which require new types of 
social protection mechanisms (Adger 2001). Collective organisation of access to 
resources exists to a higher degree in my fieldwork area, compared to the rest of 
Vietnam. I am interested in the role of the collective for resilience and capacity to 
cope with disasters and in how this role is changing. 
 
It is proposed that resilience to disaster is highly related to the ‘normal’ livelihood 
conditions of the people affected. Coping and recovery from the 1999 floods cannot 
be seen in isolation from the frequent seasonal production risks that are ever present   13 
in people’s livelihoods in the study area. Floods and drought frequently lead to crop 
losses and the degree of animal husbandry disease is high, which were important 
constraining factors for disaster recovery. The mountain population have particular 
difficulties as they are remote from markets and services and are going through a 
struggle with the process of adapting from their traditional shifting cultivation 
practices to 'fixed cultivation', which is more input intensive and exposed to new 
types of risks.   
 
The wider significance of the Vietnamese case concerns learning from a context of a 
high level of organisation and coordination in disaster response. It is a positive 
example of resilience, where there is high capacity in society to cope with and 
recover from disaster. Yet, vulnerability to floods is still a matter of serious concern. 
A large majority of households in the studied area are vulnerable in the sense that 
disaster floods, as well as the more frequent floods reducing the crop harvest, are 
serious impediments in the development of their livelihoods. For some households 
the vulnerability to floods interacts with other vulnerabilities, resulting in the risk of 
getting stuck in a poverty cycle. In order to reduce such vulnerabilities, we can learn 
from the process of coping and recovery in the studied area, which indicates 
conditions and mechanisms that lead to differences in capacity to recover.  
 
Policies and institutions may address vulnerability and resilience at community 
level, but have different consequences for different groups within the community. 
The organisations and authorities at commune- and village level have an important 
role in mediating resources within the village, which may have either differentiating 
consequences or result in broad access. 
 
The Vietnamese context provides an interesting environment for the study of the 
relation between individual and collective conditions for vulnerability and resilience. 
The collective organisation of production was reformed during the early 1990s and 
land allocation is now based on household tenure. There are, however, still many 
elements of collective influence and decision-making in Hai Lang and A Luoi 
districts, where this study is conducted. Collective action was strong in the 
immediate disaster response, while the networks of the individual household become 
more important in long-term recovery.  
 
My research question is concerned with how vulnerability can be understood in the 
context of a resilient society, with a high level of organisation and active disaster 
response. How do we understand the vulnerability and resilience that is determined 
by conditions that are common for a village, as compared to conditions that have a 
differentiating effect between households?  
 
1.2 Research process and method 
Empirically driven – theoretically informed 
This research is primarily a local level empirical study of the process of coping and 
recovering from the disaster floods in central Vietnam in 1999. The research process 
has been structured in order to follow the chronology of the developments after the   14 
floods. The time perspective has been an important element in the study, whereby 
differences in the capacity of households and communities have become apparent. 
The theoretical perspectives have been used to structure the empirical findings, to 
pose questions to the empirical data and to facilitate looking at the findings from 
different perspectives. The theoretical context of the study is presented in chapter 2.   
 
My background is in agriculture economy, but the thesis also draws on other 
disciplines including, human geography, sociology and political science. My interest 
is in the livelihood conditions of households and how these were affected by the 
floods. Such conditions are influenced by a wide range of factors. My entry point 
from agriculture economy means that the study has a major focus on the context of 
agricultural production and natural resources. Geography contributes to my interest 
in time and place, and political science to the relation between the state and other 
actors in society.  
The interest in how relations in the communities and in society influence household 
access to resources collects inspiration from sociology. I do none of these disciplines 
justice in terms of theoretical framework. My approach should be seen as an effort to 
bring together concepts and perspectives that I see as important in understanding 
vulnerability and resilience for households in different socio-economic and 
institutional contexts.  
 
Delimitations of the study 
There are naturally several dimensions, which are important for vulnerability and 
resilience that have not been included in the study.  
For example, socio-cultural institutions strongly impact on resilience, but has not 
been included. Neither have the environmental and ecological perspectives, although 
they are of obvious importance. A deeper understanding of the historical background 
to present day policies and practice would contribute significantly. The delimitations 
of the study are a consequence of my capacities as an agriculture economist as well 
as what was feasible to cover within the time frame.  
 
All scales in society are not covered in the research. The study is limited to 
household, village, commune and district level. National and provincial policies are 
referred to as part of the local conditions in Hai Lang and A Luoi districts. The 
policy frameworks for disaster mitigation etc at national level are not addressed as 
this would have led much further and remains to be discussed in future studies. 
Neither was the discussions taken up to province level, as the staff at this level do 
not primarily work directly with the villagers.  
 
The research focuses on the situation of the household and does not go into the 
differences within households, like gender and generational differences. It is 
possible that having the household as a unit of analysis may obscure intra-household 
differences in access to resources and vulnerability. It is likely that there are gender 
differences in coping and recovery, which have not been revealed in this research. 
The assessment was, however, that a gender analysis would require a much deeper 
and comprehensive level of interviews, for which there was no scope during this 
study. The reason for focus on the household level is also linked to the purpose of   15 
the study, which focuses on the livelihood, i.e. ways of making a living. The 
household in this context is seen as an economic unit, rather than as a group of 
family members. 
 
A gender analysis of disaster impact and vulnerability to floods is underway in A 
Luoi district, conducted by researchers at Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) 
together with staff of Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
A qualitative study 
The study has been done as a qualitative analysis. The purpose has been to get 
subjective accounts from households in different situations about their process of 
coping and recovery from the floods.   
The discussions and interviews with households, village leaders, representatives of 
local organisations and authorities at commune and district level have provided 
insights into the institutional context, the rationale behind the implementation of 
disaster response and the relations between households, organisations and local 
government in the recovery process.  
  
The interviews were semi-structured, i.e. the respondents were asked to give their 
story based on fairly open questions, followed up with more detailed questions to 
clarify and elaborate.  
 
The experience gained is that interviews and discussions provide much more 
information than a questionnaire survey. This is especially so regarding sensitive 
information e.g. informal loans, which people would be reluctant to document. The 
purpose was to understand how households, local leaders and staff look at the 
problems and opportunities that arose in the coping and recovery process, not just to 
collect information about the existence of such problems and opportunities. A formal 
survey could have provided additional weight to the research findings, but the 
limited number of interviews was compensated for by the iterative process of the 
research, in which the results and conclusions were discussed repeatedly at 
household, village, commune and district level.  
 
The interviews were supplemented with group discussions. In some of these 
discussions PRA
1 tools were used, such as ranking, mapping and organisational 
(Venn) diagrams. These were good starting off the discussions, but most of the 
information came from individuals commenting on their own (household) situation, 
or leaders commenting on the situation in the village.  
 
Selection of the villages studied 
The fieldwork covers three villages in three communes in Hai Lang district and two 
villages in one commune in A Luoi district. They were selected to represent different 
geographical and socio-economic conditions and had all been severely affected by 
                                                           
1 Participatory Rural Assessment, as initiated by Robert Chambers and elaborated by many 
researchers and practitioners.    16 
the floods. All the villages are situated on the banks of major rivers
2. They are 
slightly poorer than average in the district. (Section 3.3 situates the villages within 
the broader district context.) The selection was done in agreement with the district 
and commune People’s Committees. It can be expected that the study was directed to 
villages with more hardship than others in order to draw attention to the need for 
support.   
 
By highlighting the differences in impact of the floods and means of coping and 
recovery between the villages the study attempts to contribute to an increased 
understanding of how vulnerability and resilience differs depending on the context. 
Policies for disaster mitigation and risk reduction in Vietnam have previously tended 
to focus on low land conditions, but have recently started to pay attention to regional 
differences (Govt of Vietnam 2001). 
 
General and context specific 
The interviews with households presented pictures of the situations in their villages. 
The discussions with village leaders, local organisations and district staff served to 
understand whether the situation for the households interviewed were general for the 
village and sometimes even for a wider area. All villages have their own specific 
conditions, and generalisations within a broader area must be treated with caution. In 
the analysis, differences between the low land, hill land, and mountain areas are 
pointed out, as many of the outcomes are interesting from this perspective. This does 
not mean that all low land, hill land, mountain areas necessarily have these 
characteristics. Sometimes the reference to low land, hill land or mountain is mainly 
to clarify which of the studied villages are being referred to. In other cases the 
interview results with district staff suggest that the findings are more broadly 
relevant for all the low land, hill land, or mountain area of the district.  In the latter 
cases such assessments are referred to. The experiences regarding for example the 
importance of different types of assets and local level organisation may be more 
broadly relevant.  
 
The frame of the fieldwork  
The study included interviews and group discussions conducted in five villages, as 
well as discussions with authorities and organisations at commune and district level 
in the two districts where the villages are situated. Interviews were held with 9-16 
households in each village. Hai Lang is more densely populated and each of the 
villages there has about 200 households, while the villages in A Luoi have about 40. 
For details on number of interviews and discussions held, see Appendix.  
 
Fieldwork was conducted in May 2000, October-November 2000, February-March 
2001, December 2001, November 2002 and May 2004. The study was conducted as 
team-work with staff from the district organisations and researchers from the Hue 
University of Agriculture. In 2000 and the spring of 2001 the interviews were done 
                                                           
2 Xuan Loc village lies by the O Lau river; Van Tri village by the O Giang river, Phuoc Dien 
village by the Nhung river and Hong Ha commune by the Bo river.    17 
with a larger team of staff. In the fieldwork of 2002-2004 the interviews were held 
by the author together with one other person from the team. The fieldwork data thus 
consists of two types of interviews. Interviews by the author were followed up for a 
longer time period; and consequently from these households there is a better 
understanding of their story and most of the quotes are from them. Together with the 
interviews done by the rest of the team, a somewhat broader sample was provided as 
a basis for discussion with village, commune and district leaders.  
 
The interviews and discussions were not taped and transcribed, which means that the 
quotes should be taken as the interviewers’ notes of what has been said, rather than 
as direct word-by-word quotes.  
 
The study contains more data regarding Hai Lang district compared to A Luoi 
district. Overall conditions in Hai Lang district are more frequently referred to, 
whereas conditions in Hong Ha commune are mostly particularly written about, 
rather than A Luoi district as a whole. 
 
Selection of households to interview 
The selection of households did not follow statistical sampling. It was done based on 
village categories of households representing differences in severity of flood 
damage. When selecting households, attention was given to getting a spread of poor, 
middle-income and better-off households. Interviews were held with households 
who had experienced significant losses, although not loss of life. The selection was 
done partly as a random sample from village lists of households, in combination 
with selection through discussion with the village leaders. These leaders did not 
appear to steer the sample of households or avoid any particular households. The 
aim was to get a broad spread of households as a basis for discussion of conditions 
in the village.  
 
Fieldwork sequence  
The first round of interviews, in May 2000, focused on the families’ experience of 
the floods, the losses, the support received, the role of local organisations and the 
types of resources they could access for coping. The interviews focused partly on the 
issues that the respondents raised as important for their coping and recovery. This 
meant that the content of the interviews to some extent differed between the 
households. Some talked a lot about health, others about loans, others about 
migration etc. Some basic information was collected from all households, for 
example: data on losses, food deliveries, credit and loans.  
 
Discussions were also held with groups of villagers, where issues of the disaster 
impact, reasons for differences in coping and recovery and the role of different 
organisations and the authorities were commented upon. After the completion of 
interviews and discussions in a village, the results were presented at a follow-up 
meeting with representatives of village- and commune leaders and organisations. 
These meetings provided comments on village results, additional information on 
commune level actions and comments on differences in vulnerability within the   18 
commune. Finally, meetings were held with district level organisations and 
authorities, to get further comments and to put village results in a district 
perspective. District actions for disaster response and mitigation were also discussed 
at the meetings. The results from the household interviews were mostly verified at 
commune and district level. Only a few issues, like the prevalence of taking informal 
loans, were said to be outside the scope of the authorities’ knowledge, but that it 
would be ‘looked into’.  
 
The second round of fieldwork in October 2000 followed a similar pattern. The 
focus was then on the process of recovery. Two rice crops had been harvested and 
the immediate crisis had subsided. A lot of the discussion concerned the role of bank 
credit and private loans in recovery.  The fieldwork in March 2001 was mainly 
oriented towards the district level organisations and authorities and their assessment 
of priorities in order to improve resilience. The third and forth round of household 
interviews in December 2001 and November 2002 followed-up on the recovery 
process. Group discussions were also organised at village level in order to get 
household opinions on adaptation and production strategies from a vulnerability 
perspective. The work in 2004 included only a few household interviews and 
focused mainly on interviews with organisations and filling gaps from previous 
fieldwork. (See appendix for a list over interviews and meetings.) 
 
In the interviews in 2000-2001, a picture of the village as a whole was aimed for. In 
the interviews 2002-2004 there was more focus on the vulnerable households, i.e. 
households who had more difficulties to recover than average in that village.  
 
The household as the lowest level of analysis 
A household in this area normally contains three generations; husband, wife, two-
four children and the husband’s parents. In most cases both the husband and wife 
took part in the interview. In Hai Lang district it was mostly the husband who took 
the lead and talked more. In Hong Ha commune many of the households were 
represented by the woman. This may have been an effect of the circumstance that an 
NGO project working with the commune on 'Community Based Natural Resource 
Management'
3 has during many years focused on cooperation with the women. The 
respondents answered on behalf of the household. The answers may have been 
influenced by whether it was the husband or the wife who answered, but no 
systematic differences were noted in the material.  
 
The experience of the study is that the well-being of family members to a large 
extent depends on the access to resources of the household as a whole, rather than 
being differentiated for family members. Division of labour in agriculture is 
relatively equal between men and women, although women work more in total, as 
                                                           
3 This project is managed by a multidisciplinary group of researchers at Hue University of 
Agriculture and Forestry, with support from IDRC (Canada) and Ford Foundation.   19 
they often bear most of the responsibility for household work and the children as 
well
4.  
 
Conditions for research in the study area 
The possibilities for me to do research in the area were much improved by the fact 
that I had lived and worked in the area prior to  the study. I worked as district 
coordinator in the Quang Tri Rural Development Program
5 based in Hai Lang 
district 1996-1999. 
 
The research draws on the understanding that I developed during this period. It gave 
insights into livelihood conditions of different groups of people as well as the 
relations between authorities, local organisations and villagers. My understanding of 
Vietnam also derives from three years of working in Tuyen Quang and Yen Bai 
provinces in the Vietnam-Sweden Forestry Cooperation Program 1992-1995.  
 
The previous work in the area meant that the authorities had a level of trust in me, 
which provided conditions for me to access people. It was important for me that the 
leaders at different levels were involved and felt comfortable with the research. I 
find that openness and trust in this respect is a prerequisite for doing research in 
Vietnam.   
 
The feed back meetings at village, commune and district level provided the 
opportunity for me to ‘test’ conclusions drawn, at different levels. I do not perceive 
the research results to be politically sensitive, as they are part of an open discussion 
at district level. In a few cases I have avoided using the names of people 
interviewed, in case households might feel exposed. The staff are mainly quoted 
with the positions they held, sometimes with names, when they were known in the 
local area anyway.  
 
Possible biases 
The interviews were often conducted in the presence of someone from the village- or 
cooperative leadership. This is a prerequisite for acquiring research permission from 
the authorities. There was therefore some risk that the respondents would ‘modify’ 
their story according to what they thought was expected of them. Although it was 
difficult to know if that was the case, there was a heterogeneity in the answers that 
suggests that households responded independently. Many households seemed to take 
the opportunity of the presence of village leaders to raise issues that they were 
concerned about. People would confront the village leaders with issues of access to 
credit and irrigation etc., and with their opinions on how it was organised. The 
                                                           
4 The Women’s Union in Hai Lang district has made time studies on gendered use of time on 
different types of work.  
5 A bilateral cooperation between Finland and Vietnam with development projects in a wide 
range of areas, including, credit, extension, capacity building and infrastructure. There was 
close cooperation with the district and commune People’s Committees, the mass 
organisations, the cooperatives and the villagers.   20 
experience from my previous work in the area is that people are fairly open about 
voicing criticism.  
 
The village leaders tend to know the household conditions well and their presence at 
the household interviews made it easier to get supplementary information and 
clarifications from them afterwards, when discussing the implications of the 
interview data. An example of such supplementary information could be if a 
household for instance failed to mention access to overseas remittances, or other 
sources of income. Either the interviewees thought it not relevant, or maybe they 
thought it would disqualify them from potential support.  
 
The issue of expectations that the research would lead to some kind of support was a 
general problem. It was reinforced by the fact that I had been working previously as 
a project coordinator in the area, and was thus connected with a project environment 
in many people’s eyes. This was mainly a problem in the discussions with commune 
authorities, where it was difficult to stick to a discussion of conditions in the village, 
rather than their interest in arguing for investments.  Household members however, 
were keener to tell the story of their own situation and household answers regarding 
received support were given with a level of detail that indicated accuracy. However, 
there is a risk that households, who for some reason had not received support, were 
excluded from the list of interviewees.  
 
In Hai Lang my co-interviewers were people from the district Agricultural section. 
In Hong Ha commune they were university staff active in the Community-based 
Natural Resource Management Project, mentioned above. They are people that I 
know well and whom I trust. I had worked with them in the villages before and had 
a good impression of how they worked with the villagers. They impressed me as 
genuinely interested in the farmers’ stories, situation and opinions.  
 
The information that they got from their interviews corresponded with the 
information that I got from my interviews. The type of biases in the answers that 
could have occurred would therefore relate to ‘outsiders’ in general, not only me, as 
a foreigner. There is always the risk that the respondents feel that they should 
present modified stories to coincide with what they think is being expected of them. 
The findings were discussed with many people at different levels in order to 
triangulate the results. Biases or distortions that may have occurred could involve 
interviewees not voicing criticism against local authorities or organisations. I was 
careful to get details, in order to avoid positive but vague answers.  
 
Interviews were conducted in Vietnamese language, which I speak and understand. 
Misunderstandings due to translation difficulties could thus mostly be avoided. On 
the other hand there was the possibility that I thought I had understood something 
which I had not. In order to grasp nuances in the language and to avoid 
misunderstandings, the interview team discussed the results after completed 
interviews in order to make sure that we had the same perception of what had been 
said. In group discussions in Hong Ha commune the participants would sometimes 
switch to their own language, Ca tu or Ta oi. I was then dependent on one of them 
translating to Vietnamese, which never captured the whole complexity of what was   21 
said. The cooperation with staff who worked closely with the villages provided me 
with valuable background and the contextual knowledge necessary to be able to 
understand the interviews. I am infinitely grateful to them for all the time and effort 
they have spent in discussions. Naturally, whatever biases they had, were also 
present in their explanations of what was going on. I tried to discuss with people 
representing many different roles, and to keep an awareness of what each person 
stood for. The level of trust between us probably influenced the research in different 
ways. On the one hand, it will have entailed the risk that I would too easily ‘buy’ the 
version of the district staff in understanding the situation. On the other hand, the 
staff were prepared to share with me their personal views and experience with me, 
and not only the ‘official’ version. 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter one introduces the thesis. Chapter two formulates the theoretical and 
conceptual framework for the thesis, and places it in relation to relevant theoretical 
contexts. Chapter three gives a background to the policy environment in Vietnam 
and introduces the fieldwork area and the livelihood conditions there.   
 
Chapter four to six are mainly descriptive presentations of the fieldwork results, 
structured roughly according to chronology and geographical area. Some references 
are made to empirical and theoretical experiences by other authors relevant to the 
presentation. Chapter four gives the account of the disaster and the impact for 
different groups of people. Chapters 5 and 6 have a similar structure. They present 
the fieldwork data on humanitarian assistance, coping and recovery, separately for 
Hai Lang district in chapter five and for Hong Ha commune, A Luoi district, in 
chapter six.  
 
Chapter seven is analytical and ties together the different factors influencing coping 
and recovery and their impact on the livelihood situation of different groups of 
people in the various geographical and socio-economic contexts. The institutional 
context of relations between local government, local organisations and households is 
discussed. 
 
Before chapter eight the thesis focuses on the response to the 1999 floods. Chapter 
eight broadens the perspective to discuss actions and policies for disaster mitigation, 
risk reduction and adaptation and the implications for vulnerability and resilience. 
Chapter nine is a summary and concluding discussion of the research results.   22 
2. Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
2.1 The framework and approach of the study 
 
The thesis centres on a number of issues in relation to the disastrous floods of 1999. 
They include:  
•  How did the Vietnamese society and households respond to and cope with 
the floods? 
•  Which factors influenced household capacity to cope with and recover from 
the floods? 
•  Which were the different institutional and socio-economic conditions that 
influence the impact of the floods and the recovery process for different 
groups of people?  
•  Which were the characteristics of the livelihoods and the production system 
in the different geographical contexts and how did this influence flood 
impact and capacity to cope and recover? 
 
In order to explore these questions the thesis engages with several concepts and 
discourses, which are discussed in the sections below in this chapter. The main 
concepts are vulnerability and resilience.  
 
The concept of vulnerability is vital in order to understand why a hazard becomes a 
disaster, and for whom. The study refers to Hewitt (1997) in terms of the focus on 
the conditions that influence people’s protection, ability to withstand, mitigate, cope 
with and recover from damage, rather than the severity of the damaging agent itself. 
The study looks at the vulnerability of both the community and of the households. 
The following definition of vulnerability by Wisner et al. (2004) is adopted: ‘the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that negatively influence 
their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of a 
hazard’.  This definition recognises that vulnerability is a characteristic both of 
people and their situation. For example: A characteristic like ‘health problems’ may 
cause a person, and the whole household, to be vulnerable in one context, but not in 
another.  
 
The concept of resilience is used as the opposite of vulnerability. In the definition by 
Walker et al. (2002) resilience is: ‘Maintaining the functionality of a system, when it 
is disturbed’. ‘Maintaining the elements needed to renew or reorganise the system, 
to maintain its main functions’. The approach in this study is similar in that 
resilience is used to signify the capacity of households and communities to 'bounce 
back' and recover from disaster, and their capacity to reorganise in order to maintain 
crucial functions of their livelihoods. The concept includes the ability to adapt and 
build capacity to cope with future shocks. Resilience is seen as a product of 
household characteristics, their assets, their means of making a living, as well as the 
characteristics of the community and the society to which they belong.   23 
Resilience is a central concept in the ‘Sustainable Livelihoods Framework’ as 
discussed below in 2.2. Capacity to recover from shocks is a core part of 
‘sustainability’ as argued by Chambers and Conway (1992). The Sustainable 
Livelihoods framework centres on household assets and livelihood activities in a 
context of ‘policies, institutions and transforming processes’, and discusses which 
livelihood outcomes are the result of this interaction. In this thesis household 
vulnerability and/or resilience is at the centre of the analysis. Livelihood activities 
and outcomes are discussed in the context of capacity to cope and recover from the 
1999 disaster. Wisner et al. (2004) argue that a vulnerable livelihood is the opposite 
of a sustainable livelihood. The aim of the thesis is to further the understanding of 
what constitutes a vulnerable and/or resilient (sustainable) livelihood.  
 
The differences in resilience between the villages depend on a range of factors. The 
study focuses on the following:  
•  Geographical location of settlements and production 
•  Production conditions 
•  Access to resources like land, labour, financial assets etc 
•  Access to support from the government, NGO’s and the public 
•  Mutual support networks 
•  Institutional capacity of local government and local organisations in 
disaster response 
•  Relations of trust between actors in society 
•  Institutional context of tenure rights, labour markets, common property 
•  Government policies on disaster mitigation, natural resource management, 
social protection and poverty reduction. 
 
When seeking to understand the conditions, which determine access to resources for 
coping and recovery for different socio-economic groups, the study builds on 
Bebbington (1999) who distinguishes between collective and individual aspects of 
access. The former is when the organisation of access to resources is 
institutionalised for the community or a larger group of households, while the latter 
depends on factors specific to the individual household. This is an important aspect 
in the study area, Hai Lang and A Luoi, where there is a high degree of collective 
organisation of access to resources.  The study looks especially at the role of the 
cooperatives and their role in mediating access to resources in Hai Lang, in 
particular for the poorer households.  
 
The resilience of the communities is explored and its relation to collective action in 
disaster response, as well as the strong role of the state in providing and coordinating 
resources. The study refers to Peter Evans’(1996) discussion of state-society 
synergy, which he argues is based on equitable distribution of resources and a strong 
state. The third factor in his theory, which is strong state-private relations, is 
complicated in the Vietnamese context. Such relations are more explicit in terms of 
state-household relations. There are however few private companies who are active 
locally in the area.  
 
For the discussion of state-society relations I also draw on theory and experience 
from Elinor Ostrom (1993), Michael Lipsky (1980) and Judith Tendler (1997) who   24 
highlight the relation between individual staff and the villagers as important in 
understanding the outcome of development actions. Tendler mentions trust and 
responsiveness as key factors. In her example from Ceará in Brazil the local staff 
enjoyed strong recognition of their actions. Tendler concludes that the extent to 
which government programs are able to combine social capital formation with the 
delivery of services is a strong factor behind the success of development efforts. The 
close interactions between staff and clients resulted in integration between state and 
civil society by making officials almost part of the communities. This echoes my 
experience of state-society relations in Hai Lang and A Luoi, where I argue that a 
high level of trust is prevalent, which influences collective action and enables 
effective disaster response. The above authors’ contributions are further introduced 
in 2.9 below, and discussed in chapter 7.5.  
 
The concept of ‘communities’ is sometimes used when referring to the villages in 
Hai Lang district and Hong Ha commune. The concept of community is problematic 
as it can give an impression of homogeneity of interests, conditions and relations. 
The analysis in the study acknowledges that there are such differences within the 
community, which can cause tension. The concept is still useful, for example when 
discussing the differences in vulnerability within a community. Here the emphasis is 
on the group of households rather than the village as a place.  
  
The particular vulnerability of the poor is prevalent through the whole thesis. 
Poverty and vulnerability are seen as strongly related. Hulme et al. (2001) discuss in 
terms of the 'transient poor', as distinct from the ‘chronically poor’. The former is 
when people fluctuate above and beneath the poverty line and occasionally dip into 
poverty due to an extreme decline in income. This distinction is important when 
looking at vulnerability to disaster. It is argued that government policies and local 
action in disaster response focused on the needs of the majority of the population 
who faced major losses and experienced hardship of the duration of one to three 
years. They can be said to be transient poor. The chronically poor were not given 
specific attention. The material suggests that the support systems were insufficient 
for the needs of the chronically poor households as they suffer from additional 
difficulties, not only the floods disaster. The prevalence of such ‘additional 
difficulties’ makes it necessary to discuss recovery from disaster in a broader context 
of poverty alleviation. 
 
2.2 The sustainable livelihoods framework 
 
The Sustainable Livelihoods framework was introduced by Chambers and Conway 
(1992). The perspective in this thesis lies close to Chambers’ definition of livelihood 
sustainability, which is ‘household capacity to recover from crises and shocks and to 
generate new activities in response to needs and opportunities. This capacity 
depends on the level of risk, household assets, the institutional structures and 
processes that provide the context for people’s livelihood’.  
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Chambers definition of sustainability thus emphasises resilience, i.e. the possibilities 
of households to 'bounce back'. This agrees with the focus in this study on coping 
and recovery after disaster as a determinant of livelihood resilience. The assumption 
is that there is not a correlation between the level of damage and capacity to recover. 
People may be hard hit by the floods, but still have the capacity and institutional 
support to recover. On the other hand, smaller impacts may also have severe 
consequences for some people. The Sustainable Livelihoods framework does not 
suggest that recovery means continuing with the same livelihood activities as before 
the disaster. Scoones (1998) argues that the context, as well as people’s access to 
resources continuously changes, which requires capacity, as well as access to 
resources to adapt. The concept of adaptation is crucial also in the concept of 
resilience, which is discussed further in section 2.5.  
 
Scoones describes the SL framework as a tool for analysing the livelihood resources, 
institutional processes and livelihood strategies, which are important in enabling and 
constraining the achievement of sustainable livelihoods for different groups of 
people.  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.livelihoods.org  Institute of Development Studies. 
 
 
The thesis also emphasises the relation between household resources and 
institutional and organisational conditions. Scoones (and others) however tend to 
focus on household strategies to a higher degree than is done here. Instead of seeing 
household strategies as separate decisions based on the institutional environment, 
this study emphasises the integrated nature of household actions and the institutional 
environment. It is a characteristic of the study area that government policies and 
institutions have a major influence on household behaviour, which in many cases 
makes it difficult to distinguish the households’ own strategies from the context of 
community level strategies and state policies. This does however not mean that 
household responses are homogeneous. They differ between households depending 
on differences in institutional relations, access to resources and household capacities.    26 
 
The Sustainable Livelihoods approach has made a significant contribution to asset 
analysis (Scoones 1998), which is also used in this study to analyse the importance 
of different assets for coping and recovery, as well as the consequences of such asset 
use for building resilient livelihoods. The SL analysis divides household assets into 
5 types of 'capital', namely physical, financial, human, natural and social capital. 
Sometimes institutional and/or political capital are added as separate types of capital, 
at other times they are included in social capital. The three latter types of capital are 
related and can be difficult to separate conceptually.  
 
Twigg (2001) sees the potential for using the Sustainable Livelihoods approach for 
disaster risk reduction by paying attention to household livelihood assets and 
vulnerabilities in order to identify entry points for protecting those assets that are 
most at risk, or that could be most valuable in a crisis. Chapter 7 ties together the 
outcomes of the fieldwork to analyse the importance of different types of assets for 
coping and recovery. 
 
2.3 Disaster and Risk 
A hazard turns into a disaster if people are vulnerable.   
Hewitt (1997) distinguishes between disaster and hazard. In his definition it is the 
consequences of the hazard, which determines whether it becomes a disaster or not 
and for whom. The same magnitude of a hazard (floods, in this case) may have very 
different consequences depending on mitigation, preparedness and socio-economic 
factors influencing the losses and the capacity to recover. People have different 
capacities and possibilities to mobilise alternative resources to cope with the losses. 
To have a low level of such capacities make people vulnerable. A disaster is thus the 
combination of a hazard and vulnerable conditions of a population. A hazard does 
not in itself necessarily produce a disaster. (Hewitt, Twigg, Wisner and others).  
 
The research focuses mainly on the societal factors that influence vulnerability and 
resilience to flood-hazards. The focus on societal factors, as opposed to the extreme 
forces of nature is sometimes referred to as the 'structuralist paradigm', as opposed to 
the 'hazards paradigm' (Hewitt 1997). Hewitt's point is that there is not necessarily a 
relation between vulnerability and living in an exposed place. The biophysical 
exposure explains only a smaller part of how severely damaged people are by a 
hazard. Hazards are spread all over the world, but most deaths from disaster are in 
the developing world. A UNDP study (2004) found that 11 per cent of all people 
exposed to natural hazards live in countries with low human development index. 
They account for 53 per cent of disaster deaths.  
 
There are many definitions of disaster as discussed by Quarantelli (ed. 1998). Some 
imply damage to the society, loss of control and social breakdown. This did not 
apply to my study area. The Vietnamese society has the capacity to cope with crises. 
The flood damage was a disaster to many individuals and caused a lot of suffering, 
but as will be shown in chapter 5 and 6, it was not compounded by social 
breakdown.    27 
 
The UN/ISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) 
definition of disaster is "A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses 
which exceed the ability of the affected community or society to cope, using its own 
resources." 
 
The focus of this definition is on the community and society and its capacity to cope 
'using its own resources'. If 'society' refers to the area affected by the hazard, it is 
clear that there was a need for 'outside resources' to cope with the 1999 floods.  
'Coping with its own resources' is vague, as most communities even under 'normal' 
conditions have an interactive relation with the wider society, which includes 
dependency on resources from 'outside'. Compared to the capacity of the Vietnamese 
society as a whole, the disaster was relatively local in character and did not have 
disastrous consequences at a national level, which has been the case in other 
countries.
6 Vietnam received international aid in response to the 1999 disaster, but it 
was limited in comparison to the Vietnamese state funds for this purpose.  
 
There is no commonly accepted definition of what size of losses, injury or damage 
that constitutes a disaster. What people perceive as a disaster is mainly a subjective 
matter.  
 
As central Vietnam is a flood prone area, people live with the risk of crop losses as a 
constant threat. Disaster lies at the one end of a continuum of an ever present threat 
of bigger or smaller losses. Hewitt (1997) discusses the distinction between routine 
risk and extreme events. The former are integral, accepted, although feared, parts of 
everyday life. The latter are threats and levels of damage that can overwhelm whole 
communities. Consequences vary, however, for different people. A flood may be a 
disaster for some, but not for others.  
 
Risk 
Slovic and Weber (2002) distinguish between risk assessment and risk management, 
where the former involves identification, quantification and characterisation of risk. 
Risk management centres around processes of communication, mitigation and 
decision-making.  
Vatsa (2004) finds that in social science, the concept of risk is primarily concerned 
with the distribution of risky outcomes and its impact on the people who experience 
them. This study focuses on risk management issues rather than the discussion of 
frequency and probability of risky events.  
 
                                                           
6 IMF studies of disaster in Cambodia, Honduras and Zimbabwe found that disaster impacts included 
deterioration of fiscal accounts, along with the worsening of external trade balance, with loss of export 
earnings and higher imports of food and reconstruction material. Fiscal impacts also involved cuts in 
social spending, and post-disaster inflation on food prices. (White et al. 2004) 
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The ISDR definition of risk focuses on ‘probability’ i.e. ‘The probability of harmful 
consequences, or expected losses, resulting from interactions between natural or 
human-induced hazards and vulnerable conditions’. On the other hand the definition 
emphasises the relation to vulnerability, i.e. that risk is defined as a product of 
hazard and vulnerability (R=H x V). ‘Probability’ in this context has less to do with 
statistical analysis, and more to do with an understanding of vulnerability.  
 
Risk can be understood as subjective and socially differentiated (Miller 2003). 
Miller emphasises that it is crucial to recognize that risks may be either inherent to 
and exist within social systems, or can be created. It is important to consider the 
social contexts in which risks occur and that people therefore do not necessarily 
share the same perceptions of risk and their underlying causes. 
 
I subscribe to the view of risk as socially differentiated, and the need to analyse it in 
terms of communities at risk, while at the same time recognising the differences in 
risk within the community.  
 
People or their livelihoods may be at risk due to location of settlements and 
production, type of production and seasonality.  
Hewitt (1997) discusses the displacement of risk, where he identifies how actions at 
one scale can transfer the risk spatially to other scales or other segments of society. 
Transfer of risk is important when discussing water-related hazards like floods, since 
water moves, and efforts to protect one area is likely to move the water to other 
areas.  
 
Vatsa refers to Siegel (2000) regarding the discussion of household specific risks 
versus risks, which affect many households in a community or region 
simultaneously. The former are called idiosyncratic risks and the latter covariate 
risks. The covariation of risk depends on the size of the risk pool that the group of 
households can draw upon for assistance in management of the impacts of risk. The 
capacity to insure also depends on the size of the risk pool. The distinction between 
idiosyncratic and covariate risk is therefore largely contextual.  
 
2.4 Vulnerability 
Community or individual vulnerability? 
The ISDR definition of vulnerability focuses on the ‘community’. ‘The conditions 
determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or processes, 
which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards’.  
 
Discussing the vulnerability of communities, however, obscures the fact that the 
impact of the hazard is not evenly distributed. Even though the floods affected the 
whole population in certain areas, the impact differs depending on variation in 
vulnerability, also within communities.  
 
I look at the vulnerability of both the community and of the households. The 
definition of vulnerability by Wisner et al. (2004) includes both the individual and   29 
communities, where vulnerability is ‘the characteristics of a person or group and 
their situation that negatively influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist 
and recover from the impacts of a hazard’. It involves a combination of factors that 
determine the degree to which someone's life, livelihood, property or other assets are 
put at risk by a hazard. They stress that people are ‘vulnerable’, while assets are not. 
Assets are ‘at risk’.  
Wisner’s definition includes both the components of 'unsafe conditions' and reduced 
capacity of people to cope and recover from the consequences of the hazard. 
 
Is it people or situations that are vulnerable? 
The study follows the definition of vulnerability by Wisner et al. above. I emphasise 
that it is the situation that makes people vulnerable, rather than the characteristics of 
the household. As the situation of a household changes, its vulnerability may also 
change. I argue that the concept of vulnerability should not be used to 'label' people, 
but to specify what and how their livelihood situation is making them vulnerable.  
 
Hewitt (1997) distinguishes between exposure and susceptibility. The former is the 
degree to which people and resources are physically exposed, and the latter include 
the social, economic, political, psychological and environmental variables that 
intervene by producing different impacts among people with similar levels of 
exposure. In Hai Lang and A Luoi almost the entire population were exposed to the 
1999 floods, but their susceptibility to damage differed within the communities.  
 
The concept of susceptibility is close to the concept of vulnerability, but focuses on 
the impact, while the latter includes the capacity to cope and recover. Given a certain 
level of impact, households or communities still show differences in capacity to cope 
and recover. My material suggests that there is limited correlation between the 
impact of a hazard and a capacity to cope and recover. Susceptibility and 
vulnerability is not the same thing. 
  
The importance of distinguishing between exposure and vulnerability or 
susceptibility is given in Adger's (2001) study of the coastal district of Xuan Thuy, 
where the poor salt-makers are more vulnerable than the better-off aquaculture 
people, even though aquaculture is physically more exposed to hazards.   
 
Capacity to cope and recover is dependent on structural conditions, and is not merely 
a property of the individual household. The focus of this study is on the conditions 
that influence capacity to cope and recover, and how these ‘conditions’ become 
differentiating factors in creating vulnerability for different people.  
 
Structural vulnerability is analysed by Wisner et al. with the help of the ‘PAR 
model’, which stands for Pressure and Release. The model can be represented as 
follows:  
Root causes Æ Dynamic pressures Æ Unsafe conditions Æ Disaster  Å Hazards 
 
'Unsafe conditions' include things like lack of information, risk-prone location of 
production etc. The PAR model is a way to structure and identify the causes behind   30 
the unsafe conditions that make people vulnerable. They trace the unsafe conditions 
back to what they call dynamic pressures and root causes. These must be addressed 
in order for the pressures causing disaster to be ‘released’, i.e. removed. They do 
however acknowledge the difficulties in establishing evidence of causal connections 
in practice. As many factors are involved in giving rise to unsafe conditions, it may 
be difficult to single out the ones to address. The PAR model focuses on the 
systemic pressures contributing to vulnerability. It does not provide insights into 
what constitutes vulnerability at household level. This is instead done in the ‘access 
model’. That model focuses on the level of access to resources as a determinant of 
vulnerability, and which may turn a hazard into a disaster for some people. The 
access model is further commented on below. 
 
Vulnerable livelihoods 
The Sustainable Livelihoods framework portrays vulnerability as an external factor, 
which threatens the livelihood conditions of the household.  In the terminology used 
in this study, it is the hazard which is an external factor, while vulnerability is a 
characteristic of the household in their context. I agree with Pain and Lautze (2002) 
who argue that the conventional livelihoods framework is inadequate for analysing 
vulnerability because it treats it as an external factor, rather than linking people’s 
livelihoods (e.g. assets levels) to their vulnerability. Wisner et al. (2004) conclude 
that most people who are vulnerable are so because they have livelihoods which lack 
resilience in the face of shocks. A vulnerable livelihood becomes the opposite of a 
sustainable livelihood. It lacks resilience to shocks because it may not provide 
enough to live on, may lead people into hazardous places, or be embedded in 
exploitative social relations (ibid). Like this study also concludes, Wisner et al. 
observe that health and resilience are closely related.  
 
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of 
living (Chambers and Conway 1992). A livelihood is specific to a certain household, 
but is closely related to the context. I see the concept of ‘vulnerable livelihoods’ as 
an important supplement to the understanding of people’s vulnerability because of 
its focus on the dynamic (not static) aspects of being vulnerable.  
 
The time dimension is important in vulnerability analysis. The consequences of a 
hazard may produce an impact on the household livelihood conditions immediately, 
gradually or after some time. New vulnerabilities may also be born out of the 
inadequate coping and recovery after a disaster. Davies and Hossain (1997) stress 
that vulnerability to hazards needs to be understood as a downward spiral of 
increasing vulnerability rather than one-off events. Repeated stress undermines the 
resources, which would normally be reserved for any unusual stress/disaster.  
 
Adger (2001) discusses vulnerability as divided into individual and collective 
vulnerability. Individual vulnerability is determined by access to resources, the 
diversity of income sources and social status within the community. The collective 
vulnerability of a social grouping is determined by institutional and market 
structures, such as formal and informal social security and insurance, infrastructure 
and income. Adger recognises that individual and collective vulnerability overlap   31 
and can be difficult to separate analytically.  Institutional- and market structures, for 
example, also result in differences in vulnerability within the community/collective.  
 
In chapter 7 the relation between individual and collective vulnerability is discussed 
from the perspective of access to resources, which is seen as crucial in understanding 
vulnerability. Bebbington (1999) discusses collective and individual aspects of 
access. The former is when the organisation of access to resources is 
institutionalised for the community or a larger group of households, while the latter 
depends on factors specific to the individual household. The relation between 
individual and institutionalised access and capacity to recover will be explored.  
 
To understand vulnerability it is important to understand the socio-economic and 
political processes that influence the distribution of resources under normal 
conditions, not only in the context of the hazard. Vulnerability is in fact created 
under normal conditions, but becomes explicit during disaster (Hewitt). Chapters 
four to seven deal with the disaster situation 1999 and the responses to it, while 
chapter eight discusses disaster mitigation, adaptation and efforts to reduce 
vulnerability more broadly.  
 
It was difficult to find an adequate translation of ‘vulnerability’ into Vietnamese. 
The expression ‘dễ bị tổn thương’ approximately means ‘easily hurt’, which is close 
to ‘susceptibility’. This concept was however not commonly used in the Vietnamese 
discussion. The expression ‘khả năng đối phó và khôi phục lại’, however, which 
means capacity to cope and recover was common. 
 
2.5 Resilience and adaptation 
 
The concept of resilience i.e. capacity to cope with and recover from stress and 
shock can be seen as the opposite of vulnerability. The concept also includes 
capacity to adapt in order to reduce vulnerability and susceptibility to future hazards. 
Authors use it in different ways. Chambers and Conway (1992) defines it as ‘the 
access to assets or social support systems that carry you through periods of 
adversity’. Smith (1992, in Wisner 2004) defines resilience as 'the rate of recovery 
from a stressful experience, reflecting the social capacity to absorb and recover 
from the occurrence of a hazardous event'. White et al. (2004) elaborate on this 
definition by reflecting on the distinction between the concept of capacities, as 
attributes of individuals and households, while resilience also includes a favourable 
institutional environment. Resilience in that perspective is the coming together of 
capacities with the social, institutional and informational resources that enable their 
effective use.  
 
The ISDR definition emphasises resilience as a property of a system, which is able 
to adapt and reorganise in order to better cope with future hazards. ‘Resilience is 
determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to 
increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and 
to improve risk reduction measures’.    32 
 
This interpretation is very similar to the way the concept is used in the systems-
ecology discourse. There is a school of thought about resilience as a property of 
systems, both ecological and social. The 'school' has a network called 'the resilience 
alliance'. Brian Walker et al. and Carl Folke et al. (2002) define resilience as: 
‘Maintaining the functionality of a system, when it is disturbed’. ‘Maintaining the 
elements needed to renew or reorganise the system, to maintain its main functions’. 
In this discourse vulnerability is the flip side of resilience. When a system loses 
resilience it becomes vulnerable to change that previously could be absorbed. (ibid) 
 
When Folke et al. analyse socio-ecological resilience their main focus is on the 
ecological system. They recognise the interaction with the social system however, 
which influences the resilience of the ecosystem and its capacity to provide 
ecosystem services. The interest in 'outcomes' concentrates on the ecosystem rather 
than the social system. My approach is the other way round. The study focuses on 
the social context, while recognising that it is dependent on the ecological system.  
 
The resilience of households and communities is discussed in terms of their capacity 
to 'bounce back', which includes coping, recovery and reorganisation in order to 
maintain crucial functions of the livelihood and society.  
 
Adger et al. (2000b) uses the concept social-ecological resilience in order to analyse 
factors determining the resilience of social systems in response to ecologic change. 
They express ambivalence however, regarding the use of the concept of resilience 
transferred from the ecological sciences to apply it to social systems, as there are 
essential differences between socialised institutions and ecosystem behaviour.  
 
The concept of adaptation and learning in social systems, as used by Folke et al. 
(2002) is valuable to the present discussion. They discuss factors that support the 
development of management strategies that support resilience. Such factors include 
characteristics of both the social and ecological system e.g. diversity of species and 
economic options that maintain and encourage adaptation and learning. Folke et al. 
see four critical factors required for dealing with natural resource dynamics; learning 
to live with and take advantage of change; nurturing diversity; combining different 
types of knowledge and creating opportunity for self-organisation. Diversity is seen 
not just as an insurance against uncertainty. The mix of experiences helps people 
cope with change and facilitates innovation following disturbances and crises. Folke 
et al. refer to others like Sheffer et al. 2000 who have expressed it as fostering 
'institutions and networks that create flexibility in problem solving and balance of 
power among interest groups'.  
 
Adaptation does not always increase resilience however. Folke et al. mention 
examples where people have invented ways to adapt to the reduced options in the 
development of the agriculture system, leading to the masking of land degradation 
and vulnerability. 
 
Adger sees a strong linkage between adaptive capacity and resilience, both at a 
household level and in society. Low resilience includes the meaning that adaptive   33 
options are limited. Social vulnerability and resilience are seen as determined by a 
host of complex social processes and economic factors, from access to resources 
through informal and formal social security, insurance and social capital. In essence 
these determinants are related to the concept of entitlements and access of 
individuals and groups to resources for adaptation (ibid).  
 
The institutions that influence access to resources for adaptation are crucial. 
Adaptation and flexibility requires control over resources. Chapter eight discusses 
adaptation and the institutions involved in regulating access to natural resources.  
 
Adger and Kelly’s (1999) study of vulnerability to climate variability and hazards 
aims at the identification of adaptive strategies to enhance resilience, recognising 
that society is continually responding to environmental stress and evolving 
responses. According to Adger, the responses to long-term environmental change 
are facilitated and constrained by the same structure of entitlements as adaptation to 
other, more immediate social and environmental issues. Adger and Kelly focus on 
short-term climate hazards and extremes (floods and drought etc) as it is these events 
that people first and foremost experience and react to. Extreme events are 
particularly important as triggers for adaptation. This agrees with my experience in 
Hai Lang and A Luoi, where I find that adaptation to disaster, climatic stress and 
institutional change are integrated and difficult to distinguish between.  
 
Davies (1996) distinguishes between positive and negative adaptation. Positive 
adaptation she argues is by choice, can be reversed and is concerned with risk 
reduction. Negative adaptation is of necessity, tends to be irreversible and frequently 
fails to contribute to a lasting reduction in vulnerability. Negative adaptation is a 
result of people no longer being able to cope with shocks, which forces them to 
fundamentally alter the ways in which they subsist. In chapter eight on adaptation, it 
is discussed to what extent people are ‘forced’ to adapt by the circumstances and to 
what extent they take initiatives ‘in advance’ in order to avoid future stress.  
 
2.6 Capacity to cope and recover 
 
Wisner et al. (2004) draw our attention to the fact that reports of 'recovery' often 
concern a community or region, yet this may not mean that all households have 
recovered. The households selected for interviews in Hai Lang and A Luoi had all 
suffered large losses, either they were better-off, middle-income or poor households. 
Their possibilities to cope and recover, however, were different.  
 
The ISDR definition of coping capacity is: ‘The means by which people or 
organizations use available resources and abilities to face adverse consequences 
that could lead to a disaster." The definition has a close relationship to resilience. 
"The strengthening of coping capacities usually builds resilience to withstand the 
effects of natural and human-induced hazards’. 
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I use the term coping for the emergency actions conducted by people and 
organisations in order to solve the immediate and basic needs after the floods. 
Capacity to recover concerns the medium-term perspective and involves regaining a 
similar level of livelihood conditions compared to before the disaster. The livelihood 
activities are not necessarily the same as before. Actions aimed at coping may in 
some cases undermine the possibilities of recovery, for instance the sale of 
productive assets or becoming indebted.  
 
Access to assets 
Start and Johnson (2004) stress the importance of assets for coping, especially those 
that are easily convertible into cash to solve urgent needs. Moser (1998) also sees 
assets as the primary factor in determining vulnerability and resilience, but she sees 
assets in the broader perspective of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, were 
assets can be physical, natural, financial, social, institutional or human resources. 
My material suggests that in the study area the important types of assets are not 
necessarily those that can be sold, but rather ones that can provide a small daily 
income during the critical period until regular sources of income and food security 
are re-established. Such assets may be the access to land and forest for emergency 
production and collection of minor forest products, as well as access to labour 
opportunities. The concept of access therefore becomes central. As people lose 
assets in a hazard their recovery is dependent on the renewed access to the resources 
that were lost or other resources which can fill similar livelihood functions. 
Bebbington (1999) argues that the concept of access is related to having the social 
and institutional relations and human capital to rebuild assets. 
 
White et al. (2004) stress that both adequate household assets and supportive social 
and governance relations are necessary for capacity to cope and recover. The study 
focuses on the institutional structures for access to resources that result in different 
types of access for different groups of people.  
 
Wisner et al. also see the concept of access as crucial in understanding vulnerability 
and capacity to recover. They use the 'access model', which helps to analyse the 
access that people have to capabilities, assets and livelihood opportunities that may 
enable them to reduce their vulnerability. The 'access model' focuses on the role and 
agency of people, the impacts of hazard on them and how they cope, develop 
recovery strategies and interact with other actors. The focus is on the individual, but 
the model acknowledges that individual decisions are made in a socio-economic 
environment, which is discussed in the two 'boxes' of 'social relations' and 'structures 
of domination'. There is also a 'box' called 'social protection', which represents the 
hazard precautions and preparedness that is provided by the state and local collective 
action.  
 
The 'access model' provides a useful overview of the factors that are important for 
coping and recovery. Similar to the livelihoods analysis, the focus is on the agency 
of the individuals and households. This can be difficult to analyse in the Vietnamese 
context, where I found the strategies of households, local organisations and local 
government to be closely interwoven. Many of the initiatives in disaster response lay   35 
at the level of local government. The conditions of the households however differ in 
terms of livelihood base, wealth, health, social position etc., which result in different 
capacities to recover.  
 
Coping is influenced by major changes in society 
Coping capacity is influenced by the social or economic changes in society. 
Traditional coping mechanisms may no longer successfully mediate risk. Some 
'traditional coping strategies' disappear and new ones emerge. Adger (2001) looks at 
the institutional structure in Vietnam under change. Areas where previously the 
family and kinship networks were most important may today be replaced by formal 
institutions and organisations for coping and recovery. The trends are also the other 
way around. Whereas the market economy increasingly replaces the village 
cooperatives and local government as responsible for the well-being of the citizens, 
the dependency on family and kin networks have increased, according to Adger. 
This is also the experience in this study. 
 
The transition to market economy implies that government services, which were 
previously free, are now paid by the user. Health care and education fees are 
significant costs to the household. Poor households (with ‘poverty cards’) have a 
reduction in fees, but costs can still be high. The interview results suggest that health 
costs can be a significant differentiating factor for household capacity to cope with 
shocks. 
 
Including risk reduction in the recovery process?  
Recent thinking is that the concept of recovery should also include mitigation in 
anticipation of future hazards. White et al. describe recovery as a spiral of learning 
from the disaster, leading to adaptation and modification of development, rather than 
merely a reconstruction of pre-existing conditions, which often were part of the 
conditions which lead to disaster in the first place. The relation between relief, 
rehabilitation, recovery and development is further discussed in the following 
section. 
 
2.7 Disaster response and development 
 
The Vietnamese expression ’Living with the floods’ has long been used to signify 
the ambition to build a society and livelihoods, which are (reasonably) resilient in 
the context of frequently occurring floods and seasonal crises. The meaning differs 
in the different parts of the country, as the character of the floods and risk varies. 
 
After the 1999 floods in central Vietnam and the 2000 floods in the Mekong delta, 
the policy discussions on how to reduce disaster risk increased. The floods cause 
high costs to society in lives lost and property destroyed, both individual and 
collective. Apart from the impact on the affected communities themselves, Benson 
(1997) draws attention to the fact that disasters also have macro-economic 
development impacts through damage to infrastructure, production and human   36 
capital, and may have long-term effects on productivity and growth through loss of 
tax revenues, diversion of resources into disaster response and price inflation. The 
mobilisation of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction take large resources away 
from development. Recent studies suggest that both governments and donors tend to 
finance disaster relief and rehabilitation by reallocating resources from development 
programmes (Benson 1997 and White et al. 2004). In Vietnam there have long been 
efforts for protection against floods through infrastructure. Such development is not 
uncomplicated. There are trade-offs to be made, as investments in protective 
infrastructure may have 'side effects', e.g. the transfer of the water to other areas, and 
high costs of repair if structures are frequently destroyed. On the other hand, 
infrastructure can be very cost-effective e.g. in Bangladesh where Oxfam estimated 
the value of cattle saved by a flood shelter during the 1998 floods at almost twenty 
times the shelter's construction costs. (White et al. 2004)  
 
Christoplos et al. (2004) stress the need to analyse the extent to which different relief 
and development activities themselves impact on risk and vulnerability. A common 
critique against relief and rehabilitation interventions is that they imply the 
reconstruction of pre-existing systems, thereby risking the rebuilding of a livelihood 
context which continues to be vulnerable and exposed. Instead the crisis could be 
seen as an opportunity to introduce policy changes and institutional reforms to 
sustain recovery and establish rural livelihoods and institutions that are better 
equipped to deal with risk (ibid). In a later discussion paper however, Christoplos 
(2006a) cautions us that there are many constraints against actively implementing 
disaster risk reduction in the immediate recovery phase of a disaster. The urgency of 
reconstruction may be difficult to combine with the political decision making 
process about disaster risk reduction, which needs time.  
 
Policies for risk reduction and development that may influence vulnerability are 
discussed in chapter eight. To what extent was the flood disaster in the case of 
Vietnam just a temporary break in a development process, which has since then 
caught up in a similar way? And to what extent have development strategies been 
altered as a consequence of the disaster? It is clear that the latter has influenced 
socio-economic and political processes and given rise to new ideas and priorities and 
has perhaps also shifted relations in control of resources.  
 
'Relief' has been criticised for not addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability 
(Twigg 2001). This has given rise to debates on the need to link humanitarian relief, 
rehabilitation, social protection and development in a more coherent way. 
'Developmental relief' is a concept articulated by the Red Cross, which received 
broad attention in the late 1980’s. This expresses a broad-based and sustainable 
approach to post-disaster work with focus on participation, accountability, 
decentralised control, sustainable livelihoods and the needs and capacities of the 
survivors and local institutions. The focus is not only on the immediate humanitarian 
needs but also on restoring livelihood assets and rebuilding livelihoods. (World 
Disasters Report 1996 cited in Twigg 2001).  
 
Christoplos et al. (2004) cites Macrae (1998) criticising the trend towards 'loading 
relief with development objectives' on the grounds that it is unrealistic and   37 
ultimately compromises core humanitarian principles. Christoplos et al. conclude 
that the focus should rather be on working towards a greater integration and 
coherence in terms of overall objectives, so that relief and development can mutually 
reinforce each other. In his evaluation of the tsunami response, Christoplos (2006b) 
finds that most aid actors have demonstrated a limited understanding of what kinds 
of interventions may eventually prove sustainable with respect to livelihoods, 
community development and resource management. Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 
(1994) argue that: ‘Better development can reduce the need for emergency relief and 
better relief can contribute to development. Better rehabilitation can ease the 
transition between the two’. 
 
Lewis (1999) ties together the concepts of vulnerability, recovery and development 
by arguing that the condition of a person, structure or community before a disaster 
has significant bearing on the capacity to recover. Disaster mitigation and 
development thus come closer together conceptually.  
 
The relief and development debate has led to a changing understanding of disasters 
as more than short-term crises, and has shifted the focus from saving lives to include 
the need to save livelihoods. The World Food Programme is now emphasising social 
sustainability, which means that social structures will have to be strengthened 
allowing people to rebuild their livelihoods with more independence and resilience 
to future crises (WFP 1998 cited in Christoplos et al. 2004). Christoplos et al. find 
that the concept of resilience may be useful in finding ways of supporting local 
efforts for rehabilitation. Long-lasting impacts can be achieved where intervention 
strategies enhance resilience through strengthening local livelihoods and enhancing 
assets.  
 
Christoplos et al. (2006a) suggest that an increased attention to the possible 
synergies between social protection and livelihood promotion is a potential means 
towards achieving greater convergence of purpose across relief and development. 
Social protection is concerned with the ways in which individual or household 
resilience to adverse events can be strengthened. Livelihood promotion involves 
measures to encourage pro-poor growth and social equity. 
 
The relation between social protection and livelihood promotion is discussed in 
section 8.7. In the disaster response after the 1999 floods there was a major 
government effort to ensure that production was not disrupted, at least concerning 
rice production. This puts focus on the relation between ‘saving production’ and 
‘saving livelihoods’. 
 
2.8 Poverty and vulnerability 
 
According to the World Bank, one third of the population in Vietnam were poor in 
2002. If the households who are ‘near-poor’ (within 10 per cent above the poverty 
line) are included, the figure is 45 per cent (Conway and Turk 2002). In the 
discussion of vulnerability it is relevant to include the ‘near-poor’ as they risk falling   38 
below the poverty line as a consequence of shocks to the household economy. 
Conway and Turk stress the importance of social protection to avoid that people 
again fall below the poverty line.  
 
The Vietnamese government (MOLISA
7) specifies vulnerable groups as invalids 
incapable of work, elderly without relatives, orphans etc. These are groups with 
clearly reduced labour capacity. According to Conway and Turk (2002) there is a 
lack of policies designed to address the more general vulnerability of much of the 
population to experience a fall in their income and consumption. The ‘Poverty Task 
Force
8 led by the World Bank, puts the focus on a broader definition of vulnerability 
and on the importance of reducing risk for the majority of the population.  
 
When using the term 'the poor' in this study it refers to the households who are poor 
according to the local definition in the villages. Roughly this follows the formal 
government (MOLISA) criteria, which is an income below 155 000 VND/cap/month 
(10 USD) in Hai Lang district, and 100 000 VND (65 USD) in A Luoi district. This 
poverty line is lower than the one used by the World Bank, which is based on an 
expenditure of 1.79 million VND/cap/year. This is because the income based 
poverty line includes farm production consumed on-farm.  
 
Hulme et al. (2001) discuss in terms of the 'transient poor' as distinct from the 
‘chronically poor’. The former describes people who fluctuate above and beneath 
the poverty line and occasionally dip into poverty due to an extreme decline in 
income. This is a highly relevant distinction in understanding disasters and 
resilience.  
 
The relation between poverty and vulnerability is an issue of discussion by many 
authors. Vulnerability may lead to poverty and poverty may be a reason for 
vulnerability. Poverty and vulnerability tend to reinforce each other. In some 
respects it is a matter of the definition of vulnerability. If the focus is on exposure to 
hazard, almost the entire population in the flood-affected area are vulnerable. A high 
percentage of the population faced major losses and experienced hardship during the 
first year. In terms of exposure and losses the better-off are sometimes more 
vulnerable as they have more to lose. If the definition of vulnerability is interpreted 
as having difficulty in coping and recovering, the poor are more vulnerable, but not 
all in the same way. 
 
Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003) draw attention to factors that influence 
how poverty and vulnerability is perceived. The time- period over which 
vulnerability is assessed be it a season, a year or longer, has a major impact on 
conclusions.  Attention is often centred on level of income, which means a focus on 
private resources and omits social income, goods and services provided publicly like 
education and health.  
                                                           
7 Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
8 The report by Conway and Turk is a compilation of the results of work by the Poverty Task 
Force, led by the World Bank Vietnam and including the Vietnamese government, several 
donors and NGOs.    39 
 
Vulnerability as part of poverty 
Okidi and Mugambe (2002) as well as Hulme et al. find it useful to see vulnerability 
to shocks as an integral part of poverty itself. They suggest that vulnerability is one 
of the things that should be included when defining poverty levels. Dercon (2005) 
emphasises that the risk of becoming poor and the uncertainty about the ability to 
secure decent living conditions in the future are essential parts of the experience of 
poverty and well-being. He argues that one cannot discuss ‘capabilities’ and 
‘achieved outcomes’ in people’s livelihoods without recognising the risks involved 
while translating capabilities into outcomes.  
 
The concept of resilience becomes useful in order to understand the component of 
‘vulnerability’ in ‘poverty’. All poor households are not vulnerable. It depends on 
their resilience, i.e. the factors influencing their possibilities to cope with and 
recover from shocks.  
The factors we need to look at include relative risk of production losses; spread of 
risk; access to income for use in coping after loss of the main income; health status; 
sanitary conditions i.e. access to clean water and clean environment. 
 
2.9 Institutions and state-society relations 
 
A major focus of this study is to understand institutional conditions for resilience. 
Institutional conditions, which influence the household possibilities of shaping its 
livelihood is central in the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. Hobley (2001) 
discusses the ‘Policies, Institutions and Processes’ box in the SL framework. She 
refers to Goldman (2000) who includes organisations, services, incentives, rules of 
the game, power relations and processes such as decentralisation. Mehta et al. (1999) 
emphasise that institutions are both enabling and constraining. They discuss 
institutions as processual and dynamic and the product of social and political 
practices. Institutions are subject to continuous social interaction, negotiation and 
contestation comprising heterogeneous actors having diverse goals. Morrison et al. 
(2000) argue the importance of understanding institutional arrangements for access 
to key assets as critical for understanding people’s vulnerability.  
 
Following these perspectives I emphasise the understanding of institutions in 
society, focusing on relations in disaster response and development. This includes 
relations between state and society, the role of local organisations and the informal 
and formal structures in society that influence people’s access to resources. 
 
The formal institutions governing the relations between the state, local organisations 
and villagers play a large role in disaster response as well as in ‘every day’ 
development processes. Informal institutions like the family networks, relations 
between rich and poor farmers, money-lending and the use of common property 
resources are however also important. Christoplos et al. (2006a) remind us to 
maintain an awareness of the importance of the informal institutions during efforts to   40 
strengthen formal institutions. It must also be recognised that some informal 
institutions may serve to reinforce rather than alleviate structural vulnerability.  
 
A major part of the international discourse concerning humanitarian assistance 
(relief) and rehabilitation focuses on the role of international organisations and 
NGOs. Critique against the role of these organisations suggests that support 
frequently tends to be uncoordinated, partly irrelevant to local needs and may 
undermine local informal systems of coping (e.g. Christoplos 2006b). In Vietnam 
the main actors in humanitarian response and rehabilitation, apart from the 
households themselves are the state and local organisations. The issues discussed 
here are therefore partly different compared to the international discourse. The 
organisations involved in the relief and rehabilitation work after the 1999 floods in 
Vietnam were the same as for the ‘normal’ work of service provision and 
coordinated under local government. The issues of disaster response therefore relate 
also to how ‘normal’ local development structures function. Christoplos (1996) 
emphasises that the role of different actors in the context of disaster must be 
understood as part of the ongoing process of construction of the relation between 
organisations and villagers in development.  
 
Vietnamese society is undergoing major changes. Since the start of the market-
oriented reforms in 1986 the division of responsibility between state, village and 
houeholds is changing, which also impacts on roles in disaster response. I discuss 
these changing roles and responsibilities, especially those of the cooperatives and the 
village level organisations.  
 
Structural changes in Vietnamese society lead to a decreasing role of the state and 
the collective as responsible for the welfare of the individual, to a society in which 
family and kinship networks have a larger role in providing social safety nets. The 
development direction however involves both increasing and decreasing cooperation 
at the same time. More intensive agriculture production has increased the 
interdependencies between people, especially in matters of water control and 
cropping cycles. As the thesis suggests, the responsibility of society for the welfare 
of all citizens is reinforced in disaster response. Quarantelli (1978) has studied 
community responses to disaster, such as floods, and found that emergent 
organisation is much more common than social chaos, and that altruism is more 
common than selfishness. 
 
The thesis draws on work by Peter Evans (1996) and Elinor Ostrom (1996) and their 
argument relating to state-society synergy. It also draws on the work of Judith 
Tendler (1997) about 'good governance'. Lipsky (1980) provides an approach to 
understanding the role and behaviour of the individual members of staff in 
government services and their relations to clients. These relations, as Lipsky argues, 
heavily influence the implementation and outcome of government policy. 
 
The above authors have in common the emphasis put on the relations between 
government staff and their clients, in the case of this study, the villagers. They all 
stress the importance of recognition of the actions of the staff, both from below and 
above, and trustful relations between staff and villagers are regarded as vital in   41 
achieving positive results in development. Both Ostrom (1996) and Morrison et al. 
(2000) make the point that transaction costs, risks and scope for opportunism are 
reduced by building up personal relations, knowledge and long-term co-operation 
between staff and clients.  
  
Evans analysis of state-society synergy emphasises how government and 
communities can actively enhance each others' developmental efforts. Synergy is 
most often fostered in societies characterized by egalitarian social structures and 
robust, coherent state bureaucracies, characteristics which apply to the study area. 
Evans points to the norms and loyalties that develop in the process of day-to-day 
public-private (household) interactions. This provides a frame for the understanding 
of the interactions between government staff, local organisations and villagers in this 
study.  
 
Evans refers to Lam's (1996) work on Irrigation Associations in Taiwan, in which he 
concludes that “the dense network of social relationships which exist among IA staff 
and IA members is the key to the system's effectiveness at the local level”. The 
experience of these authors agrees with how I understand relations between staff and 
villagers in Hai Lang and A Luoi. The high level of integration of government staff 
in the communities provide conditions for collective action, which became useful 
especially in the situation of disaster response.  
 
The relations of trust in staff-citizen relations, however, are not unproblematic. 
Lipsky suggests that such relations may lead to favourisation of some clients over 
others. The district level staff have to develop ways of coping with the fact that 
needs are inevitably greater than the time and capacity which has been allocated. 
Personal relations are important in determining which people actually access 
government services in practice. The staff get greater job satisfaction from working 
with people they know and trust, which means that they focus on a few relations and 
hope that they in turn spread the work. The functioning of the community in terms of 
spreading information and access to resources is crucial. I discuss the role of the 
village leaders, the cooperatives and mass organisations from this perspective.  
 
Lipsky however also sees the problem that government staff tend to deal with clients 
on a mass basis. Ideally staff should respond to individual needs but in practice this 
is not possible given the time constraints. They therefore tend to categorise people, 
which has large influence on these people’s lives. I discuss the differences in access 
to resources under emergency conditions and the following phases of rehabilitation 
and recovery. The material shows that access to resources, especially for the poor, is 
to a large extent dependent on provision through local government and local 
organisations, and so is influenced by staff-client relations. This agrees with 
Bebbington (1999) who accentuates the importance of different types of 
relationships for access in the institutional context of state, market and civil society. 
Bebbington’s experience from the Andes suggests that the medium-sized farms 
access resources through the market and kin networks, while small producers 
depend more on formal and externally supported access to knowledge, credit, 
irrigation, markets etc.  
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Ostrom (1993) points out that the experience of cooperatives can be a possible 
institutional arrangement to avoid adverse selection processes, i.e. that service 
organisations focus on the better-off. The cooperatives can be an institution, which 
can even out the costs of involving different groups, and thereby being inclusive of 
the poor. This agrees with the situation in Hai Lang, where I argue that the 
cooperatives increase access to resources for the poor. Ostrom et al. stress the 
positive aspects of an accountability structure in which staff are paid by and 
responsible to the farmers. Employer and employee thereby have similar stakes in 
the proper performance of the tasks. Ostrom et al. also argue that adaptability and 
capacity for coping with changes and crises are greater with local control of 
resources. I discuss whether the cooperatives and local organisations in Hai Lang 
and A Luoi contribute to resilience in this respect.    43 
3. Empirical background 
 
This chapter gives a background to the context of floods in Vietnam and the policy 
environment concerning disaster risk reduction and poverty alleviation. The study 
villages and districts are introduced along with the livelihood conditions in the area.  
 
3.1 Living with Floods  
 
Vietnam has 'always' been flood prone and has a long history of coping with floods. 
The 1999 flood disaster attracted a lot of attention in Vietnam. It is called the 
'century floods', being considered the biggest during the 20th century.  
 
Every year there are several heavy storms affecting different parts of Vietnam. Only 
a small percentage of the floods and storms turn into disasters, but many of them still 
cause damage to infrastructure and hardship for the population affected. 
 
Some rainstorms are mainly a threat to production. All through history the state and 
communities have struggled to build and reinforce dike systems to protect the fields 
against flooding. Other rainstorms are a threat to people's homes, villages and cities. 
Some major cities have dike protection. Hanoi is dependent on a substantial dike 
system protecting it against the Red River, which runs through the city. For most 
residential areas, the cost of dike protection would be too high. Towns like Tuyen 
Quang in the northern mountains have to endure the town being flooded every three 
or four years, and people having to move up to the second floor of their own, or their 
neighbour’s house. Hai Lang district town lies on higher land and the houses were 
only slightly flooded during the 1999 floods when all the land around it was under 
water.  
 
It is not feasible to build dikes against major floods like the one in 1999. Dike 
protection in Hai Lang is mainly a concern regarding the reduction of the seasonal 
flood risk during the cropping season, which people struggle with every year. The 
large autumn floods overflow the dikes, which is normally not a problem, but 
combined with storms creating strong waves, the dikes can be damaged, causing 
costly repairs. During the autumn floods the dikes may constrain the drainage to the 
sea, which causes the water to rise higher than it otherwise would have done. Dike 
construction in this area is therefore a balance between mitigating the frequent 
seasonal risk and the rarer disaster risk. 
 
The history of flood mitigation in Vietnam 
A major part of Vietnam is exposed to floods caused by heavy rains and storms. 
Because of population increase more people have settled in areas which previously 
may have been considered too prone to flooding to be secure for habitation and 
production. Development of dikes and drainage facilities has gradually expanded the   44 
areas under settlement and cultivation, first in the Red River delta, in the central 
coastal zone and then in the Mekong delta.    
 
The state and the community have always had responsibility for protecting society 
and individuals against floods. Luttrell (2001) refers to authors like Le Thanh Khoi 
(1955) and Phan Khanh (1984) in her overview of the Vietnamese relation to floods 
in history. According to these authors the Emperor was ultimately responsible for 
protecting the people and agriculture from natural hazards and disasters otherwise 
the people had the full right to rebel. Mid-eighteenth century village regulations on 
communal works for flood protection were very harsh. According to Khoi and 
Khanh destruction of dikes was punishable by death and commune authorities held 
responsible for dike failure suffered corporal punishment.   
 
Flood and storm protection is still an important part of state responsibility. The battle 
against the cyclones and storms is thoroughly ingrained in the Vietnamese psyche. 
Institutions for this purpose have widespread support, commitment and legitimacy 
(Cecilia Luttrell 2001). Today the pressure is more social and political, rather than 
the harsh punishments for failure in history. A commune leadership which fails in 
the management of the dikes and in flood protection cannot count on being re-
elected, as the pressure in this case would come both from both high and low in the 
political hierarchy, according to staff in Hai Lang district.  
 
Recent changes along with market reforms 
Adger (2001) draws attention to how in some areas of the country,  the expansion of 
the market economy has meant less power of commune leaders in organising 
community labour efforts, which has given rise to situations where the communal 
system of dike-repair and maintenance has become problematic. Rambo (1995) has 
observed cases where individuals use the new possibilities to opt out of the 
centuries-old obligation to provide labour for communal works, and to pay substitute 
fee instead. This is often insufficient and undermines the maintenance system. 
Rambo reports cases where resources for maintenance have been diverted to other 
use. It would require significant financial resources to upgrade the dikes to make 
them less dependent on an abundant labour for maintenance. The reform process is 
in this respect threatening the capacity for disaster response because of erosion of 
collective action in some areas. The extent to which this is the case varies greatly 
between different areas. In my study area the practice of communal labour is still 
intact. The commune People's Committee and cooperatives maintain a strong role in 
the management and maintenance of the dike system. The changing relations 
between state and society and their impact for disaster risk reduction are discussed in 
chapter seven and eight.  
 
Has the number of disastrous floods increased? 
There have been a large number of disastrous floods during the history of the area. 
Duong Phuoc Thu (2000) has compiled a documentation of major floods in Thua 
Thien Hue province since 1361. All these floods caused damage with collapsed 
houses and erosion of land. In several cases the force of the water was such that it   45 
opened new river mouths to the sea. Most of the floods were in the autumn and 
connected with storms. The years marked in bold involved major loss of life.  
 
The floods occurred in the years 1361, 1403, 1467, 1497, 1504, 1627, 1629, 1665, 
1670, 1671, 1676, 1679, 1680, 1685, 1691, 1694, 1698, 1706, 1710, 1712, 1713, 
1726, 1728, 1730, 1735, 1738, 1740, 1774, 1796, 1810, 1811, 1820, 1825, 1826, 
1828, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1836, 1839, 1841, 1842, 1844, 1846, 1847, 1848, 1856, 
1864, 1867, 1876, 1878, 1880, 1882, 1887, 1894, 1897, 1904, 1953, 1964, 1975, 
1983, 1985, 1989, 1995, 1998, 1999.  
 
The flood in 1953 killed more than 500 people in Thua Thien Hue. In 1983 it rained 
1217 mm in two days, which was the highest rainfall so far during the 20
th century in 
Vietnam. 252 people were killed. In 1985, 840 people died. In 1995, 11 people died 
and in 1998, 25 people lost their lives. In 1999, the death toll in Thua Thien Hue 
province was 375. During the four days of storm it rained 2300 mm, which broke the 
previous record from 1983.     
 
According to Nguyen Ty Nien (2000) of the Central Committee for Flood and Storm 
Control, the number of deaths caused by natural disaster over the last 20 years in 
Vietnam has been 9896, of which 5894 have been in central Vietnam.  
 
Floods and the environmental context  
There is a widespread perception in Vietnam that storms have become more frequent 
and more serious with the ENSO phenomenon. ENSO stands for El Nino Southern 
Oscillation, which causes cycles of exceptionally wet and exceptionally dry weather, 
associated with periods of warming of surface water in the Pacific. Research 
suggests that floods and storms related to ENSO are increasing in frequency (Mc 
Guire et al. quoted in Wisner et al. 2004). There has been increased scientific 
understanding of ENSO as part of the world's climate system. The relation between 
ENSO and climate change however, has not yet been revealed in the modelling 
efforts (Glantz 2002 referred to in Wisner et al.). 
 
I will not go further into the discussion on the contribution of climate change to 
climate related hazards, except to say that the frequency of storms is taken seriously 
in the Vietnamese debate, irrespective of the discourse on climate change.  
 
There is a popular perception that the increasing frequency of flood hazards is 
related to deforestation. According to a recent report by the FAO and CIFOR
9 
(2005) there is no scientific evidence that deforestation is causing increased 
frequency of major floods. The report states that the frequency of major flooding 
events in Southeast Asia has remained the same over the last 120 years, including 
times when forests were still abundant. The report argues that forests can only play a 
role in reducing the impact of limited amounts of rainfall. In major floods after 
heavy rains the soil has become saturated and the capacity of the vegetation to hold 
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back the water is much reduced. Forest cover plays a role in preventing smaller 
landslides around a meter in depth, but also in this context the report cautions us 
from expecting trees to be able to hold the soil in major slides.  
 
Since around 1990, watershed protection and reforestation has been an active policy 
of the Vietnamese government, with the expected outcome of reducing the force of 
water flows and erosion. In the 1999 floods the force of the water still managed to 
uproot many hectares of trees and caused many landslides despite comprehensive 
forest cover.   
 
During the past decade flood hazards have also increased in Europe and North 
America. The failure of the rich countries to protect themselves against flood 
hazards, and the high damage costs involved, have partly shifted the policy debate 
on flood protection away from 'engineered' flood control measures, to modes of 
adaptation. An increased interest in a 'living with the floods' approach has emerged, 
with more attention paid to the balance between the costs and benefits of 'natural' 
floods compared to structural flood control. (Wisner et al. 2004) 
 
In the Vietnamese context of 'living with the floods', infrastructure protection is still 
an important component. In the Mekong delta the concept includes moving people to 
'residential clusters' on higher land, which is a strongly debated way of avoiding 
flood risk, as it causes social and economic difficulties for people who have to adapt 
to new conditions (Fforde 2003).  
 
Miller (2003) discusses, in her thesis on the political ecology of risk in the Mekong 
delta, the problem of increase in other types of risk when aiming to reduce flood risk 
through increased water control structures. She discusses how people have moved 
from a mainly adaptive approach to the floods to increased control through dikes and 
pump stations. There is a tension between flood protection by dike construction, and 
farmer need for the floods for soil improvement and fishing (ibid). In Hai Lang there 
is no such tension as the autumn floods are higher here and overflow the dikes. The 
important sedimentation of nutrients that comes with the floods is therefore 
maintained. Adaptation to the floods in this area would mean to go back to a 
cropping pattern of one harvest per year, which is not perceived as an option by 
people in the area.  
 
Policies and organisation for flood mitigation  
At the national level there is a ‘Committee for Floods and Storm Mitigation’ under 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. There are equivalent 
committees under the People’s Committees at all administrative levels. They are 
responsible for the planning and co-ordination of flood protection and disaster 
mitigation efforts. Every year there are several heavy storms affecting different parts 
of Vietnam. Monitoring and evaluation reports are prepared by all administrative 
levels after each storm season.  
 
The Vietnam Water Law 1998 is based on Integrated River Basin Management 
(IRBM) as a guiding concept, which is also a commonly used concept   47 
internationally Miller (2003). She discusses the tension between two principles 
within IRBM; the principle of planning and management of water on a basin scale, 
and the principle of management at the scale closest to the direct users of water (and 
watershed) resources and services. In her study of the Mekong delta she observes 
that there has been a scalar redistribution of decision- making authority on key 
aspects of water use, access and control from the household level to greater scales.  
She concludes that the process of institution creation in the water resources sector in 
the Mekong delta has directly challenged household decision-making authority. 
 
3.2 Policies for poverty alleviation and vulnerability reduction 
 
The poverty reduction plan in Vietnam is called the Comprehensive Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS 2002). The relation between poverty and 
disaster risk is recognised. The document states an ambition to reduce by half the 
number of poor people falling back into poverty due to disasters and other risks by 
2010. The CPRGS suggests an integrated approach that includes employment 
generation for the vulnerable, support for children of vulnerable families to attend 
school and the development of an Emergency Relief Fund. The definition of 
vulnerable groups is however not explicit. The National Strategy and Action Plan for 
Disaster Mitigation and Management (Govt of Vietnam 2001) explicitly calls for a 
larger integration between efforts for disaster risk reduction and poverty reduction.  
 
In the CPRGS, the poverty line is defined as an expenditure of 1.16 million VND 
per annum per person in 1993 and 1.79 million VND (128 USD) in 1998. Based on 
these poverty lines the poverty in Vietnam was reduced from 58 percent in 1993 to 
37 percent in 1998, and further to 29 percent in 2002.  In the North Central Coastal 
region, where Hai Lang and A Luoi districts are situated, the poverty rates are higher 
and have only decreased from 48 percent in 1998 to 44 percent in 2002, according to 
the Vietnam Development Report on Poverty (2003). A major reason for this is that 
this area is especially disaster prone as well as prone to frequent seasonal stress in 
the form of floods, drought, insect attacks etc. during the cropping season, which 
reduces the harvest and causes livelihood stress.   
 
The frequent occurrence of seasonal stress causes the CPRGS to put high priority on 
the development of irrigation and drainage structures in the central region. The 
CPRGS links policies for improved agriculture extension and the introduction of a 
wider range of financial services to the objectives of reducing vulnerability. 
 
The poverty reduction policies of the Vietnamese government are to a large extent 
concentrated in programs like the HEPR (Hunger Eradication Program) and Program 
‘135’
10 (Govt of VN 1998). The latter is a geographically based poverty program 
focusing on the poorest communes, which to a great extent are in the mountain 
areas. The purpose is to 'concentrate and focus policies and resources to areas where 
service capacity is low’ and to 'reduce the points of contact for local officials and 
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citizens in order to improve the outreach and access to services and other forms of 
assistance’. Hong Ha commune (one of the study communes) receives major support 
through this program.  
 
The HEPR targets poor people wherever they are. Poor people receive 'poverty 
cards', which for example entitles them to reductions in hospital costs and school 
fees. The distribution of poverty cards is however insufficient according to the 
Poverty report (World Bank 2003). Not all poor households receive poverty cards, 
as the allocation is based on pre-set quotas for the district. The process of deciding 
who will get poverty cards is not quite transparent.  According to the villagers and 
village leaders in Xuan Loc, there were 15 poor households, whereas only seven of 
them received cards. It was not clear to them why only these had been selected by 
the responsible district staff.  
 
Social security for people outside public employment and who are not war veterans 
is limited. MOLISA
11 figures from 1999 show that of the total government funds for 
social protection, 40 percent is support to the war invalids and the families of war 
heroes from the war of unification and another 40 percent are civil service pensions 
and other employment related assistance. The remaining 20 percent is assistance to 
the poor in various poverty alleviation programs (Conway and Turk 2002). The 
government has so called Social Guarantee Fund for regular social assistance to the 
elderly without relatives, orphans and invalids, but funds are limited. While nearly 
one million individuals qualify for assistance, only 20 per cent of these actually 
receive it (Conway and Turk 2002). There are also Emergency Relief Funds both at 
national and province level.  
 
A broader social security system is being discussed. The costs of the commitments to 
the war veterans are still so high that it is expected to take many years before a 
broader system can be implemented.  
 
3.3 Livelihood conditions in the study area 
 
Hai Lang district 
Hai Lang district lies in the southeast part of Quang Tri province, bordering to Thua 
Thien Hue province. It has around 100 000 inhabitants, and 16 300 households. The 
district stretches from the coast to the highland plains. It has 21 communes, of which 
two are fishing communes
12, five are hill land communes, one district centre, and 13 
are low land communes. 
 
The 17th parallel, which divided Vietnam between 1956 and 1975 runs 40 km north 
of Hai Lang district, which belonged to South Vietnam during the ‘American war’. 
The war was very intense in this area and Quang Tri province was devastated. The 
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former capital of Quang Tri was in ruins. Hai Lang district was deforested and large 
areas reduced to sand. The fields were impossible to cultivate for the first five years 
after the war. They had to be cleared from explosives in the ground and the bomb 
craters had to be filled with soil. There are still a few craters of 5-10 metres in 
diameter in the fields. All through the 1980s people were very poor. The 1990s 
coincided with the period of market reforms (đổi mới) and living standards gradually 
rose. In 1993 the paddy fields were formally allocated to individual households, 
although they had been cultivated individually in an informal way since around 
1990. The land tenure contracts are for 25 years, with an expectation of being 
extended. The contract can be inherited. People consider the land as their own, but 
the state maintains the formal ownership of the land.  
 
The economic base of most people in the district is paddy (wet rice cultivation). The 
hill land villages also have some paddy land, and some villages have access to 
additional paddy in arrangement with the low land villages. The economic base in 
the hill land villages is more diverse than on the low land and includes more garden 
crops, dry land crops and animal husbandry compared to the low land. 
 
Since the 1990s the state has invested heavily in the intensification of rice 
production with infrastructure for irrigation and drainage, new seed varieties and 
subsidised fertiliser. This has enabled people in Hai Lang to grow two crops of rice 
per year. Most people have enough own-grown rice for their yearly consumption and 
also have a surplus to sell. The profitability of rice is unstable. With increasing 
market liberalisation the output price of rice varies significantly between years, and 
also between months. Fertiliser subsidies have been removed. The frequent seasonal 
problems of heavy rains and drought ‘at the wrong time’ in the production cycle 
frequently cause reduced harvests. Rice production is still considered by most 
farmers as very important for food security. Many fields are not suitable for other 
crops than rice because of the wet conditions. As a consequence, the main effort of 
the local government and farmers in Hai Lang district (as in many low land areas in 
Vietnam) is to protect rice production with an expanding network of dikes, canals 
and pumps for drainage and irrigation purposes. As investments continue and 
production becomes more stable, the living standards are gradually rising.  
 
 
The differences between the poor and the better-off are growing all the same. The 
better-off are diversifying away from rice, and are developing e.g. trade, animal 
husbandry, and cultivation of the sandy areas. The latter can give a good income 
from e.g. melons and chilli, but requires a lot of investment in fertilisers and 
irrigation. 
 
 'Living with the floods' 
In general the standard of living is higher for the low land population than in the hill 
land villages and the mountains. 
 
The low land of Hai Lang district is highly exposed to inundation during the heavy 
rains, especially as the rivers do not flow straight to the sea but into the lagoon of the   50 
neighbouring province, Thua Thien Hue. Hai Lang district slopes from the sea 
inward, and the communes in the central part of the district are actually below sea 
level. There is a five meter high, man-made, sand dike protecting the fields and 
residential areas from the sea.  
 
There are normally heavy rains and storms in north central Vietnam during 
September to November. The low land area becomes inundated for a few days and 
water rises up into many houses, at times up to half a metre. People are accustomed 
to this type of floods. They are part of the production cycle on the low land and 
contribute valuable sediment with high nutrient content. Even so, people get worried 
if the floodwater drains slowly and the children have to stay away from school for 
too many days. There is also the worry of emergency health problems occurring 
during floods when transportation to the hospital is difficult.  
The area of Hai Thanh commune is the lowest lying land, the 'basin' of Hai Lang 
district. It is 0.5 m below sea level and the land slopes down to this area from all 
directions. According to the villagers, the first inhabitants of this area lived on rafts 
and boats and had no fixed investments which could be damaged. They grew one 
crop of rice per year of a low yielding, but flood tolerant variety. During the 15th 
century people from the northern provinces of Vietnam started settling in Hai Lang 
district and started the enormous project of draining the area to create more 
cultivatable land. Dikes were built to protect the crops against flooding. The settlers 
also cultivated one crop per year, which was harvested well in time before the 
autumn storms and floods. The area of Hai Thanh, however, was long considered to 
be too difficult.  
 
Floods during crop season can cause ‘small disasters’ for vulnerable 
households  
Nowadays all households have two crops of rice per year, but the cultivation 
schedule is tight. If there are heavy rains in January, the drainage capacity will 
determine the time of planting. A delay increases the risk of damage to the harvest 
by the heavy rains in May (tiểu mãn). Replanting of the second crop must be done 
quickly in order for farmers to be able to harvest in early September before the 
autumn storms.  Seasonal risk is thus part of the cropping pattern. Risk is decreased 
by the continuous investments in dikes and drainage systems, which enable farmers 
to protect the crop. It works more often than not, but during the period of my study, 
three out of nine harvests were reduced due to rains during the cropping season. 
Different households are dependent in various ways on the income from the rice 
crop. A bad harvest can be perceived by the individual household as a disaster if 
they have few alternative sources of income.  
 
I never heard the term ‘disaster’ (thiên tai) being used regarding the seasonal crop 
losses caused by heavy rains, drought or insect attacks on the growing crop. The 
word disaster seemed to be 'reserved' for the autumn flood storms, which also cause 
loss of life, destruction of houses and collective infrastructure. The threat of seasonal 
crop losses, however, is continuously present in people's minds. The status of the 
crop and the level of harvest is always a major subject of discussion, because it   51 
influences the everyday life to such a large extent. Many of the development policies 
and actions are also directed towards increasing the security of the rice crop.  
 
The fieldwork villages 
The three villages in Hải Lăng district selected for my fieldwork are Văn Trị village, 
low land; Phước Điền village, extreme low land; and Xuân Lộc village, hill land.  
 
Van Tri village, Hai Tan commune, has 221 households. Most of the families have 
paddy production as their main income while 23 households are fishermen (and 
women). It is a poor village compared to the other areas in the district. The 
geographical conditions are unfavourable. It is a low-lying area, close to a large 
river, frequently exposed to rains and flooding. Van Tri village has relatively little 
paddy area (40ha) compared to other villages on the low land, and little area for dry 
land crops (6 ha). They have pigs and poultry, and buffalo grazing on the grassland. 
The road that links them with other villages and markets is low-lying and gets 
flooded during several weeks every year. This makes the location of the village 
remote compared to other villages, which affects market access and prices. 
 
Phuoc Dien village, Hai Thanh commune, is the poorest village in the district 
according to district staff. It lies 0.5 meters below sea level and is therefore 
physically very exposed. As in Van Tri, the villagers are dependent on rice and 
animal husbandry. Many households in Phuoc Dien village have difficult living 
conditions despite having around one hectare of paddy land per household, which is 
double the average land holding per household in the district. Frequent seasonal 
stress reduces the harvest and they have little higher land for other types of crops. 
Having few other sources of income, apart from rice, makes their livelihood 
vulnerable. Around 40 percent of the families are poor, according to the local 
classification, as compared to 10-20 percent in the other communes. Many 
households were indebted even before the floods, some of it caused by incapacity to 
pay the production costs because of low harvest. Short-term migration occurs when 
people take part in the coffee harvest in Dak Lak province. Migration patterns are 
however constrained by the need for households to use all available labour for rice 
production. 
 
Xuan Loc village, Hai Chanh commune, lies on the gently sloping land along the O 
Lau river, below the hill plateau, which stretches 30 km to the west, and then rises to 
mountains. Xuan Loc village has an arrangement with My Chanh village, which 
gives them access to some paddy land on the low land, but not enough to meet all 
their consumption needs. They have more diverse sources of income from gardens, 
dry land crops, forest planting, minor forest products, pigs, buffalo and as day 
labourers. They are close to the major My Chanh market, which facilitates small 
trading. Many families in Xuan Loc village have sons and daughters who work in 
Ho Chi Minh City, as there are better income opportunities for the young in the 
south than in Hai Lang. They are often able to send back around 1 million VND (65 
USD) per year. The average income level is lower than on the low land in general, 
but higher than in Phuoc Dien village.  
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A Lưới district and Hồng Hạ commune  
A Luoi is a mountain district in Thua Thien Hue province bordering with Laos. The 
district town lies 75 km from Hue City. Hong Ha commune is on the road between 
Hue City and A Luoi town around 50 km from Hue. In 2000 Hong Ha commune had 
198 households and 1176 inhabitants
13. They belong to the ethnic minorities of Ca 
Tu, Ta Oi and Bru-Van Kieu. 60 percent are Ca Tu. A few Kinh (the majority people 
in Vietnam) people have moved to Hong Ha from the low land and have become 
residents. The commune was established in 1975 after the war, but many of the 
households come from this area originally. During the war they had been resettled in 
the forest close to the Lao border. When the Hong Ha households were resettled 
within the present commune boundaries, they were also subject to the government 
sedentarisation policies, which discouraged shifting cultivation and focused on wet-
land rice cultivation and permanent social infrastructure. Sedentarisation has been a 
government policy since 1968 in the northern mountains (resolution no.38/CP) and 
after 1975 it became a major part of the socio-economic policies also in the central 
provinces.  
 
A Luoi district was heavily deforested during the American war. Once the forest 
destruction had started, it continued both through logging by the government and 
illegal logging. For the last 15 years there have been intensive campaigns to replant 
and protect the forest, and the area of Hong Ha commune is today mostly covered 
with forest. There are also vast areas of imperata grassland, which are difficult to 
cultivate. Imperata is a grass with a tough root system, which tends to take over on 
deforested hills.  
 
The total area of Hong Ha commune is close to 19 000 hectares. 7800 ha is natural 
forest, 700 ha is planted forest and 136 ha are used for agricultural crops
14. People of 
Hong Ha commune used to practice shifting cultivation but after 1975 they have 
gradually changed to an emphasis on irrigated paddy production on flat land near the 
river. The main food crop is still cassava, which is also grown in the river valley. To 
a limited extent people still cultivate 'old' plots on the hill slopes. These are plots 
from the times of shifting cultivation, which have not been 'shifted' for many years 
and therefore have very low productivity.  
 
The head of the Agriculture Section, Mr Bui
15, explains that people do not have the 
capital or practice to pay for inputs in production. Their production system is 
dependent on having plenty of land. Now they have to produce in a very limited area 
with low productivity, which has resulted in hunger. 43 percent of the population in 
A Luoi are poor. According to Hong Ha commune People’s Committee there are 43 
chronically poor households in Hong Ha (out of 198 households) and in addition 54 
households who are hungry in the months before harvest
16.   
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Most of the area of Hong Ha commune is under the management of the Bo River 
Watershed Management Board under the province Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Development. According to household interviews many households do not 
invest in the land because the state is in a position to claim it for forest plantation 
with short notice. The commune Party Secretary confirms that people have little 
long-term relation to the development of the area because of the lack of household 
entitlement to the forest land
17.  
 
There have been a number of government campaigns to introduce cash crops, like 
cinnamon, sugarcane, pepper and pineapple, all of which were said to have failed 
due to insufficient markets. The latest campaign for planting rubber trees involves 
50 percent of the households in the commune.  
 
Hong Ha commune consists of five villages. The interviews focus on two of these, 
which are Pa Rinh village with 46 households and Con Tom village with 43 
households. All villages are situated along the river, and suffered similar problems in 
the floods. The two irrigation systems in the commune are located in the selected 
villages, and these were heavily damaged. Con Tom has better access to hill slopes 
for cultivation than Pa Rinh village, although access is limited in the whole 
commune. 
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4. Disaster  
 
When dealing with the impact of the disastrous floods of 1999 in A Luoi district 
(mountainous) and Hai Lang district (low land and hill land), the study is based on 
interviews with households, local organisations, the commune and district People’s 
Committee in May and October 2000. Before the actual fieldwork started, I visited 
Hai Lang more informally for two weeks in January 2000, which gave provisional 
impressions from a time when the floods were more recent. The interviews in May 
and October provided accounts of what had happened and of people’s perceptions of 
the disaster.  
 
The extent of the disaster and the impact on people's livelihood varies between areas 
and households. In part this variation comes from the differences in housing, 
production conditions and location, i.e. what Wisner et al. (2004) call 'unsafe 
conditions'. These are discussed in this chapter. The variation also depends on 
differences in capacity to cope and recover, which is the subject of analysis in the 
following chapter. 
 
4.1 The 1999 floods in historical perspective 
 
The 1999 flood hazard was called a ‘disaster’ (thiên tai) both by people in the 
affected area and nationally. Compared to other floods, the shock effect was 
enormous because of the unusually high water levels, which rose rapidly during the 
night, and the combination of strong winds. It was a humanitarian disaster in that so 
many people lost their lives and an economic disaster in terms of the high level of 
loss and damage.  
 
In central Vietnam the 1999 floods are called the 'floods of the century' and are 
regarded as the most severe hazard during the century. When compared with other 
major floods in history, some people felt that the floods in 1953 or 1983 were worse, 
even though the losses were smaller, because of the resulting food crises.  
 
An old man in the mountain commune Hong Ha, Mr Dam says: I am 69 years old. I 
have been living here all my life. The flood in 1953 was even bigger than last year’s 
flood. But in 1999 there were more landslides. In 1953 there was full forest cover, 
but the flood still destroyed a lot. Every year the flood takes land along the river. We 
used to plant bamboo along the river, but the 1983 floods took the bamboo as well. 
In 1983 we lost all the cassava and tubers. We were very hungry. We dug out roots 
in the forest to eat. 
 
People interviewed in Hai Lang also commented that the 1983 floods were worse in 
terms of hunger and diseases after the floods. The society was very poor and relief 
was insufficient. Nowadays more people have improved houses, which protect them 
better, and have more buffers in terms of savings to help them through adversities.   55 
Yet, the level of loss and physical damage has latterly increased as there are more 
productive resources and infrastructure now than previously.  
 
Adger’s (2001) experience is that the perceptions of a flood or storm are different 
depending on whose property is affected, and whether it is individual or collective 
property. His study from Xuan Thuy shows a difference between the perceptions of 
coastal households and commune officials regarding the 1992 storm, which resulted 
in the loss of shrimp stocks and caused some households to sell their leases. 
Commune officials did not consider it to be a disaster because it did not impose cost 
on the collective. From the household perspective it is worse losing private property. 
A household in Giao Hai commune commented: ‘The 1983 storm was significant, 
but I did not own any assets then. The 1986 storm seemed worse, as it was our own 
property that was being lost’.  
 
On the other hand, floods may cause severe damage to collective property in terms 
of infrastructure, while not affecting the households to the same degree. The floods 
in Hai Lang during the autumn of 2004 were reported by the district People’s 
Committee to involve almost as high flood levels as in 1999 and infrastructure was 
badly damaged. When I asked the households a few months later, people did not 
complain much. The water had risen more slowly, had not been as stormy as 1999 
and they had been able to secure their own private property.  
 
4.2 Impact of the 1999 flood disaster  
 
On November 2
nd 1999 the water started rising in the rivers in Hai Lang and A Luoi 
districts. It rained 2300 mm in four days. On the low land the floods caused damage 
both because of the force of the stormy water, and by the long inundation period 
with high water levels, reaching up to the roofs of many houses for three days. A 
large proportion of the animals, like pigs, poultry and cattle drowned, food crops in 
storage in the houses were lost. In the hill land areas, the growing annual and 
perennial crops were destroyed or damaged. In the mountains, where the force of the 
floods was the greatest, there was land erosion, land inundation with sand and stones 
and destruction of growing crops. Trees were uprooted and swept away. In the 
whole area there was extensive damage to houses and infrastructure. 592 people died 
and 24 people were missing, according to the newspaper Lao Dong in November 
1999. 
 
In the seven provinces affected, from Quảng Bình to Bình Định, there were 41 866 
houses that were pulled down, 48 367 hectares of growing crops were destroyed, 
219 000 tons of rice in storage were destroyed. The total value of the damages was 
3 300 billion VND (220 million USD)
18.  
 
The most exposed people were those living close to the river. The fishermen in Van 
Tri live on the banks of the river and most of their houses were destroyed. They 
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moved whatever belongings they could to their boats. Van Tri village only had one 
two-storey building at the time, belonging to Mr Thai, who was said to be the richest 
man in the village. 40 people sought refuge there.  
 
Many people sat on the rooftops of their houses for three days before the storm 
subsided and the water sank to a level where it was possible to move around. There 
were few boats strong enough to challenge the violent waters so many people were 
isolated by the water for three days. They were hungry and cold and many got 
diarrhoea from drinking the water around them. The temperature was only around 15 
degrees.  In Van Tri village, the staff of the People’s Committee and the Red Cross 
volunteers started going around in boats on the first morning, distributing noodles to 
people on the roof tops, but it took time before everybody could be reached.  
 
29 people died in Hai Lang district, and 9 people in A Luoi district. It was said that 
many of the people who died did so whilst trying to move through the cold water 
with its strong currents, in efforts to rescue people or belongings. According to the 
head of the Hai Lang Fatherland Front many old and weak people died
19. 
 
Poor people living in simple houses experienced their houses collapsing. Many 
people had a relatively steady main building, but with an adjacent kitchen and pigsty 
which were both much weaker and these collapsed. Apart from the areas close to the 
rivers, the areas that were particularly exposed were the small hamlets surrounded by 
large areas of paddy, and consequently surrounded by stormy water during the 
floods.  
 
Most of the pigs, ducks and chickens on the low land died as well as many of the 
cows and buffalos. In Hai Lang district, 30 000 pigs and close to 400 000 poultry 
died during the flood, according to district reports
20. Over 25  000 tons of rice 
became wet and inedible. The head of the cooperative
21 in Van Tri village (223 
households) reports that 64 houses in the village partly collapsed, 38 buffalo and 70 
percent of the pigs died.  
 
Floods during September-November are part of the seasonal cycle on the low land, 
so people here do not have paddy rice in the fields during this time. A major part of 
the rice stored in the houses was lost however. The interviews showed that most 
people store the rice they need for consumption at home until the next harvest at the 
end of May. Some households also had rice at home which was intended for sale but 
had not yet been sold, awaiting higher prices.  
 
In the hill land communes the autumn floods do not normally affect the growing 
crops, but this time the inundation period was too long. A lot of both annual crops 
like sweet potato and beans, and perennial crops like pepper and fruit trees were lost 
or damaged. Hai Chanh commune lost 60 percent of all pepper and 100 percent of 
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the annual crops according to the commune People’s Committee
22. People often 
have their houses, gardens and cultivation in basins and close to the river, where the 
soil is best and there is access to water for irrigation, but therefore also at risk to 
floods.  
 
Mr Duoc’s family in Xuan Loc village (hill land) used to be above the poverty line 
before the floods. He tells us:   
When the floods came, people from the co-operative came by boat to help my family 
to move to the co-operative building, which is on higher land. I stayed with the 
house, sitting on the roof for nearly 3 days. I got diarrhoea from drinking the 
floodwater. We lost 400 kg of rice and 150 kg of dry cassava and sweet potato, 
which got wet. It was all that we had in storage in the house. We lost 2 pigs and 32 
chickens. One pig did not die in the flood, but from disease after the floods. All 22 
pepper plants in the garden were destroyed by inundation, 10 of them were bearing 
fruit. 11 citrus trees were also destroyed. It was our main income before the floods, 
and gave an income of 2 million VND (120 USD) per year
23. The house was 
damaged and part of the roof collapsed.  
 
Damage caused by the floods in Hai Lang district, November 1999.  
(Hai Lang District People’s Committee report number 60 17/11/99) 
People killed:                             29 
People wounded:                        20 
Value of material losses:            159 332 million VND (approx. USD11 million) 
(1 USD = 15 000 VND) 
 
Table 1: 
Selected figures: (the full list is too long to be included here) 
Item  Quantity lost  Value in million VND 
Erosion on the dikes  203 146 m3 of soil  2 438 
Damaged dams and sluices  257  577 
Damaged pump stations  24  194 
Damaged canals  98 610 m   
Soil erosion  144 477 m3  1 734 
Damaged bridges and culverts  366  1 893 
Damaged road  44 824 m   
Growing crops destroyed  1 089 ha  4 580 
Fruit trees damaged  51 ha     141 
Industrial crops damaged  30 ha     789 
Dead cattle   472      566 
Dead pigs  29 914  10 979 
Dead poultry  392 790     6 477 
Rice seed lost   466 tons     1 631 
Rice lost or damaged  25 291 tons  45 170 
Class rooms damaged       150       536 
Class rooms collapsed          50       472 
School material and equipment      1 205 
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Houses seriously damaged      1 867    9 083 
Houses destroyed         267     1 299 
Houses flooded     16 207     8 104 
   
Source: Hai Lang People’s Committee (UBND 1999) 
 
Losses through disease after the floods 
Losses not only occurred in the immediate floods but also as a consequence of the 
polluted environment after the floods. Most households interviewed on the low land 
had the experience that the new generation of pigs bought after the floods had died 
of disease. Many people did not realise the risk of disease and took loans to reinvest 
in pigs and poultry as fast as they could, leading to many failed investments and 
debts. In the hill land village there were epidemics after the floods among the cattle.  
 
There were however no epidemics among people, although many got   stomach 
disorders from drinking the floodwater. Chlorine was distributed by the clinics to the 
households to clean the drinking water. The veterinary staff were worried that it was 
difficult to bury all the dead animals quickly enough. There were so many tasks that 
needed to be done, and initially people were concentrating on recovering their 
houses from the mud, basic repairs and drying the rice.  
 
The impact of the floods in A Luoi district and Hong Ha commune  
The water level in the Bo River in A Luoi rose 15 meters higher than the normal 
level according to the vice chairman of the district People’s Committee
24. 150 
hectares of a total of 550 hectares of paddy land in the district was inundated with 
stone. 21 ha of these have not been possible to recover according to the vice 
chairman
25. Along the 75 km road from Hue city to A Luoi district town there are 
many eroded slopes. The district People’s Committee reported that there were 64 
landslides blocking the road along this stretch, which took more than a month to 
clear.   
 
In Hong Ha commune the floods had a drastic impact on the land areas close to the 
river. The force of the river eroded large chunks of the riverbank, making the river 
up to 20 meters wider than before in some places (my eye-sight estimation). The 
river carried sand and stone that invaded the cultivated land. The commune People’s 
Committee chairman reports that all 16 hectares of paddy rice land had been covered 
with up to two meters of gravel. Two hectares were not possible to recover
26. The 
rest required several months of digging. 17 ha of forest was uprooted and carried 
away. The large, relatively stable iron bridge across the Bo River was torn away.  
 
The Pa Rinh village head, Mr Duong said: 
                                                           
24 Interview 17/5/00 
25 Interview 15/9/00 
26 Commune meeting 18/5/00   59 
My family has 1000 m2 of paddy rice divided in 5 plots. All the land was deeply 
inundated with sand and stone. We lost our fish and the fishpond filled up with sand 
and clay. The cassava and maize got wet and were destroyed.  
 
According to the chairman of the commune People’s Committee
27, a third of the 
households in Pa Rinh had fishponds, which were all destroyed by the floods. Eight 
households in Pa Rinh lost all their paddy land. With the repair and improvement of 
the Khe Ca Te irrigation system in the commune, six of the households are expected 
to have paddy again.   
 
Both households and the staff of the People’s Committee were concerned about the 
food security situation after most of the cassava roots had become rotten and 
inedible due to inundation. Cassava is the most important food crop in the 
mountains. The roots can be harvested gradually all year round. Most of the cassava 
was destroyed in the floods and had to be replanted, and it took nine months before 
the new roots could be harvested
28. 
 
Con Tom village lost three hectares of land, which were pulled away by the river. 
One hectare was paddy land and the other two were for dry land crops. The village 
used to have seven hectares of land for dry land crops, but now there are only five 
hectares left says Mr Thay, the village head.
29 In Pa Rinh village eight hectares of 
dry land were inundated with sand.  
 
There was massive damage to individual houses near the river. Mr Mau's family, 
who was better-off, had their two-storey brick house and restaurant on the riverbank, 
which were both completely destroyed. The poor household of Mrs Kan Bang in 
Con Tom village had just collected wood
30 to build a house but this was all lost in 
the floods
31. 
 
Some poor households lost practically everything they had; house, belongings, 
animals, crops and part of their land. The family of Mr Eo and Mrs Hat live close to 
the river in Pa Rinh village. Their house was pulled away by the river. They tell us
32: 
We had 300 m2 of paddy, but it is dry land now. We lost 30 of our 46 chickens. We 
had 2000 plants of cassava, but the roots rotted in the floods and became black and 
smelly. We lost our 150 banana plants around our house. We had a mother pig, 
which we had bought on credit from the ‘Department of Fixed Settlement’. It died in 
the floods, but we still have to pay back the loan.   
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Mrs Diep’s family (middle-income) in Pa Rinh
33 lost two cows and five goats all 
bought on credit. She now has a bank debt of 5.5 million VND (365 USD) which 
she does not know how to pay back.  
 
Table 2: Hong Ha commune People’s Committee estimation of the 
damages in their commune
34.  
Flood loss and damage  Quantity 
Paddy land inundation with sand and stone   16 hectares (all) 
Paddy land lost completely  2 ha 
Growing cassava destroyed  12 ha (out of 60 ha) 
Dry land lost  4 ha (out of 10 ha) 
Hill land fields damaged  7 ha 
Banana trees damaged and lost  10 ha 
Growing pineapple lost  9 ha 
Growing sugarcane lost  15 ha (out of 35 ha) 
Planted acacia forest lost  7 ha 
Bamboo lost  10 ha 
Fishponds were damaged and fish escaped.  
 
3000 m2 (out of 7000 m2). 30  000 
fish 
Dead cattle  
 
19 (out of 360) 
Dead pigs  11 (out of 200) 
Dead poultry  285 
Dead goats  13 (out of 36) 
Rice that was swept away  1 156 kg 
Rice seed that was lost  420 kg 
Fertiliser that was lost  750 kg 
Wood for house construction lost  9 m3 
Bridge collapsed  1 (out of 1) 
Classrooms were damaged  5 (all) 
Dams/reservoirs for irrigation have been 
damaged 
2 (all) 
Houses collapsed  7 
The clean water system was damaged   
Telephone lines were unworkable   
Source: Hong Ha commune People’s Committee 
 
In addition many households lost furniture, clothes, household equipment, radios, 
school books etc. According to the commune People’s Committee there were 102 
households in the commune who were seriously affected and 52 households who 
were slightly affected by the floods. The total commune population was 198 
households. Only 42 households can be said to had enough to eat, according to the 
commune People’s Committee
35. The estimated total value of losses in Hong Ha 
commune were 1.3 billion VND (approx. 0.8 million USD). 
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5. Humanitarian response, coping and recovery, 
Hai Lang district 
 
This chapter looks at the actions of the government, local organisations and 
households in the coping and recovery process. The chapter draws on the whole 
fieldwork material from 2000-2004. The story pays particular attention to the 
experience of poor households as the focus is on the difficulties that people faced in 
coping and recovery. The households quoted should thus not be seen as 
representative of all the households in a particular village.  
 
The story of Mr Thanh and Mrs No's family in Van Tri village
36 (low land) gives a 
picture of the situation of a poor household during the floods and the following year. 
Their story brings up many of the issues that will be discussed further on in this 
chapter e.g. the role of local organisations, the struggle to secure food needs and the 
difficulties involved in recovering production. 
 
The household of Mr Thanh and Mrs No includes two small children (three, from 
2000) and Mr Thanh’s mother. Their house is 20 meters from the banks of the O 
Giang river. Mr Thanh tells us:  
The water rose very fast. The house was damaged and the roof over the kitchen and 
pigsty collapsed. The water was very cold, and there was wind and high waves. The 
house was filled with mud. Tables, chairs and household utensils were pulled away 
by the water. We lost all our animals, 2 pigs, 50 ducks and some chickens. One ton 
of rice got wet and was spread all over the place. My family sought refuge in a 
neighbour’s house further from the river, but I stayed on the roof of our house. On 
the third day we were reached by emergency deliveries of food from the commune 
People’s Committee, the Co-operative and the Red Cross. We received rice from 
people in Hai Lang Township, who cooked rice, packed it in bags, while the district 
People's Committee organised delivery to the low land communes. When the water 
had receded, the district police and army helped to dig out the mud from the house. 
The commune Youth Organisation together with the Red Cross helped to repair the 
house. We received blankets and kitchenware from the commune Buddhist Pagoda. 
The commune Women’s Union and Farmers Association mobilised food support. We 
received medicine and disinfectants from the health station against diarrhoea and to 
clean the drinking water. We got 200 000 VND as a grant from the district relief 
funds to buy 2 new piglets. During December and January we received 200 kg of 
rice and a big box of noodles as food support through the district relief committee. 
 
We borrowed one ton of rice from private lenders in another commune, with an 
interest of 400 kg to be paid after harvest. We took loans to repair and strengthen 
the house, in total 2.5 million VND; 500 000 VND from neighbours, 500 000 VND 
from the district Women’s Union and 1.5 million VND from the state bank 'flood 
recovery credit'. We got production inputs on credit from the co-operative. 
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We have 3500 m2 of paddy land and 250 m2 of garden land. In 1999 we harvested 
2.1 tons of rice. After paying back credit for production inputs and loans for food we 
still had 1 ton of rice. This was mostly lost in the floods. During spring 2000 it 
rained so much that the planting was delayed, and then we had to replant part of the 
crop twice. After the autumn crop 2000, we only had 400 kg of rice left after paying 
production costs and the food loans. This rice was finished by October. After that we 
borrowed first from relatives, and then later taking new private loans. The spring 
crop in 2001 was again bad, because of insects and rains before harvest, but the 
autumn crop was all right. Our rice debt is now two tons.  
 
The garden production of sweet potato and vegetables is barely enough for the pigs 
and for home consumption. The 2 pigs that we got from the district died through 
disease and we bought 2 new ones. The pigs grow very slowly, only 40 kg weight 
after 10 months. We bought new ducks and chickens, but they died. 
 
In 2000 Mrs No made traditional hats from which she could earn 3000 VND per 
day. 
 
We are worried about the bank loans. We took a loan in 1996 from the 'Bank for the 
Poor' of two million VND. The repayment was postponed because of the floods, but I 
think that we have to pay in 2001. There is also the 'flood-recovery-loan' to pay 
back, but we still do not have any surplus from production. At least we are not in 
debt to the co-operative. We borrowed from relatives to be able to pay back the 
input credit to the co-operative in 2000. My health is not good. I have had strong 
headaches for some years. The treatment in Hue costs about one million VND each 
year. We borrow from relatives for the medical costs.  
 
The situation of Mr Thanh’s household was similar to a majority of low land 
households
37 in terms of losses. They however have more difficulties to recover 
compared to the majority in Hai Lang district, because of their limited resources and 
a poor health situation. They are a newly established household, and have less land 
than average in the district. 
 
The responsibility taken by the state and the community in the provision of basic 
needs in the immediate disaster situation was high. The households however 
depended more on individual resources and social networks for coping and recovery 
after the first few months. The public support was not sufficient to prevent poor 
households from resorting to risky coping strategies, such as taking informal loans 
with high interest. The seasonal stress and production risk that followed after the 
floods contributed to prolonging the period of recovery.  
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5.1 Humanitarian assistance 
Any major relief had to wait until the water level had gone down. 
When the flood water rose, and people were sitting on the roof of their houses for 
three days, waiting for the water to subside, there were some interviewed families 
who reported to have been reached by the commune- or cooperative staff with food 
packages, mainly noodles. Most people however, said they had had to wait until the 
water had receded before they were reached by food relief. The commune staff 
complained about the lack of boats sturdy enough to be useful in the strong waves 
and current
38. 
  
The People’s Committee, cooperatives and mass organisations in Hai Lang 
distributed food, clothes and blankets. According to a district People’s Committee 
report
39 4500 packages of noodles were distributed on the first day of the floods. 
Between the second and the seventh day 6400 kg of rice was distributed. 
Households in Hai Lang town were involved in cooking and packing rice for 
distribution
40.  The interviewed households had all received support and attention. In 
Hai Tan, the commune Red Cross/Youth Organisation mobilised 120 people into 
groups for food distribution, sanitation, helping people dig out the mud from the 
houses and doing basic repairs. In Hai Chanh commune the equivalent organisation 
mobilised 107 people
41. The volunteers of the Red Cross and Youth Organisation are 
often the same people at commune level.  
 
A high level of coordination of humanitarian assistance 
Humanitarian assistance from donors, NGOs and Vietnamese organisations and 
individuals started to arrive at an early point.  
The Vietnamese government at national level distributed 33 000 tons of rice from 
the national storages to the seven affected provinces, according to the media
42 
 
'Boards for Management and Distribution of Flood Relief ' were established under 
the district and commune People's Committees. In Hai Lang district the Board was 
composed of representatives from all sections of the district authorities, the mass 
organisations and the Red Cross. At commune level there were similar boards under 
the commune People's Committee, with representatives of commune level mass 
organisations and the Red Cross, that were responsible for the organisation of 
distribution. 
 
There was national mobilisation whereby the entire society seemed to be involved in 
organising support. Fund raising was conducted through organisations, schools, 
private companies, at all places of work, rural communities, the media, 
…everywhere. The people I talked to in other parts of Vietnam were all concerned 
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with the situation in the flood stricken area and had made some kind of contribution. 
Hai Lang district received approximately 15 billion VND in flood relief, both in cash 
and kind, according to a District People’s Committee report (UBND Huyện 4/5/00). 
Approximately 9.3 billion were from state funds.  
 
When there were disastrous floods in the Mekong delta in the following year of 
2000, 'everybody' in Hai Lang also collected relief funds to send. For example, 
people in Hai Hoa commune who had been badly hit in the 1999 floods and at that 
time received a lot of support, collected 25 million VND (1600 USD) for the people 
in the Mekong delta. From the whole of Hai Lang district 130 million VND were 
contributed
43.  
 
Distribution according to need or according to losses? 
Coordination of the inflow of humanitarian assistance at both national and district 
level seems to have led to a comprehensive outreach, and that overlap or gaps were 
avoided. The first phase of disaster response, which involved solving the acute need 
for food during the first four months appears to have been adequately addressed, 
according to the interview results. Nevertheless, there was a tension regarding the 
principles of distribution according to need or according to losses. 
 
The Hai Lang district Board originally took the decision to base distribution of food 
relief according to the size of the family. Distributions were made gradually as 
outside support arrived. Each household received three to four batches of rice and 
noodles. According to staff of the district People’s Committee, the later batches of 
support were distributed more selectively according to need. The interviewed 
households had all received food relief to cover their basic needs for the first three 
months after the floods. The interview results suggest an acceptance of the principle 
of ‘blanket’ distribution of relief, at least in the beginning, when equitable 
distribution to all was perceived to be practically the same as distribution according 
to need. More or less the entire population in Hai Lang district were assumed to 
suffer from acute food shortage during the first months. In the distributions where 
village meetings decided on the target group, the focus was on assisting the 
households who had suffered the biggest damage. This could be said to follow 
principles of need in some respects. Even so, from a perspective of poverty there 
were households who would have needed more support to avoid negative 
consequences of hunger or indebtedness, as the interview results suggest. 
 
A diverse set of actors and organisations were engaged in  providing assistance. 
Some local organisations provided assistance directly to individual communities. 
Hai Tan commune reported to have received 131 tons of rice through the district 
Board and 30 tons directly from NGOs
44. The village head organised village 
meetings to decide on the distribution of NGO support. In Van Tri village the 
meeting divided the villagers in categories, based on the size of the losses. Families 
whose houses had collapsed or were badly damaged got particular local attention 
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and support
45. Certain relief efforts were targeted specifically to the poor, like the 
support from the Buddhist Pagodas.  Hai Lang Red Cross distributed 200 tons of rice 
to 2000 households, based on lists of those most in need compiled by the commune 
Red Cross together with the village leaders
46. The commune and village leaders in 
Hai Tan commune however, seemed to prioritise distribution of support, based on 
the size of the loss rather than in relation to need
47. Commune leaders stressed that 
the assistance was not a poverty alleviation program but should follow flood 
losses
48.  
 
The main part of the relief distributed was rice 
Relief that came to the district as cash funds were mostly used to buy rice for 
distribution. In other disaster situations internationally, cash grants have been tried 
instead of food distributions as relief. An example is the floods in Mozambique 
2000, where USAID provided cash grants of 100 USD to 85 000 families.  The 
director of USAID in Mozambique explained that their experience was that people 
often sell the relief supplies, in order to be able to buy what they need, so it is better 
to give people cash directly. (Christie and Hanlon 2001 in Wisner et al. 2004) In Hai 
Lang the interview results suggest that there was a general need for food and that the 
relief was adequate, especially for poor and middle-income households. Better-off 
households may have preferred cash support. Rice is however easily exchanged for 
cash in the local economy according to cooperative staff. Publicly controlled 
purchase of rice for distribution was also done to avoid rice prices from rocketing, 
according to the head of the district Financial Section
49. 
 
The general exemption from the land-based tax was another type of government 
relief. The government subsidised the price of pork over Tết (the Vietnamese New 
Year), so that people could have a decent celebration despite the food shortages and 
high prices
50. Beef prices doubled in relation to normal as slaughter of cattle was 
prohibited in Quang Tri because of the epidemics after the floods
51.  
 
Community responsibility for food needs were gradually replaced by 
individual networks  
In general, the provision of public relief had subsided in early March, four months 
after the floods. There were still two to three months to go before the rice could be 
harvested and many people suffered food shortages. It appears that the culture of 
community involvement in the welfare of all households mainly applied to the 
immediate disaster response during the first three to four months after the floods. 
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After this period the individual household responsibility for their own welfare, with 
the help of family and relatives, seemed once again to be the norm.  
 
During the time of collectivised agriculture in Hai Lang, (between 1975 and 1990), 
the cooperatives were responsible for everybody’s basic needs, at least to the extent 
that it could be handled by the collective economy. According to informal 
conversations with households in Hai Lang about the ‘old times’, the 'cake' was 
small but divided equally. After the land reform when each family received 
individual land tenure, community responsibility for food security decreased and 
depended more on the capacity and situation of the individual households. The 
interview results suggest that poor households do not normally receive community 
support and depend on family and relatives for assistance. In the immediate crisis 
after the floods however, the community again took on responsibility of securing the 
well-being of all. Interviews with poor households suggest that they got more 
attention than they get under 'normal' conditions. The individual families got support 
irrespective of whether or not they had 'social networks' or whether they were 
members of organisations. 
 
The attention of community leaders to the well-being of the households, shown by 
visits to their houses, was valued very highly by the families interviewed. People in 
all the studied villages would frequently specify in the interviews which leaders had 
visited them to enquire about their situation. I understood that the village, commune 
and district leaders did spend a lot of time on such visits. If they failed in these social 
commitments it could impact on their posibilities to continue in leadership positions, 
as suggested by the case of a commune leader in Hai Tan, who was replaced after 
criticism of not being active enough in the community after the floods
52.  
 
At village level, it was the village head who organised the other organisations in 
disaster response
53. This can be interpreted as a sign of the strengthened role of the 
village head, which is the trend in Vietnam as a whole since the 1990’s (Shanks et 
al. 2003). 
 
Before 1975, the role of the village leaders was very important in Hai Lang. The 
village, household groups and kinship ties were the primary ‘community’ that people 
relied on in crises. In the period 1975-90 their role decreased in favour of the 
commune People’s Committee and the cooperative. During the 1990s, and especially 
since 1999, the roles of the village and household groups have again become more 
important according to local staff.  
 
The mass organisations gathered neighbourhood groups for mutual 
assistance 
Luttrell (2001) finds that reciprocal assistance through neighbourhood groups has a 
long history and is well anchored in Vietnam. She suggests that egalitarian village 
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institutions, Buddhism and Taoism have contributed to this. Hy Van Luong (1993) 
sees a re-emergence of kinship ties in solving problems and dealing with crises.  
 
In the interviews I found that households were more ready to speak of formal 
assistance than informal. Households and local leaders mainly mention 
neighbourhood groups in the context of the mutual assistance organised by the mass 
organisations. It appears to be difficult to distinguish between the initiatives that rely 
on ‘groups of households’ and the ones organised by the mass organisations. The 
Women’s Union, the Farmers Association, the Youth Organisation and the War 
Veterans Organisation have a ‘government oriented’ as well as a ‘community’ 
character. They have the role of mobilising for national goals concerning e.g. family 
planning and agriculture development. In disaster response however, they played an 
active role in organising mutual assistance and support based on the neighbourhood 
groups that meet and exchange experiences also under ‘normal’ circumstances. The 
Youth organisation/Red Cross organised teams to help people repair their houses. In 
Hai Tan, the Farmer’s Association was also involved in forming neighbourhood 
labour teams for this purpose.
54 The Women’s Union organised household food 
contributions. The War Veterans Associations had their own networks and mutual 
support funds. In Hai Tan commune, they mobilised a fund of 50 million dong (3500 
USD) from members, for loans to other members in need.  
 
Support for house construction 
The Hai Lang district army section allocated labour to help with the reconstruction 
of houses. The commune army section in Hai Tan mobilised 60 people to help with 
the repair of houses
55. Families who had lost their houses completely got one million 
VND (65 USD) in government support. The Vietnam Red Cross established a 
support program for people who had lost their houses, whereby the household would 
receive a metal frame for a new building (to make it stable, in anticipation of future 
hazards) and one million VND to construct a simple house on the frame. In Hai 
Lang 171 families received such support out of a total of 267 households whose 
homes had been competely destroyed. Village meetings decided who would get 
support for a new house. The program was directed to the very poorest and probably 
succeeded in this targeting as the buildings were too small (10 m2) for less poor 
people to be interested
56. My experience is that community norms would not accept 
non-poor households to put up such a house. In addition, the local Red Cross 
volunteers could be expected to have a clear understanding of the status of those 
who received support. Two Red Cross volunteers helped with the house construction 
in each commune
57.  
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57 Mr Cuong, Hai Lang Red Cross, October 2000   68 
The commune clinics prevented spread of disease 
Another part of disaster response was the distribution of disinfectants to purify the 
water, which all interviewed households in Hai Lang reported to have received from 
the commune clinic. The mass organisations were active in organising people to 
bury the dead animals to avoid the spread of disease. All households interviewed in 
Hai Tan reported to have taken part in this work. The head of the health clinic 
however, expressed the need to have a fund for remunerating the household labour 
that took part in this work
58, as households were keener to spend the time in 
recovering their own damaged houses, lost belongings and wet rice.  
 
To sum up: As we have seen the disaster response from the authorities, local 
organisations and the public was immediate and comprehensive. The primary goal 
was the supply of food, basic necessities and shelter. I understand the organisational 
preparedness and capacity in disaster response as partly a legacy of the war, as well 
as the frequency of natural disasters in the area. The society has experience of 
handling crisis situations. The Confucian tradition of clear authority and lines of 
command may also contribute to quick decision making and action. Community 
norms of equitability contributed to that ‘everybody’ seemed to have received 
attention and support in the immediate disaster situation. The mass organisations, 
which sometimes are criticised locally for being too much of a channel for the 
agenda of the central government, fulfilled an important role in organising relief and 
mutual support. In a crisis situation like this, the tight relation between local 
government and local organisations appears to have been an advantage.   
 
The mass organisations also played an important role alongside the cooperatives in 
organising the rehabilitation of production and community infrastructure, which is 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
5.2 Support for rehabilitation of production  
Continued heavy rains constrained recovery of rice production. 
When the first phase of clearing up amidst the chaos of dead animals, damaged 
property and layers of mud was reasonably under control, the next worry was how to 
secure the coming rice season. The co-operatives and production groups held 
meetings to clarify the losses and the requirements for production. Delay in planting 
the next rice crop would result in shorter growth season and poorer harvest. The 
district authorities acted as guarantor allowing the cooperatives to sign credit 
agreements with supply companies for diesel and hiring extra pumps for the 
intensive drainage of the fields
59.   
It was not only the flood water from the November floods that needed to be drained. 
There were continued heavy rains in December, January and February, so the 
drainage pumps had to work hard. People were out with their buffalos ploughing the 
fields although the water was still a decimetre deep. After planting the rice it rained 
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again and both seeds and fertiliser were washed away. Some areas even had to be re-
planted twice. The costs of drainage, replanting and re-fertilising the fields resulted 
in higher production costs than the income from the rice, according to the 
cooperatives in Van Tri and Phuoc Dien
60. A district People’s Committee report
61 
states that the rains in January-February 2000 flooded 2547 ha of rice, of which 
2000 hectares had to be replanted. 250 ha of dry land crops were destroyed. On 28 
April 2000 there were heavy rains in which 300 ha of rice were destroyed 
completely and a larger area suffered partial damage.  
 
The authorities were active in securing access to rice seed. 
Access to rice seed was a big worry. As the floods hit seven provinces, there was a 
shortage of seed in a large part of central Vietnam. The People’s Committee leaders 
at district and province level travelled in person around the country to secure 
contacts with seed suppliers in time for planting in January
62. Seed was distributed to 
the farmers through the cooperatives as is the practice in many villages also under 
normal conditions. The state subsidised the seed with 50 percent of the price (2000 
dong/kg) and the rest was a credit, which the farmers were expected to pay back 
after harvest.  
 
In Hai Lang the seeds were the same varieties that they normally use, so difficulties 
did not occur in relation to seed varieties. Most of the seeds are supplied yearly from 
research stations and from farmers who specialise in the production of seed. Cau Nhi 
cooperative in Hai Tan commune takes pride in being able to produce and purchase 
their seed themselves. Some supplies, but not all, survived the floods
63.  
 
Distribution of seed as a relief intervention has been criticised in other contexts for 
being undertaken without analysis of the real needs, leading to supplies that are not 
relevant (Sperling and Longley 2002). The critique points to research findings where 
farmers in many cases have been able to secure access to seed on their own, also 
after a disaster. The situation in Hai Lang however is different, as the cooperatives 
also under normal conditions have a big role in seed supply, coordinating farmers’ 
requests for seed. Households in Xuan Loc told us that they normally order part of 
the seed through the cooperative, while part of it is from the previous year. In 2000, 
they relied on the cooperative for all the seed
64. The cooperatives purchased fertiliser 
on credit from the district supply company. The district subsidised the credit so that 
the farmers did not have to pay interest
65. 
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63 Conversation with Mr Hong, the chairman of the Cau Nhi cooperative, October 2000 
64 Mr Le, Mrs Nghe 11/10/00 
65 Hai Lang Agriculture Section 11/5/00.   70 
Large sums of state credit were provided, mainly for rice inputs. 
The reinvestment in rice production was enabled by state credit through the Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development. Hai Lang district received 20 billion VND 
(approx. 1.3 million USD). It was intended as a one-year credit with 0.3% interest 
for the short-term recovery of production, mainly rice. In reality it could not be 
collected from the farmers until after a two year period. The credit was distributed 
on the basis of the area of household tenure of paddy land. The interviews suggest 
that the credit reached practically all the eligible households according to that 
criterion. Van Tri village received 230 million VND (15 000 USD) of credit, which 
was on average around one million VND (65 USD) per household (130 000 VND 
per/500 m2). The range of land holdings is from 2500 m2 to 8000 m2, except for the 
23 fishing households who do not have any allocated paddy land at all. It was cash 
distribution, which meant that people could use it for other purposes as well as rice 
inputs. The interviewed households used most of the credit for the latter, but also for 
piglets, house repairs and for servicing old debts.  
 
The decision to base credit allocations on the area of paddy land meant that the low 
land households received more credit than those in the hill land. The fishermen and 
others without allocated land
66 did not receive this credit at all. It was unclear to me, 
who actually took this decision. The director of the Bank for Agriculture, Mr Mai, 
said that the Bank regulations for the credit were that it should be distributed 
according to level of damage, need, and capacity to pay
67. According to him, it was 
suggested by the district People’s Committee that the credit should be based on area 
of allocated paddy land. Mr Tho, vice chairman of the DPC, said that this was only a 
basic principle, and that the commune People’s Committee were entitled to distribute 
the credit as they found appropriate according to local conditions. He said that some 
of them had not understood this
68. The principle for credit distribution was defended 
by Mr Tho in view of the urgency of rehabilitating basic food production. There was 
the expectation of further credit allocation for rehabilitation of income generating 
activities, including perennial crops and animal husbandry at a later point during 
2000
69. Allocation according to acreage of paddy land was also a matter of 
administrative convenience in order to facilitate rapid disbursement. I understand it 
as a reflection of the central role of rice in the identity of the majority in Vietnam, 
which may be the reason why it is sometimes ‘forgotten’ that there are groups of 
people whose main livelihood is not rice production. 
 
According to the director of the Bank
70, the distribution of credit was based on lists 
over credit applications compiled by the commune People’s Committee together 
with the mass organisations and cooperatives. From the figures mentioned in the 
household interviews there seems to have been an approximate correlation between 
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70 Interview 13/12/01   71 
area of paddy and received credit in most cases. Only in one case (in Van Tri) there 
was a clear mismatch. In this case the household claimed to have only 2000m2 of 
land, while they reported to have received 2 million VND of credit. According to the 
regulation it should have been around 500 000 VND. 
 
For the majority of the population in Hai Lang district who have paddy cultivation as 
their main source of food and income, the tying of credit to area of paddy land 
resulted in a relatively equal distribution. The allocation of paddy land is based on 
number of members of the household. Some poor households may have lost their 
tenure in practice, temporarily or long-term, but they retain the formal certificate of 
the land. This meant that also very poor households received credit, while under 
‘normal’ conditions they would have difficulties in receiving any
71. Households who 
have less land than average are mainly newly established households, often the 
children of the farmers who received tenure in 1993, and who have established 
households of their own on the same area of land
72.  Cooperative and village leaders 
in Van Tri were concerned about the fact that newly established households have so 
little land. They also expressed the need to find a solution to the problem that the 
fishing community do not have any formal allocation of paddy land
73. According to 
the interviews, the households, including those of the fishermen, and village leaders, 
see paddy land as the basis for making a living in the area.  
 
The role of the cooperatives was crucial for state credit to be effective. 
A complication concerning the ‘flood-credit’ was that many people had not yet paid 
the cooperative for the inputs used in 1999, which had been purchased on credit. The 
flood-credit was therefore in many cases used to pay for these outstanding loans 
first, in order for the cooperatives to be able to mediate the purchase of new inputs 
for rice production 2000
74. The system used by many cooperatives in Hai Lang is 
that they buy fertiliser on credit from the district supply company according to 
farmer requests
75. The input credit does not have to be paid back until the middle of 
November to avoid farmers having to sell their rice immediately after harvest in 
September when the prices are low. When the floods came on November 2nd 1999, 
many people had their rice stored in their houses, waiting for the market price to 
rise. When the flood took this rice, they used the state credit to pay back the loans to 
the cooperative for the 1999 inputs. This was common according to the staff of the 
Agriculture Section. The state credit was distributed gradually between January and 
March 2000, but inputs for the winter-spring crop were needed in January. With the 
promise of state credits arriving, the co-operatives were able to bridge that gap and 
buy inputs in time. The credit was thus necessary for the whole input supply system 
to function. Without it people would not have been able to pay the debt to the co-
operatives who would have gone bankrupt. Similarly, without the co-operative input 
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credit, the state credit would have come too late to be useful in the winter crop after 
the floods. 
 
As the credit was used to pay for costs incurred in 1999, it became a replacement for 
losses rather than an investment. Using credit to cover loss rather than for new 
income generation prolonged the period generating enough income to enable 
repayment. This issue is further discussed in the following section. 
 
According to Wisner et al. (2004), one of the most effective ways of building more 
economically resilient communities is through micro-credit schemes being applied to 
disaster recovery in order to stimulate the reconstruction of small enterprises. They 
refer to the Grameen Bank 1996, which supported communities after flooding in 
Bangladesh by providing small grants for the repair and reconstruction of houses. 
After the 1998 floods, the Micro-Finance Institutes (MFI) experienced difficulties 
even in giving access to clients’ savings (Nagarajan and Brown, 2000). Although 
Benson and Clay (2001) note that at least one quarter of aid is channelled through 
the MFI’s in Bangladesh, Nagarajan and Brown still find that the MFI’s had 
difficulties in accessing funds from the donors to provide recovery loans.  
 
Twigg (2004) cautions us that micro-credit schemes are themselves vulnerable to 
situations of large losses. An important lesson from the 1998 Bangladesh floods was 
the need to protect the credit organisations themselves, as they soon found 
themselves critically short of funds when their disaster affected borrowers failed to 
make repayments. Twigg refers to a World Bank report 1999, which suggests that 
the micro-finance sector needed a cash infusion of 200 million USD after the 1998 
floods. The practice of putting money aside into emergency reserves is becoming 
more widespread in areas with regular disasters. Micro-Finance Institutions and 
donors have begun to experiment with donor-backed reserves that can be released 
quickly in an emergency (ibid).  
 
In the case of the Vietnam 1999 floods the state provided the credit. The floods 
covered seven out of Vietnam’s 63 provinces, which represented a relatively limited 
part of the Vietnamese economy as a whole. State provision of credit was less 
vulnerable than NGO-organised micro-finance schemes when it came to coping with 
the extreme imbalance between credit needs and incoming payments in a disaster 
situation. This money came directly from government funds and was not intended to 
be a sustainable finance mechanism. 
 
Re-investments in pig keeping failed because of the polluted environment 
after the floods. 
Apart from recovery of paddy production, there was also strong support from the 
government and the mass organisations for recovery of animal husbandry, mainly 
pig and buffalo. The district People's Committee supported the re-establishment of 
pig keeping with credit of 200  000 VND (enough for two piglets), and the 
equivalent as a grant for poor households. Funds for this were taken from the state   73 
‘fund for employment creation’
76. Practically all Hai Lang households keep pigs, as 
it is a good way of using household waste and agricultural bi-products.  Pig keeping 
is especially important for the poor as a way of 'saving' for investments, paying 
school fees, repaying debts etc
77.  The Women's Union had its own funds for the re-
establishment of pig raising.  In each of the three studied communes the Women’s 
Union distributed 50 million VND (3300 USD) equally to 100 households (0.5 
percent interest/month over a two year period)
78. Priority was given to women who 
took part in savings & credit groups (saving 5 000 dong per month (30 US cents). 
Nine such groups existed in Hai Chanh, and seven in Hai Thanh, with 20 women in 
each
79.  
 
Practically all households interviewed had reinvested in pigs immediately after the 
floods.  Unfortunately the animals were affected by rampant disease because of the 
polluted environment. The district veterinary services provided vaccinations, which 
in many cases did not have effect as the infections were already established. Lack of 
fodder for the pigs led to slow growth and more susceptibility to the many 
diseases
80. According to the district Veterinary station, the contaminated 
environment was worst in Phuoc Dien village as it is on the most low-lying land. 
Reinvestments in pig keeping  in the hill land area was more successful because  this 
area was not as badly affected by disease due to the shorter time of water inundation.  
 
Other constraints were the lack of draught power and planting material. 
It was difficult to secure sufficient draught power for ploughing as many buffaloes 
had been lost in the floods. The Farmers' Association had credit funds for the re-
investment in buffaloes, of which Hai Tan commune got 100 million VND (6 600 
USD), which was allocated to 27 households with around 4 million VND each (0.6 
percent interest/month over 3 years). Van Tri cooperative solved the immediate 
needs by hiring six small tractors, in order to plough the fields in time
 81.  
 
Households in the hill land village Xuan Loc have 2000-4000 m2 of paddy per 
household, partly in the lower areas of the village and partly in other villages in 
state-sanctioned arrangements to make sure that ‘everybody’ has paddy land. Apart 
from this they have hill land for sweet potato, cassava, groundnuts etc. The district 
Agriculture Section distributed seed and planting material for sweet potato, 
vegetables, beans and such short-term crops with a 50 percent price subsidy. Sweet 
potato is a very important crop in Hai Lang both for consumption and for fodder, but 
it was difficult to get enough planting material, which has to be fresh. Production 
was constrained by problematic weather when rains in April 2000 reduced the 
harvest of dry land crops with 50 percent
82.  
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Most of the households in Xuan Loc had pepper plants and some households had 
fruit trees, which suffered damage. According to commune officials, 60 percent of 
the pepper in Hai Chanh commune was lost. In 2000 there were no special projects 
by the government or mass organisations for re-investment in perennial crops. 
Among the households interviewed in Xuan Loc, most people re-planted some of the 
pepper with seedlings from neighbours immediately after the floods. There was 
hesitance in the beginning about undertaking any major reinvestment, partly due to 
limited knowledge about how to get good seedlings, but also related to the risk
83.  
 
Fishermen had to recover boats and nets with other means than state credit 
In Van Tri village there are 23 fishing households who live on the banks of the O 
Giang river. According to the head of the fishermen’s group, Mr Chay, many of 
them had to take informal loans with 3-5 percent interest per month to buy new nets 
and repair the boats
84. Mr Chay was in particular difficulties as he, apart from the 
flood losses, also has other debts for hospital costs. He tells us: We live right on the 
riverbank and our house was badly damaged by the floods. Our boat was damaged 
and we lost our nets and two pigs. Before the floods I had taken a bank loan of 2 
million VND to buy nets. When I lost them, I did not know how to pay back the loan. 
Now I have borrowed 2 million privately to mend the boat and buy new nets. We 
could not get ‘flood recovery credit’ as we do not have paddy land of our own. We 
have an old bank loan of 4 million VND (265 USD), which was meant for fish cages, 
but we had to use it for hospital costs as my wife is sick with heart problems. We 
rent 1500 m2 of paddy land in Cau Nhi village. In 2000 it gave 300 kg of rice. The 
land is outside the dike system and therefore more exposed to heavy rains, so we 
often have crop losses. The fishing is the most important income and gives 10 000 
VND (65 US cent per day). Two of our children still go to school, but our elder 
daughter left school in class 10 and helps with the fishing.  
 
Another fisherman, Mr Vach finds himself in a better situation. He was able to get a 
bank loan of 2 million VND (135 USD) after the floods to buy new nets and repair 
the boat. They also got a loan from the Women’s Union of 500 000 VND
85.  
 
When I asked the vice head of Van Tri cooperative why the fishermen could not get 
the state flood credit, he said that they were expecting an additional, three-year 
credit for recovery, which many households already have signed up for
86. The 
expectations of such credit were exaggerated according to the director of the district 
Bank for Agriculture
87, as only a few hundred million VND were available for this 
purpose. According to him, the district People’s Committee had prioritised using the 
state funds available (20 billion VND) for the general short-term credit.  
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To sum up:  
The focus of state policies in the 1999 flood response was on support for 
rehabilitation of short-term production, especially paddy rice, vegetables and pig 
raising. The massive focus on paddy rice is based on the situation in which almost 
all households in Hai Lang have paddy as an important source of food security.  
Even poor households, who normally had difficulties getting credit, received it this 
time. This meant a bias in favour of the low land farmers compared to the hill land 
population and fishermen.  
  
The fact that there are active co-operatives in Hai Lang, meant that there existed an 
organisational structure for the supply of inputs, the organisation of drainage, 
draught power etc, which enabled quick recovery of paddy production. Individual 
purchases would have been difficult as the floods affected such a large area (seven 
provinces). 
 
Recovery of production was constrained by difficult weather conditions with 
continued heavy rains, which led to high production costs and lower harvest. 
Diseases in animal husbandry due to polluted environment caused the failure of 
many re-investments for replacement of lost animals. Production credit to the 
households was to a significant extent used to cover losses, which prolonged the 
period in which the households were indebted.  The recovery took several years for 
the majority of households as will be discussed in section 5.4. 
 
5.3 Rehabilitation of village infrastructure  
Household labour contributions and state finance ensured rapid repairs of 
damaged infrastructure 
Production in Hai Lang is highly dependent on infrastructure and the immediate 
restoration of dikes and canals was a priority both for the farmers and the authorities. 
The practice of household labour contributions to community works is well 
established in Hai Lang. None of the interviewed households questioned the 
practice, although in some parts of Vietnam the labour contributions have been made 
voluntary and possible to replace with monetary contributions. The labour 
contribution is normally 10 days per year for each able-bodied person (men and 
women) between 18 and 45 years old, and involves the maintenance and repair of 
infrastructure, mainly dikes and canals
88. The fact that this number of labour days 
was exceeded was taken as an obvious consequence of the disaster.  
  
In the areas of Vietnam where communal labour has been replaced by monetary 
contributions, there is an increased risk that the maintenance of protective 
infrastructure could be undermined, according to the experience of Adger (2000) in 
Xuan Thuy district, as well as of Miller (2003) in Tra Vinh province. They argue 
that it becomes difficult to make sure that the monetary contributions are reserved 
for the intended purposes. 
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In Hai Lang the tradition of organising joint labour efforts is strongest in the low 
land villages because of the cooperative management of irrigation and drainage of 
the paddy rice, which is a major part of people’s livelihoods there. As explained to 
me by staff of the Agriculture Section, the cooperatives in the hill land villages are 
also fairly strong, but have less authority in organising joint activities  compared to 
the low land.  
 
Staff of the district People’s Committee inspected the damage and prioritised funds. 
Hai Tan commune received 81 million VND (5400 USD) for repairs, of which Van 
Tri village received only 2 million. According to the chairman of Van Tri 
cooperative Mr Dao, the reason for this was that the road to Van Tri was under 
water, so the district inspection team never came to assess the damage there
89. They 
did however receive financial support for investments in the following year.  
 
Few opportunities for labour income in rehabilitation projects 
In disaster response in other countries it is common to use paid labour in 
rehabilitation of infrastructure as a way of providing households with an income for 
coping. Although the World Food Program has had some ‘food for work’ activities 
in Vietnam, it is not common practice. Labour opportunities in local reconstruction 
were not significant sources of income in either Hai Lang or A Luoi district.  
 
The rehabilitation of infrastructure that could be done by the villagers themselves 
was done without pay. For more advanced rehabilitation, or for the repair of 
infrastructure that was under district or province management, the authorities 
contracted companies, who in turn recruited the labour they needed. To some extent 
such employment opportunities were offered to the local population, but often the 
companies had their own workers
90. Villagers in Van Tri and elsewhere complained 
even before the floods that it was difficult to compete with labour from other 
provinces. In 1998 I came across people from Ha Tinh province who were prepared 
to work in Hai Lang for 5000 VND per day (0.3 USD), which is below the norm of 
what is accepted by workers in Hai Lang.  
 
In principle the Government promotes the provision of paid labour opportunities for 
local people on public works. Shanks et al (2003) refer to a study by MPI/UNDP 
(2003), which found that obligations to hire local labour are limited under both 
national and donor projects. The terms are frequently not specified or enforced in 
contract agreements, and there is often confusion over which works should be done 
with paid labour and which based on community contributions.  
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5.4 Coping and Recovery 
 
The previous sections in this chapter discussed humanitarian assistance, the 
collectively organised recovery of community assets and the government support 
that farmers received for recovery of production. The following two sections focus 
on how households coped with the situation of food shortage until production had 
recovered. How the households were able to solve the period of food shortage was 
vital for the continued recovery process. The section also continues the discussion of 
government credit policies and their importance for recovery.  
 
Food shortage led to poor households on the low land taking informal loans 
at high interest 
It was difficult to avoid a food shortage during the months before the harvest of rice 
in May-June of 2000. On the low land it is common, also during 'normal' years, for 
poor households to take informal loans as a way of bridging the food gap during the 
months before the harvest of the winter-spring crop. These loans are paid back in 
rice directly after harvest at 130-150 percent of the borrowed amount
91.  The 
problem with private loans was said (by the households interviewed) to be 
decreasing before the 1999 floods because of the increased availability of other 
sources of credit, but it increased significantly after the floods. According to the 
Agriculture Section, around 20 percent of households in the district had a food 
shortage during the 3 months before harvest in 2000
92.  
 
Mrs H in Phuoc Dien village says
93:  I bought rice to eat for part of the flood-
recovery-credit. I cannot borrow from relatives as they are just as poor as I am. I 
borrowed privately (at 5 percent interest per month) to pay an old bank loan in 
order to get a new bank loan. I have interest payments on private loans of 250 000 
VND per month, so it is very difficult to get enough surplus to invest in production. 
After the floods I bought new piglets twice, but they all died. 
 
Many of the household stories about the coping process in the low land villages 
were preoccupied with informal loans taken for food security. Experience from other 
countries suggests that poor households under stressful post-disaster conditions 
commonly increase their levels of borrowing. In Bangladesh borrowing food and/or 
taking credit for the purchase of food was by far the major coping strategy of the 
poor (del Ninno et al. 2001).  An IFPRI study (2001) finds that approximately 11 
percent of flood-affected households in Bangladesh were still taking loans from 
money-lenders in 1999 one year after the floods.  
 
In Hai Lang the poor harvest in 2000 accentuated the problem. Also in subsequent 
years there were several seasons with crop losses due to heavy rains. A staff member 
of the Agriculture Section says that he is not so worried about households who 
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‘only’ have food loans. These households will be able to pay back. It is worse for 
those who also have informal debts for other purposes, especially medical costs
94. 
Such informal debts are more common in Phuoc Dien village, than in other villages 
in Hai Lang according to the staff. The cooperative leaders in Phuoc Dien
95 say that 
30 percent in the village (40 out of 130 households) are very poor and have informal 
debts. Reasons for taking informal loans are, according to them, to pay back bank 
loans, to cover medical costs and for house construction.  
 
The members of staff of the Agriculture Section suggest another reason why the 
loans in Phuoc Dien village become more of a problem there compared to elsewhere 
in the district. The loans are mostly taken from traders at Dien Sanh market and are 
more difficult to control as they are outside community social pressure.  
 
In Van Tri village on the other hand, the loans were mainly taken locally, from 
better-off households in the community, and there is a degree of social pressure on 
these households not to claim excessive interest rates. There is however little open 
discussion about the problem. The Party Secretary of Hai Tan commune says that 
they have to look into the problem more closely, if informal loans really are as 
common as our interviews suggest
96.  
 
Phuoc Dien village got special attention from the state Bank in order to avoid food 
shortages before harvest. Mr Mai of Hai Thanh commune Farmer’s Association says 
that the Bank for the Poor provided the commune with 1.2 billion VND (80 000 
USD) in ‘pre-harvest-loans’ for food, which was distributed to 540 households 
through the Association
97. Household interviews suggest that this was not enough to 
avoid the problem of informal food loans. 
 
District leaders expressed concern about the amount of informal lending going on 
after the floods. Mr Tho, the vice chairman of the district People’s Committee, 
argued the need for special measures, to help people repay outstanding private loans.  
Mr Tho stressed the importance to reduce formalities in order to reduce poor 
people’s hesitance to approach the Bank
98. The director of the Hai Lang branch of 
the Bank for Agriculture also expressed the need for special agreements to solve the 
situation for the households who could not solve their debt situation on their own
99. 
 
In the hill land village of Xuan Loc, people did not take informal loans for food after 
the floods. The difference is that many of the low land households have few other 
sources of income than paddy. They had little opportunities of earning an income for 
buying food in the period before the rice harvest. In Xuan Loc, people have more 
land for vegetables and other short-term crops. They have access to firewood, broom 
straw, and other minor forest products, which can be sold in the market. They also 
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have more contacts and experience of working as day labourers for others. In all, the 
households in the hill land village have more sources of day-to-day income to solve 
the immediate food needs
100. This is further discussed below. 
 
The kinship networks are important sources of loans for coping. Many households 
mentioned loans from relatives as important for securing food needs. The kinship 
networks were insufficient, however, as the disaster affected almost everybody. 
Social relations for access to resources are discussed further in chapter 7. 
 
Savings- and credit groups exist in all three of the studied villages in Hai Lang, 
organised by the Women’s Union. A group is around 20 women, who saved 5000 
VND (0.3 USD) per month each at the time
101. Every month the sum of 100 000 
VND is allocated to one of the women in the group. This enables women for 
example to buy a piglet or pay school fees. The funds were however too small to 
make any significant difference in coping with floods disaster.  
 
The experience of coping with the 1998 floods Bangladesh is different from that of 
Hai Lang. del Ninno et al. (2001) find that formal credit through the micro-finance 
institutes had a relatively limited role as sources of credit for the flood-exposed 
households. Borrowing from friends, relatives and informal groups represented 58 
percent of the loans. In addition there were loans from money-lenders. Beck (2005) 
emphasises a lesson from the Bangladesh floods 1998, which is the need to expand 
availability of subsidised credit. This is important to avoid a situation where poor 
households take expensive loans from money-lenders. Many poor households made 
distress sales of small livestock, which were difficult to recover later due to 
insufficient capacity of the credit institutions. 
 
In Hai Lang, credit was available, but was aimed at recovery of rice production. As 
input costs are high, this absorbed large sums of credit. Gulli (1998) quoted in 
Pantoja (2002) argues that post-disaster consumption credit would be important to 
smooth consumption, avoid distress sales of productive assets and allow faster 
replacement of lost assets. Given the strong linkage between food consumption and 
labour productivity, research indicates that the poorest households can benefit 
greatly from consumer credit and savings, protecting household consumption, 
according to Gulli.  
 
Employment creation in the rehabilitation work needs to be considered more 
carefully as an alternative to high levels of credit, as argued by Beck in his list of 
lessons learnt from the Bangladesh floods.  
 
Informal loans for house construction is also a potential problem 
Informal loans were not only taken for food, but also for housing. The middle 
income household of Mr N. in Van Tri village
102 took a bank loan of 3 million (1.05 
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percent interest) and an informal loan of 10 million (630 USD) at 4 percent interest 
per month, to strengthen the house. Middle-income households can normally cope 
with informal loans to a higher degree than the poor, but it is still quite a risk. In Mr 
N.’s case it ties him to a monthly outlay of 400 000 VND (26 USD) to cover the 
interest.  
 
The interviews show that many people were prepared to spend large sums of money 
on repairing and strengthening their houses. 7 out of 16 interviewed households in 
Van Tri took informal loans to invest in the house. According to the head of the 
cooperative, 30 percent of the village households were building stronger houses, 
partly with informal loans. The village leaders in Van Tri are very clear on the fact 
that support for house construction is a priority
103. They were expecting state credit 
for house repairs, and households had already registered applications for a total of 
500 million VND (330 000 USD). Such credits did not materialise however. Bank 
credit for house repairs was not available for ordinary villagers, only for government 
employees, who have a regular income. Also for the employees the credit amount 
available was limited to 12 million VND (around 800 USD)
104. 
 
In Phuoc Dien village, the area most exposed to floods in the district, households 
had already invested in their houses during previous years. This had been done with 
informal loans, which remain a burden to the household economy. 4 out of 11 
interviewed households had informal loans for house construction from before the 
floods. Mr Dang's family in Phuoc Dien used part of the flood recovery credit to pay 
interest on a private loan taken out three years ago when they built their house. The 
loan is 3.5 million VND (235 USD) with 2 percent interest rate, which is 70 000 
VND per month. We only manage to pay the interest, we have not yet been able to 
pay anything on the principal, he says.  
 
In the hill land village of Xuan Loc, several households sold assets to   finance 
strengthening their houses, but it was not common to take credit or informal loans 
for house construction. The hill land houses are not quite as exposed to floods as on 
the low land.  Among the households interviewed it was common to sell buffalo in 
order to invest in the house. According to the head of the cooperative, 70 percent of 
households in Xuan Loc have buffalo grazing in the hills
105. Other households, like 
that of Mr Be and Mrs Binh, did not sell their five buffalo, even though they were in 
difficulties. They needed to save them for their six daughters’ wedding costs
106. 
Other households, like that of Mrs Nghe and Mr Le
107, did not have buffalo. Instead 
they sold their garden crops and animals: Mrs Nghe said: We took a loan from 
relatives of eight million VND (530 USD) after the floods to invest in the house. 
After the autumn harvest we sold the rice to pay the debt. We sold groundnuts for 
900 000 VND. We have harvested the tea bushes and cut down all the palm trees, 
and jack fruit, which gave 3 million VND. We have managed to pay 5 million VND 
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of the loan. We have sold almost all the rice, so in January we will have to take 
loans again. We will apply for bank credit through the cooperative. Next year there 
will be less income. We will have to wait a few years till the pepper bears fruit 
again.  
 
The standard of the house is normally a fairly adequate indicator for the household 
economic situation; but after the floods, the house can give the impression that the 
family has a more stable economy than is actually the case. People, who did not 
seem able to afford it, still took loans to build brick houses. According to staff of the 
Agriculture Section, there are several households in Hai Lang who have relatives 
abroad, who can send financial support in urgent situations, and who contributed to 
house construction. 
 
Both the vice chairman of the district People’s Committee and the representatives of 
the mass organisations stressed the need for long-term subsidised credit for housing.  
Beck (2005) in his evaluation of lessons to be learnt from the Bangladesh floods 
1998, also calls for support for reconstruction of housing. Beck considers the lack of 
donor attention to housing to be remarkable considering that damage in this area was 
extensive.  
 
People still kept their children in school despite difficulties 
The interviews suggest that very few pupils dropped out of school as a consequence 
of the floods. This is also confirmed by Mr Doi of the district Education Section. He 
reports that teachers and students worked extra hours to catch up with the time lost 
because of the floods, and helped to restore destroyed equipment, furniture and 
books
108. Mrs Hiep in Van Tri village
109 has a teenage daughter and a newborn baby. 
She lost two big pigs, 20 chickens and 300 kg of rice, which was all she had. She 
also lost the goods in her small shop and one million VND (65 USD) were swept 
away. "My first priority is to be able to support my daughter through school. She is 
in upper secondary school, grade 10 now." she says. Mrs Hiep has a poverty card, 
which entitles her to a reduced school fee, but it is still 600 000 VND per year.   
 
The hill land households have a patchwork of sources of income for coping. 
Mr Duoc's family, Xuan Loc village
110: I borrowed 200 000 VND (13 USD) from the 
district fund to buy piglets, but we had to use the money for medicine instead. We 
got 700 000 VND (47 USD) flood-recovery-credit, which we used for planting rice 
and cassava. I collect firewood for about 10 days per month, for which I can get 10 
000 dong (0.7 USD) per day, to buy food. I do day- labour for ca 10 days per month, 
in the brick industry, or for other farmers in the commune. Our daughter in Ho Chi 
Minh City returned after the floods to help the family, as my wife is chronically sick 
and cannot work.  
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Normally, Mr Duoc’s family has their main income from pepper and fruit trees. 
When these were lost they became more dependent on collecting firewood and doing 
day labour for others. This was part of their livelihood also before the flood, but has 
now become vital. Mr Duoc’s story shows the importance of labour in the coping 
process. He even had to call back his daughter from work in the textile industry as 
her assistance was needed at home in this phase. Health problems in the family are a 
constraint to recovery, as it absorbs resources that could have been used for income 
generation.  
 
People in Xuan Loc village have some paddy land, but too little for subsistence, so 
there are established practices of earning an additional income from an array of other 
activities. Day labour is also important  in the ‘normal’ livelihood of poor 
households here, and such opportunities did not decrease with the floods
111. Another 
type of income opportunity comes with the proximity to the market centre in My 
Chanh, where several households in Xuan Loc sell products. Mrs Nghi went to the 
market to sells spices every day, with an income of around 5 000 VND (0.3 USD) 
per day
112.  
 
People in the low land villages did not have the same opportunities for day labour as 
those in the hill land. Staff of the Agriculture Section explained that the main 
opportunity for day labour in the low land economy is during the rice harvest. This 
was of course not yet available during the months of food shortage before harvest. 
The ‘low-landers’ cannot really compete with the ‘hill-landers’ for day labour, as 
such opportunities are often dependent on having a connection with the people 
offering jobs. Farmers in the hill land village have more such contacts, as it is part of 
their regular livelihood strategy to supplement farm income with income from day 
labour contracts.  
 
Labour migration to other provinces is common, but there are limited opportunities 
during the spring season. It is easiest to find work during the summer and autumn, 
for example in the coffee harvest in the Central Highlands. Contacts for seasonal 
work within the province are sometimes brokered by the authorities. In Phuoc Dien 
village many people travel to do seasonal labour in the mountain district of Huong 
Hoa in Quang Tri province
113. This was not available during the spring of 2000, 
when households would have needed it most. In the autumn of 2000 there were 
however around 100 people (from a total of 550 households) who had gone for 
seasonal labour migration, according to staff of the commune Women’s Union
114.  
 
The conflict between either using the family labour for migration or investing in the 
production at home could be seen in Mrs Manh’s case in Phuoc Dien village. The 
family that remains in Phuoc Dien has very little labour capacity now (2002) that 
both her sons have moved to Huong Hoa to work in the ‘new economic area’. Mrs 
Manh’s husband is handicapped, so they hire labour to manage their rice production. 
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We have very low surplus from the rice production, but we still continue, because I 
don’t know what else I would do; she says. When I return in 2004, the village leader 
tells me that Mrs Manh and her husband have moved to their sons’ house in Huong 
Hoa
115.  
 
Several of the interviewed households (11 out of 43) have a son or daughter working 
in the industry in Ho Chi Minh City, who send back welcome remittances. Mr Cap 
in Van Tri has four children. Two daughters are working in the textile industry in Ho 
Chi Minh City. They send back around two million dong (135 USD) per year.  
 
According to staff of the Agriculture Section, a number of families have relatives 
abroad, mainly in the USA and in Germany. Most commonly, the relatives support 
larger family investments like the construction of a beautiful grave for the parents, or 
financing weddings. The time of the disastrous floods was a situation when many 
relatives sent support for example for reconstruction of the house. A poor household 
in Xuan Loc receives remittances from Germany, which makes a big difference for 
their livelihood possibilities. The relatives have previously mainly sent them money 
for the children's schooling. When I visited the family in 2002 they were preparing 
to build a brick house with the help of remittances. Their daughter in Ho Chi Minh 
City sent back a bicycle and clothes for the children after the floods.  
 
Firewood collection and tree planting contibuted important income. 
Xuan Loc, and the other hill land villages in Hai Lang have some access to forest 
resources. The natural forest in Hai Lang belongs to and is managed by the state. 
The villagers are allowed to collect firewood, as long as it is dead branches on the 
ground. For the planted forest, firewood can be collected after agreement with the 
tenure holder
116. According to Hai Chanh People’s Committee
117 there was a lot of 
firewood to collect in 2000 in connection with clearing the bush to prepare for tree 
planting as well as where trees had been harvested. Collecting firewood for sale was 
a source of income for many families in Xuan Loc village, which became very 
useful during the post-disaster period. 9 out of 16 interviewed households referred to 
income from firewood. It is referred to as hard work and often far away. The low 
land households who said they collected firewood in the hills, said it was only for 
home consumption, not as an income.  
 
A German donor agency had started a program for tree planting in Hai lang district 
in 1999. This provided a small but regular income for many households in the hill 
land villages during the difficult years after the floods
118. According to the head of 
the cooperative, 50 percent of the households had tree planting contracts. 6 out of 16 
interviewed households had received contracts of between one and two hectares per 
household. One household, however, referred to a villager who had received 13 
hectares of forestland for planting and contracted others as labour to manage it.  
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In October 2000, Mrs Hy and Mr Thuong, a poor family in Xuan Loc, were happy 
because they had just received the first payment of 300 000 VND (20 USD) for 
having planted 1.8 ha of forest. "We will get 1.6 million VND/ha for seven years of 
tending. Then we will be able to harvest the wood and sell it to the factory in Da 
Nang. There are many price levels, but it will be a good income" says Mr Thuong.  
 
Only a few villages have significant income from handicraft 
There are not so many villages in Hai Lang who have the tradition of handicrafts. A 
few villages like Phuong Lang have developed certain skills over many generations, 
and are famous for their products. In the case of Phuong Lang it is rice pancakes and 
funeral dresses. For the more common skills like making hats, the craft is too 
widespread, so the price is low. Mrs No in Van Tri village, made hats and earned an 
income of 3000 VND per day after the floods. This was useful as an emergency 
income, when every dong was welcome. Later Mrs No stopped making hats because 
of the minimal income
119.   
 
Recovery situation 2001-2002 
In December 2001 many of the households interviewed were still in difficulties, 
largely due to seasonal risk, i.e. a number of smaller shocks during the recovery 
period. The spring harvest of 2001 had been bad. It rained heavily in May, just 
before harvest, so the quality of the harvested rice was low land fetched low prices. 
The chairman of Hai Thanh commune reports that they had been able to harvest 70 
percent of the rice, before the rains came. The remaining 30 percent was largely lost. 
They had also lost 80 percent of the dry land crops
120. The head of the Van Tri 
cooperative reports that they lost all the dry land crops in the May rains.  
 
Mr Dang and Mrs Suong in Phuoc Dien village
121 have 1 ha of paddy, which is a lot 
compared to other villages in Hai Lang
122. They have no land for dry-land crops and 
only a small garden.  
"The autumn harvest in 2000 was alright, says Mr Dang. We got 4.5 tons and 
around 1300 VND/kg for the rice. We could pay back the co-operative for the inputs 
and we paid for the drought power. But we did not get any surplus because of the 
high costs during the spring crop. The spring harvest in 2001 was bad because of 
the heavy rains in May. We only got 3 tons with low quality and only 1000 
VND/kg
123. The autumn harvest was alright, but the price was still low, and we are 
still in debt to the co-operative because of the bad spring harvest." 
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Although paddy cultivation gives a far from stable income, households who have too 
little land often try to increase their access to rice by renting paddy land from 
relatives or bidding for land through the cooperative
124.  Sometimes the land that is 
rented out has a less secure irrigation and drainage situation, and is therefore a 
higher risk. Mr T. in Van Tri village rents extra land in the neighbouring village
125. 
He says: We have 3500 m2 of own land, but it is not enough for food security so we 
rent 2500 m2 of paddy land from relatives in Van Quy village. The rent is one ton of 
rice per year. The spring crop gave 1250 kg, but the autumn crop only gave 500 kg 
as the land is sensitive to drought and there were a lot of insects. We owe our 
relatives 2 tons of rice, but without interest.  
 
The untimely rains of 2001 were a bigger problem on the low land than  the hill 
land. Mr Thuc, from a middle-income household in Xuan Loc, said that the harvests 
had been better in 2001 than the previous year, on average 4.8 tons/ha
126. Mr Thuc 
says that his household had more or less recovered after the floods. They had sold 
four pigs to pay the debts. They had expanded groundnuts and cassava production 
and bought 100 ducks. They had also bought a buffalo, but it died. According to Mr 
Thuc his household economic situation is very dependent on whether they are 
successful or not with animal husbandry. His biggest fear with floods is the risk for 
animal husbandry, both of losing the animals and losing the fodder production
127. 
Staff of the Agriculture Section agreed with Mr Thuc that success or failure in 
animal husbandry is a major determinant of success in the household economy. 
 
Mrs Nguyen in Phuoc Dien village
128 finds that her situation is better in 2001 than 
the previous year. She got a ‘Bank for the Poor loan’ to raise pigs, and has managed 
to pay her old debt of 5 million VND (for hospital costs). Other households have 
continued to have difficulties with animal husbandry.  In November 2001 Mrs T. in 
Phuoc Dien village, had just reinvested in 4 pigs again. The previous pigs had died. 
She says: We borrowed 2.5 million VND privately at 2.4 percent interest rate and 
invested in 3 pigs and 50 ducks, but they all died after a month. We had vaccinated, 
but it did not help. Before the floods, animal husbandry was alright, but after the 
floods it has been difficult.  
 
Many households rely on income from family members who migrate for work, 
especially during flood season. In Phuoc Dien village, Mrs Hue’s husband and son 
are both working in the forest and coffee harvesting in Khe Sanh (Huong Hoa 
district of Quang Tri province) in 2001. They visit home every 2-3 months. Mrs 
Nguyen’s son is working in the coffee areas in the South. Mrs Lieu’s son worked in 
Khe Sanh last year, but this year he became sick and has gone to Ho Chi Minh City 
for health care. She has relatives there, so the costs have been limited to 1.6 million 
VND, but it has still meant taking more informal loans in order to manage
129. 
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The household health situation is a factor, which seems to be of critical importance 
for resilience to shocks. The household interviews in 2002 showed that some 
families felt that their situation was worse now than before the floods. These 
families had the common factor of family members with chronic health problems.  
 
Mr Dang’s family in Phuoc Dien, are vulnerable even without disaster floods. Their 
biggest problem is their high costs for medical care. He says: In October 2000 we 
got a loan from the Bank for Agriculture of 3 million, which we used to pay back a 
private debt which we took in 1999 to cover hospital and medical costs for our 
daughter. All three children have diseases related to the”agent orange chemicals” 
in my body from the war, which make them lame if it is not treated. The oldest child 
can hardly walk. We have a ”poverty reduction card” which reduces costs by 50 
percent, but the costs are still very high. 
 
Households who rely on day labour as their main income have more difficulties in 
recovering than the farming households. Mr Duoc, in Xuan Loc village, used to have 
an income from pepper, but now his main income is from day labour:  He says: My 
situation is worse this year (2001) compared to the previous year. The rice is 
already finished. I have borrowed money to pay back input costs to the cooperative. 
I do not have pigs now; I sold them before the flood season to pay the school fees for 
my four children. My main income is from working for other farmers. I have not got 
a poverty card from the district authorities, and can therefore not get a reduction in 
school fees and hospital costs. We cannot afford an operation for my wife, which 
would cost 7 million VND (435 USD).  
 
According to the village leaders, Mr Duoc’s household is poor. The village head 
says that there are 15 poor households in the village, but only seven of them are 
registered by the district to get poverty cards
130. Such discrepancies can depend on 
differences in the definition of who is poor between the village and the district level. 
There is also a district quota for how many cards can be registered. 
 
It was difficult for many households to pay back the flood-recovery-credit. 
The time period for the ‘flood-recovery-credit’ was at first set at one year. It was 
however not possible to demand a repayment of the credit after one year, and it was 
prolonged to two years and collected in January 2002. This was still difficult for 
many households. Animal husbandry had more or less recovered by then and people 
could sell pigs to pay the loans. A few households said they would take private loans 
in order to pay the bank. In Van Tri village there were rumours that the electricity 
would be turned off if you did not pay. In fact that did not happen. According to the 
Bank for Social Policy, there were, in 2004, still a number of households in the 
district who had not yet been able to pay the loans back
131.  
 
Mr Duoc in Xuan Loc was, in December 2001, worried about his loans: I do not 
have any source of income to pay back the ‘flood-recovery-credit’. I will have to 
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borrow privately in order to pay. In addition I owe the co-operative 800 000 dong 
for rice inputs for 2001, which I also do not know how to pay. My situation is not 
improving, it is getting worse gradually. Four children in school cost a lot and we 
have lost our main sources of income from the pepper and fruit trees. 
 
Many households interviewed expressed the wish that the paying-back process 
would be spread out gradually, as it would take a long time to generate a surplus 
from which to pay back. With the low level of income generation in the years after 
the floods, several households said that they had almost as great difficulties to pay 
back the credit two years later, as they had directly after the floods. 
 
The state recovery-credit seems to have been an important safety net for people in 
Hai Lang district. But credit as a replacement for losses may not be an ideal form of 
support. Some kind of insurance would be preferred, but insurance against losses in 
natural disaster is difficult, as discussed by many authors (Dercon et al. 2005). There 
is an international discourse about possible ways how to make use of insurance for 
post disaster recovery. At present insurance is a very limited part of the Vietnamese 
rural economy. The concept of insurance is more connected with social insurance
132, 
rather than insurance of property and production. Insurance is further discussed in 
section 8.5 
 
Old debts to the Bank were prolonged 
There was also the problem of old credit which had been taken before the floods to 
invest in e.g. animal husbandry. When the animals were lost in the floods, the credit 
became difficult to pay back. According to the vice head of Van Tri cooperative, 90 
percent of households in the village had old bank loans at the time of the floods, on 
average 2-3 million VND per household
133.  
 
The national regulation was that the state would cancel bank debts if the investment 
loss in the floods exceeded 80 percent of the loan value. In Hai Lang district very 
few households were given debt cancellation. The Bank was readier to grant 
prolongation of the loan period, than cancelling the debts. According to the Bank for 
the Poor in Hai Lang district, 37 percent of the people who received loans before the 
floods had not yet been able to pay back in 2002
134. In 2004 the figure was 20 
percent
135. The Bank prolonged the debts year by year, on an individual basis, in 
assessment of the household capacity. Household interviews suggest that it was not 
difficult for poor households to get the credit prolonged.   
 
Mr B. in Phuoc Dien village says
136: I lost two buffalo – that is the worst thing about 
the flood. They were bought on credit, and I will not have the possibility to buy new 
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ones. Together with an old private debt of 1 million, my debt is now 6.3 million. I 
used the ‘flood-credit’ to pay back a debt to the cooperative, but now (October 
2000) I have a new cooperative debt of 1.3 million that I do not know how to pay. 
The rice harvest was very poor, only 1.5 tons, because the rats ate the crop. I bought 
four pigs after the floods, but they died.  
 
Prolongation of the loan period enabled some households to focus their resources on 
other things, like reconstruction. A household in Van Tri comments: We had a bank 
debt of 6.6 million, which should have been paid back at the time of the flood. When 
the repayment was postponed, we could use that money to repair the house instead. 
 
In many post-disaster situations the inability of people to pay back their loans has 
put a considerable strain on the banks, as in the example of the Bangladesh floods 
1998 (Beck 2005). In Hai Lang, the bank continued to operate normally. According 
to the director of the Bank for Agriculture in Hai Lang, Mr Mai
137, the bank could 
continue with 90 percent of its normal level of lending, despite the outstanding 
loans. The Hai Lang branch borrows money from the Central Bank at national level 
to be able to postpone household repayment of debts.  
 
From 2002 new bank loans were granted even if the old debts were not yet 
paid. 
In 2001 the director the district branch of the Bank for Agriculture stated that new 
loans could not be provided to households who had not yet paid their old debts
138. In 
many interviews people expressed worries that they would not be allowed to take 
new loans, which would leave them in a situation of very limited means of income 
generation. The first two years after the floods this seems to have been a problem for 
many households, not only for the poor. Regulations with the Bank for the Poor 
demanded that the whole group (each group between 10 and 20 households) have to 
pay back before new loans can be issued.  From 2002 onward, the availability of 
credit has however increased, and both the Bank for Agriculture and the Bank for 
the Poor have tended to grant new loans despite old debts
139. 
 
Mrs Hiep in Van Tri was very worried in 2001 because some of the others in her 
‘poverty group’ had not paid back to the bank. In 2002 she however received a loan 
of 2 million from the Bank for the Poor, despite the failure of some in the group to 
pay. She used it for pig raising and was able to sell 3 pigs that year, and for 60 
ducks, but she has not invested again in the shop that was lost in the floods. Many 
more people are trading now. I do not dare to take loans to start up trading, she 
says. 
 
The need for funds after the floods has been much broader than only for income 
generation. Households needed loans for food, reconstruction of their houses and 
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replacement of lost property.  Before 2002 the Bank would not have issued loans in 
a situation were it was likely to be invested in anything but income generation. In 
June 2003, the Bank for the Poor was closed and their function was moved to the 
newly established Bank for Social Policy. The district manager of the Hai Lang 
Bank for Social Policy expressed an understanding that households needed to use 
credit funds more broadly, as long as the main part is for income generation
140.  
Some poor households have been able to reduce their private debts with the help of 
bank credit and now have a better chance of gradually recovering their household 
economy. Others still had serious debt problems in 2004. This will be further 
discussed below.  
 
Twigg (2001) refers to research which suggests that it is common for households to 
take loans which are primarily invested in productive enterprises that generate 
income, but are also used to cope with crises that threaten livelihoods. After a 
disaster, it is common to use credit to replace lost assets. Twigg refers to Wright et al 
(1999) who found that credit funds are often allocated flexibly within the household 
for different needs, including house repairs.  
 
The better-off households seemed to have had to wait until 2002 before they could 
get back to serious business again, with the help of credit. Mr Toan's and Mrs Nghi’s 
family in Xuan Loc suffered similar losses to the others in the village; losing their 
pigs, rice, garden crops and fruit trees and also had difficulties the first year. Their 
main income however comes from a tractor and a rice mill, which also were 
damaged during the floods. Mr Toan says: In 2002 we got a bank loan of four 
million VND (260 USD), which we used to pay back the flood-recovery-credit (1.5 
million), to repair the small tractor for ploughing and to construct a drying yard for 
the rice. Now we have a stable income of a few million per year from ploughing 
services on contract with the cooperative, says Mr Toan.  
 
The situation of better-off families can equally be threatened by the flood losses, but 
it did not appear to be the losses in themselves which cause money worries, but the 
combination of other difficulties, like health problems. Mr Cap in Van Tri tells us: 
When the floods came, parts of the house collapsed. We lost 8 tons of rice, 50 kg of 
pepper, 4 large pigs and a young buffalo. We still have one buffalo. We have 1.5 ha 
of rice and 500m2 of other agriculture crops (potato, beans, sesame and pepper). It 
is only 0.5 ha of the paddy land which is allocated to us. 1 ha of land we rent from 
the co-operative for 4 tons of rice per year.   
 
We raised 4 pigs after the floods. We got 2 pigs from relatives, and 2 pigs we bought 
with the help of the Buddhist society who gave us 150 000 dong (10 USD). 2 pigs 
died from disease. Vaccination did not help. We have high hospital costs, because 
my wife is sick. Our medicine costs are six to eight million VND per year. I think it 
will take 3 years to recover to the level before the floods, mainly through rice 
production. Animal husbandry involves too much disease, so we do not consider that 
yet.  
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2002: This year is a better situation than before and we have enough to eat. We 
managed to get a bank loan of 6 million VND recently, despite an old bank debt. We 
bought a boat for 2 million and used the rest for renovation of the front of the house. 
We have also bought 2 buffalos. In 1999 we had 2 buffaloes and could plough 
almost 3 hectares. We rented a lot of land in My Chanh that year.  
 
Mr Cap's family in Van Tri village has a lot of labour and drought power. In 1999 
they had rented extra paddy land and had 10 tons of rice in the house, when the 
floods came. The family has continued to bid for additional paddy land as business, 
despite the risks, but their household economic situation is not stable. They have 
loans for house repairs and the re-establishment of their large-scale rice production, 
and are dependent on good harvests. They also had high medical costs for Mr Cap's 
wife during many years, which limits their development. 
 
The recovery situation 2004 
The head of Van Tri cooperative
141 says that 10 households in the village are still 
poor in 2004, and have poverty cards. The increased availability of bank credit has 
made it possible for many households to pay back their informal, expensive loans, 
he says. 160 (out of 230) households in the village have received bank loans. 10 
households are however seriously in debt both to money-lenders and to the 
cooperative, according to the head. Paying the debt to the cooperative is normally 
the first priority, because of the sanctions. The cooperative can make a temporary 
claim for a third of the land of a household who fails to pay its debts, and rent it out 
to other households. The income from the rent goes to repaying the debt. A total of 
two hectares have been claimed from the 10 indebted households in Van Tri in 2004. 
In 2001 it was ‘only’ 6 households who were in this situation.  
 
In 2001 there were 20 poor households in the village, according to the head of the 
cooperative
142. The decrease to 10 poor households is partly because some of the 
poor were among the 26 households who have moved and resettled in Khe Sanh, in 
Huong Hoa district in the mountains. Resettlement is further discussed in section 
8.3. 
 
The head of the fishermen’s hamlet in Van Tri says that almost all families in the 
hamlet now have a good income from fish raising and have been able to recover 
well. In 2003 the district Agriculture Section contracted a trainer from the province 
Department of Agriculture to come and hold courses in fish keeping in cages. This 
has so far been successful. The head himself, Mr Chay, however has a more difficult 
situation because of the debts for hospital costs, which are accumulating and makes 
it very difficult to get a stable livelihood
143.   
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In Phuoc Dien village, the situation has not improved much according to the head of 
the cooperative, Mr Tram
 144. 40 percent of the households still have informal debts. 
10 households have resettled in Khe Sanh. The costs of rice production have 
increased, as the state subsidies on fertiliser have been removed. The fertiliser price 
has gone up 50-100 percent, which means a total of 1.6 million VND per hectare for 
fertiliser. According to Mr Tram, households still use the same amount of fertiliser 
as before. He says there is no alternative if you want to have a decent harvest. The 
hope for change lies in expanding the area of fish raising and planting lotus in the 
paddy fields. In 2004 there were 6 hectares of paddy field in the village converted in 
this way which had been successful. Another 30 hectares are about to be converted, 
with state and NGO support, according to Mr Tram. 
 
To sum up: The period of food shortage in 2000, in the months between relief 
supplies and rice harvest was difficult. It was more difficult for low land households 
than for the people in the hill land villages, as apart from rice there are few 
alternative sources of income on the low land. Poor households took informal food 
loans with high interest, causing debts which threatened to burden the household for 
many years. For people in the hill land villages, the access to firewood and other 
minor forest products to sell was vital for coping. The hill land households also had 
a greater range of contacts for day labour and trading at the nearby market, than was 
the case for the low land villages studied. The hill land households lost long-term 
income from perennial crops like pepper and fruit trees however, which caused a 
loss of income for many years. 
 
The first two years after the floods were difficult for most people in Hai Lang. 
Repeated seasonal stress, causing reduced harvest, prolonged the period of recovery. 
In 2002 the situation had improved for many households, due to the recovery of 
animal husbandry production and the increased access to bank credit. The 
households who continued to be in difficulties tended to be those who had other 
additional problems, like poor health, causing lack of labour and high costs for 
medical care. 
 
The role of the banks was vital in recovery. The prolonging of old bank debts and 
increased access to credit from 2002 provided conditions for households to recover 
their income-generating activities. Normally the Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development  operates on a commercial basis, but this time the state stepped in and 
provided the possibilities for the bank to prolong the repayment of old debts, and 
continue to issue new credit. The establishment of the Bank for Social Policy 
reinforced the policy of subsidised credit as a tool for social security for the poor.  
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6. Humanitarian response, coping and recovery, 
Hong Ha commune 
 
In this chapter the process of disaster response and recovery in the mountain 
commune of Hong Ha is discussed and compared to the process in Hai Lang district. 
The disaster response was slower, as the Vietnamese society has more routine 
regarding floods disasters on the low land compared to those in the mountains. The 
massive credit support that was provided in Hai Lang was not provided in Hong Ha, 
with the motivation that Hong Ha has less market oriented production. The 
government however channelled large funds to the rehabilitation and strengthening 
of infrastructure. 
 
Policies for watershed protection have led to a very limited access to land for food 
production for the population in Hong Ha. Households had to cultivate marginal 
areas with low productivity and high risk, to solve food needs after the floods, but 
did not return to practices of swidden cultivation to any significant degree.  
 
6.1 Humanitarian assistance 
 
The disaster response of the national and provincial state was not as prompt in the 
mountains as in the low land, and more depended on the initiatives of the commune 
and district leaders. Hong Ha commune was isolated as the road to the district town 
was cut off by landslides and the telephone lines were down. Already on the third 
day, although it was still raining heavily, the commune leaders Mr Hua and Mr Nam 
walked the 23 km in deep mud to the district centre to inform the district leaders of 
the situation and to ask for help. The district leaders in their turn had to mobilise in 
order to get access to one of the few helicopters available in the province for 
delivering relief
145. Hong Ha was reached by the first helicopter with food aid on the 
7th day after the floods. 
 
When relief supplies started coming in it followed similar principles as in Hai Lang. 
Rice, noodles, clothes etc were distributed equally, with 8 kg rice/per/month
146. At a 
village meeting in Pa Rinh
147 people acknowledged that everybody had received 
between 60-150 kg rice per household from the state/Red Cross deliveries. Poor 
households in Pa Rinh group discussions however, felt that the support should have 
been concentrated on the households who needed it most
148.  
 
When the relief supplies subsided around March, the leaders of the commune 
People's Committee continued to mobilise support. They reported to have visited 
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every organisation they could think of in Hue to ask for food relief. According to 
their own statements
149 they succeeded well and were able to secure basic needs for 
the whole commune population (198 households) until the harvest in June. This was 
also the picture received in the household interviews.  
 
Just as in Hai Lang, the mass organisations played a large role in organising mutual 
assistance. For example, the commune Women’s Union organised household food 
contributions groups. Households contributed rice and 5000 dong (0.3 USD) per 
household to a fund, which was distributed to people in need
150. 
 
 Mass organisations in Hong Ha tend to have a more local (commune) character 
compared to Hai Lang. They do not have as much contact with the district level 
organisations. In Hong Ha the villagers were critical of the fact that there was so 
little physical presence of the district Women's Union staff in the village after the 
floods. They had however received rice, milk and schoolbooks from them
151.  
 
In Hong Ha there is no formal practice of yearly labour contribution. In the 
interviews, households still seemed to see it as natural to take part in the repairs of 
the damaged infrastructure. Hong Ha commune has never had cooperatives as this 
practice never took root in the mountains. Staff of the Hue University of Agriculture 
and Forestry working in Hong Ha describe it as a socially tight community, which is 
helpful when common efforts are needed in disaster response
152. They have had to 
stick together and rebuild their livelihoods under difficult conditions several times, 
as they have had to move first as a result of the war and then because of resettlement 
policies. They are also in a fairly isolated location with 23 km to the district town. 
These factors may have stimulated efforts at self-help.   
 
6.2 Support to the rehabilitation of production  
 
Support to rehabilitation of production focused on distribution of seed. The 
enormous labour efforts needed to recover land inundated by stone had to be 
performed manually by the householders themselves. 
 
Seed distribution was the main state support for rehabilitation of production  
In order to improve access to food within a short time period, the district Agriculture 
Section distributed seed for vegetables. Partly they were new types of vegetables 
that people had not been planting and eating before, such as pumpkin, squash and 
new bean varieties. Households said that the vegetables had been important and 
functioned well, but that production of beans was difficult. The local beans were lost 
in the floods, and the variety that was provided was attacked by insects
153. Hybrid 
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maize (usually called ‘bioseed’ in Hong Ha) was distributed intended for animal 
husbandry production and not for eating. It is harder to digest than the local maize 
but according to the Pa Rinh village head, Mr Duong
154, many people still ate it after 
the floods. 
  
After the floods the district Agriculture Section provided the Hong Ha households 
with rice seed. Mr Duong thinks it was TH30 for the winter crop and Khanh Dan for 
the summer crop, but he is not sure because he has not used them before. According 
to staff of the Agriculture Section
155 the need for seed provided a good opportunity 
to try out varieties which ripen quicker and thus reduce the risk of exposure to the 
autumn floods. In the spring season there were no problems, but in the autumn 
season there were a lot of insect attacks according to the households interviewed
156. 
There are no regulations for risk sharing in cases where the Agriculture Section 
proposes to the farmers to test new seed varieties. This could become a sensitive 
issue, especially in post-disaster situations when people are particularly vulnerable 
to crop losses.  
 
Remington et al. (2002) are critical of donors who insist on the procurement of 
improved varieties and certified seed as the base for relief distributions, instead of 
building on the strengths of existing local seed selection and production practices.  
 
According to staff of the Agriculture Section it is a general problem that there is so 
little research on local seed varieties from mountain conditions. Most of the seed 
comes from low land rice institutes. The staff stresses the need for more research on 
varieties suitable in the mountains
157.  
 
The state invested in significant upgrading of infrastructure, not only 
repairs. 
A Luoi district got significant government support for reconstruction. During year 
2000 the district received 3.5 billion VND (230 000 USD) from the state programme 
“135”, as compared to the 1999 budget of 150 million VND (9 500 USD)
 158. 
Program ‘135’ is a state poverty alleviation program, which has mainly focused on 
upgrading of infrastructure in the poor mountain communes. The vice chairman of 
the district People’s Committee stressed that the emphasis in construction from now 
on is on high quality and stable structures meant to be strong enough not to break in 
every flood
159. During 2000 the irrigation system for Con Tom village was repaired 
and a new bridge built over the Bo River. The road between Hue city and A Luoi 
district town, which goes through Hong Ha commune, was upgraded to an asphalt 
road with concrete walls built along the slopes in several places to stop the 
landslides. Repairs of the Khe Ca Te irrigation system in Hong Ha however, had to 
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wait until 2002 before it was financed. This meant that two out of four hectares of 
paddy in Pa Rinh village remained uncultivated in the dry season for three years 
after the floods
160.  
 
The commune People’s Committee was not impressed with the quality of the Con 
Tom irrigation system. They had not been able to influence the construction design 
as it was the district People’s Committee who was the investment owner
161. From 
2001 the commune People’s Committee were however ‘allowed’ to be the 
investment owner for the coming investments. 
 
6.3 Coping and Recovery 
 
The most important resource for coping and recovery in the mountain commune was 
access to land for food production, according to the households as well as the Hong 
Ha commune People’s Committee. Land is a limited resource as large areas have 
been planted with trees in the watershed protection efforts. Recovering food 
production was a major effort. Firstly recovering the paddy fields and the dry land 
fields, then uprooting and clearing the sugarcane land, clearing old swidden fields 
and grass land for cultivation, all required extremely heavy work. Replanting 
cassava, which is the main food crop, takes 7-9 months before it can be harvested. 
The first year after the floods was thus difficult for most households in Hong Ha. 
 
Efforts to recover the paddy land dominated the first few months of coping. 
Even though paddy rice is a new and relatively less important part of food security 
for people in the mountain commune of Hong Ha, the households interviewed still 
placed considerable emphasis on what had happened to the paddy land. The extreme 
inundation of stone and sand, and sometimes the complete destruction of the land, 
was quite a shock to people. It proved to be a very labour intensive task to recover 
the paddy land.  
 
Mr Duong, Pa Rinh village tells us
162: It has taken many man months to recover the 
land.  I only have one arm since I was wounded in the American war. I and my wife 
spent two full months after the floods digging and recovering two plots, which could 
be planted with rice for the winter-spring season. Then we continued digging and 
two more plots could be planted in the summer-autumn season. One plot was not 
possible to recover. We planted dry land crops also, but the soil was so wet, so it 
was not good for the crops. 
 
According to the commune People’s Committee
163 all but a few households were 
able to recover at least part of their paddy land in time to plant the spring crop of 
rice, which could be harvested in June. This crop was good, around 3 tons per ha 
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(which is good in the mountains), but the autumn crop was damaged by insects. 
Because of the major effort required to recover the paddy fields, the winter-spring 
crop was not planted until March. This postponed the harvest period of the summer 
crop until late October. People were worried about not being able to harvest in time 
before the flood season, but luckily there were no major floods in this area in 2000.  
 
One positive point about the major labour requirements needed to recover land was 
that it created some work opportunities, mainly for the youth. Most households did 
not have the money to hire labour, but a few households did. Mr Xuong
164 paid 
700  000 VND (43 USD) to recover 500 m2 of paddy field. He paid 50 000 
VND/day (3.5 USD) because it was such hard work. This wage is double the 
‘normal’ day workers’ wage in the area. Mrs Bac
165 paid 1.2 million VND (75 USD) 
for the recovery of 500 m2, as it was more deeply inundated with stone. Several 
households also paid for labour to recover their fish ponds.  
 
Dry land rice could have been an option, but there was lack of seed. 
With the focus on paddy production during the 1990s, people in Hong Ha had 
stopped growing dry land rice varieties (lúa cạn). After the floods people tried to get 
hold of dry land rice again, but it was difficult to find seed
166. The NGO project at 
the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry (HUAF) supplied some short-term 
varieties of dry land rice for trials, but these were limited amounts.   
 
Another reason why people had stopped growing dry land rice was the government 
campaign for sugarcane cultivation in 1998-99. According to the commune People’s 
Committee
167 80 percent of the families in Hong Ha commune took part in planting 
sugarcane on land where they had previously grown food. Some people got an 
income for the first harvest, but by 1999 the sugarcane-processing factory in Hue 
had found that the transport cost was too high and were closing down. Households 
could not sell their second harvest. 15 out of 32 hectares of sugarcane were 
destroyed in the floods. The land was now converted back to food production, but it 
required heavy work to get rid of the sugarcane root system
168.  
 
Mr Duong's family has 1000m2 of dry land, which in 1999 was planted with 
sugarcane. After finishing digging the paddy fields, they dug out the cane and 
planted sticky rice for the summer-autumn season. We will have enough rice for the 
winter, says Mr Duong
169.  
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Limited access to hill land was a constraint for coping and recovery 
The most severe impact for food security was the loss of the cassava, as was stated 
both by the households and the commune and district leaders
170. It takes time to 
rehabilitate cassava production. On the lower land the soil was too wet to plant again 
for two months and then it takes 7-9 months before the roots can be harvested. 
Commune leaders are worried about the lack of hill land available for cassava, since 
forest has been planted ‘everywhere’. The hill land that is still available is of low 
quality
171. Many people felt hesitant about replanting cassava in the river valley 
where the risk of inundation is high
172.  Previously (before 1990) cassava was grown 
on the hill slopes. The slopes have since then been planted with forest and are to a 
large extent barred from cultivation according to province level regulations for forest 
protection
173. In the wake of the floods many households nevertheless returned to 
old hill fields that were left fallow or opened up new fields on the grass land. These 
fields however have very low productivity.   
 
A major part of household coping strategies in the mountains are related to access to 
land. The household of Mrs Kan Mua, Pa Rinh village
174 was poor even before the 
floods. They lost their paddy land in the floods and had to depend on dry land crops 
and minor forest products.  
 
Mrs Kan Mua says: We used to have 1500 m2 paddy in the Khe Ca Te area. That 
land is now dry and sandy, but we can grow some dry land crops there. 1000 m2 of 
sugarcane by the river was destroyed, but we managed to clear the field and plant 
dry land rice instead. We had mango, persimmon, cinnamon and pepper in the 
garden, which were lost and we have not planted again. We do not have any 
seedlings. We planted beans and dry land rice and got 24 kg of beans, which we sold 
for 100 kg of rice. We opened up 250 m2 of new field to plant paddy so that we at 
least have a little paddy rice of our own. We have 500 m2 of old swidden fields, 
which gave 180 kg of rice. The swidden field is the most important source of food 
security for us now that we do not have paddy. We would like to expand the swidden 
fields, but we are not allowed to. We do not open up new fields, we return to old 
ones, which are left fallow, but they have very low productivity. We had 300 plants 
of cassava further away, but it is difficult to protect and the wild pigs destroyed it. If 
we had had the cassava we would have had enough to eat.   
 
A household
175 in Con Tom village that lost 1500 out of 2500 m2 of their paddy land 
in the floods has opened up 1500 m2 of hill rice instead for the first time. They did 
not have swidden fields before. It was unusual to open up new swidden fields. The 
other interviewed households said that they were too scared that the fire would 
spread to take that risk. They just returned to old swidden fields, which lay fallow. 
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According to the commune People’s Committee people planted 40 hectares of hill 
rice (lúa rẫy) in 2000. According to staff of HUAF
176  the area under hill rice had 
expanded from 30 ha in 1999 to 60 ha in 2000. The expansion of hill rice meant that 
people returned to fallow fields and cultivated imperata grass land. Imperata is a 
weed with very strong roots that has taken over a lot of the hill land in A Luoi after 
the forest was destroyed by US chemical defoliation during the war. Hard work is 
required in order to get rid of the imperata roots and the land has low productivity
177.  
 
People used a patchwork of opportunities to secure food production, including the 
use of marginal areas, risk-prone areas and areas not meant for production at all. Mrs 
Xuong
178 in Con Tom planted paddy rice in her fishpond and dry land rice on an old 
helicopter terrace on the hillside.  
 
Land for dry land crops is often exchanged informally between relatives or 
neighbours. Mr. Duong says: We borrowed 1000 m2 of cassava land from a 
neighbour. Before the floods we had borrowed 500m2 of banana from my wife’s 
brother in Pa Hy for three years, but we gave it back after the floods. We have some 
banana intercropped with the dry land rice now instead. We have 1000m2 of 
swidden land, but it is too poor quality to use. We want to plant maize, vegetables 
and beans on 200 m2 of land close the river. It does not belong to anyone as is too 
risk prone to be allocated. Anyone can use it. There is around 2000m2 of land like 
that in the village. We will not plant until after the flood period, so we do not know 
yet if we will be able to use that land.  
 
It took a long time to recover the dry land, of which 20 hectares was inundated with 
sand and stone. People were busy working on recovering the paddy fields so the dry 
land had to wait. In May 2000 60 out of 80 hectares of dry land crops in the 
commune had been replanted. Two hectares of dry land were not possible to recover 
at all
179.   
 
According to the commune People’s Committee
180 the commune made a limited 
redistribution of dry land after the floods, in order to ensure that all households had 
access to at least 700-1000 m2 dry land. The dry land belongs to the commune, 
which allocates it to households on an informal basis. The paddy land is however 
allocated to households with formal certificates. It was thus not possible to make 
redistributions of paddy land in response to the flood losses.  
 
New land is being opened up for cultivation some km away. 
An opportunity for accessing land for dry land cultivation is to open up land in an 
area further down the Bo River, around 7 km from the commune centre. It is part of 
a project by the province Department of Sedentarisation. The establishment of the 
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'new area' was initiated before the floods, so it was not related to the flood losses as 
such, but it did fill a convenient function as extra access to land for those who had 
lost land.  Other households who had enough labour to open up new fields also 
moved there.  The expansion of cultivation into the new area is further discussed in 
section 8.5.  
 
Mrs Kan Bang’s family
181 was one of around 30 households from the commune who 
received land in the ‘new area’ in 2000. They are one out of three households in Con 
Tom village who lost all their paddy land. Mrs Kan Bang says: We have received 
2500 m2 of land for planting pineapple and fruit trees. My husband is there now. He 
comes home once every 10 days. 
 
Limited credit in the mountain commune 
Bank credit played a relatively minor role for recovery for people in Hong Ha. State 
flood-recovery-credit of 5 billion VND (300 000 USD) was allocated to A Luoi 
district, but only 52.5 million VND (2300 USD) was granted to 22 households in 
Hong Ha according to the commune People's Committee
182.  In Pa Rinh village, 42 
households applied for credit, but only three households received it
183. The credit did 
not arrive to the households until May 2000, later than in Hai Lang district, where it 
was distributed during February-March
184. 
 
The vice manager of the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
185 in A Luoi 
district referred to directives from the province Department of Agriculture regarding 
the use of the credit. It was said to focus on recovery of lost income opportunities, 
mainly fish raising. The argument for the low response to household credit 
applications was that people in Hong Ha commune have limited production for the 
market. Their losses mainly affected consumption. For the majority of households in 
Hong Ha it was difficult to get flood-recovery-credit even for losses of commercial 
production.   
 
Mr Kon Mua
186 says: We had fruit trees in our garden, bought on credit from the 
Department of Sedentarisation. The trees died in the floods. We had pigs bought 
with a credit through the Women’s Union. The pigs were 30 kg when they perished 
in the floods. We still pay interest on the loan every month. We applied for flood-
recovery- credit, but we did not get it. The Bank does not dare to give us credit. The 
most important for us now is to borrow to repair and strengthen our house. The 
production investments would be in order to generate funds for the house. 
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Mr Duong
187 had recently invested in a fishpond. He lost his fish and the pond was 
filled with sediment, but he did not get any credit either.  
He hired labour from the local youth to help dig the pond again, which cost 400 000 
VND (25 USD). 1999 was the first year he had started trying to raise fish, with 
fingerlings provided by the university (ca tram). He says I will reinvest in fish after 
the floods, but only local species (ca rofi). I suppose we will sell the bigger fish and 
eat as much as we can before the next flood period. 
 
People without enough household labour applied for credit to hire labour to recover 
land and production, but this was not granted. Others applied for credit for recovery 
of animal husbandry lost in diseases after the floods, but this was not seen as a flood 
loss. People also applied for credit to repair and strengthen their houses, but this was 
not granted. Instead, people took loans from relatives, without interest, but the scope 
for such lending is not significant as most people in Hong Ha are quite poor.  
 
In Hong Ha there is no practice of taking private loans according to the households 
interviewed.  A reason may be that the potential moneylenders do not believe there 
is any business for this in Hong Ha, as there is little income from marketable 
products. 
 
The households that did receive credit were better-off households like Mr Xuong
188. 
He tells us: We lost 700 mature fish, 3000 fingerlings, three goats, 14 piglets and 
many chickens. Our garden crops were on higher land and not too damaged. We got 
government "flood recovery credit", six million VND (400 USD) with which we 
repaired the pond, bought new fish, ducks and pigs. We are preparing a new 
fishpond higher up and we will move the fish there during the flood period. We have 
already sold the ducks and fish, and received 6.3 million VND, so we can pay back 
the credit. 
 
Mr Dien
189 in Pa Rinh village got credit of one million VND (66 USD) for fish 
raising, even though he did not lose any fish. He started with fish ponds after the 
floods.  
 
Old debts were not cancelled, only postponed. 53 households had loans through the 
Women’s Union, which they continued to pay interest on after the floods, and 
gradually repaid. The sugarcane debt was cancelled after two years of uncertainty 
about whether this would be the case
190.  
 
The forest provided some income opportunities, but they are decreasing.  
The forest could provide several sources of income; collecting minor forest products, 
planting and tending forest on contract, or working as day labour for others who 
have a forest contract. Collecting forest products was mentioned by several 
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households as an important coping strategy, especially for the poor
191, but it was 
very hard work. When we came to visit Mrs Kan Mua’s family again in October 
2000 only the children were at home. Both parents had been away for a month 
already collecting rattan in forests far away.  
 
Mrs Kan Bang in Con Tom village was one out of a few people who worked as a 
day labourer in the forest sometimes, which gave 20-25 000 VND per day. She says: 
I try to get as much work in the forest as possible, sometimes it is difficult and 
sometimes it is easy. This year (2000) I got 50 labour days. It depends on your 
contacts. You have to have good contacts with the army or other people who have 
forest contracts. I also get an income from tending one hectare of trees that I 
planted last year and from which I earn 479 000 VND (32 USD) over three years. 
 
Mr Nam from the commune People’s Committee explains that most of the forest 
around Hong Ha commune is managed by the Bo River Watershed Management 
Board
192. From 1994 the Board made planting contracts directly with farmers, who 
got an income from planting and tending. In 2000 most of the area close to the 
commune was already planted and the Board signed contracts with the army and 
private entrepreneurs for planting and tending of forest further away. These 
entrepreneurs hired labour, and it was such a labour contract that Mrs Kan Bang got. 
58 ha were however contracted directly with 50 households in three villages in Hong 
Ha in 2000
193. 
 
Mr Duong in Pa Rinh village
194 tells us: In 2000 I planted 1.4 hectares and received 
1 068 000 dong / ha (70 USD). 14 ha were  “allocated” to the village and 9 people 
signed up for 13 ha. Then I took the last hectare. The tree planting is hard work. I 
leave home at 4.30 in the morning and reach the plot at 7 o’clock. Previously the 
payment was in three steps, but now we have asked to get the payment in one lump 
sum. It is better to get a larger amount at once so that you can use it for something 
meaningful.  
 
The village discussions in Pa Rinh
195 suggest that as long as the villagers had an 
income from planting and tending they were basically positive about the 
arrangement with the Board. After the year 2000 there have been no more forest 
planting contracts. This is further discussed in section 8.2.  
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Recovery situation 2001-2002 
Group discussions in Pa Rinh and Con Tom villages
196 in February 2001 suggested 
that 60 percent of the villagers had recovered, while 20 percent were recovering, but 
more slowly. 20 percent were in difficulties. The reasons for the differences in 
recovery according to the groups, included the level of how deeply inundated the 
paddy had become with stone, labour capacity in the household and health situation 
of family members. In terms of assets, the households who had cattle had more 
reserves to recover quickly. Mrs Lan in Con Tom said that she had recovered 
quickly. Her paddy fields were only slightly inundated. She has a salary (200 000 
VND = 13 USD per month) for being the head of the commune Women’s Union. 
Mrs Xuong lost 1500 out of 2500m2 of paddy, and the garden and dry land crops 
were inundated with sand and stone. The paddy she has left only gives one crop per 
year. Her main income now is from collecting firewood and rattan, used to buy 
rice
197.  
 
In 2002 the situation had stabilised and improved for most people in Hong Ha 
commune according to the People’s Committee
198. Access to credit had improved 
and 60 poor households had received credit from the Bank for the Poor. 70 percent 
of the households have pigs now, more than double from 1999. 50 households had 
income from planting rubber in 2002. The state rubber project provides inputs and 
labour wages on credit to the households, which they are expected to pay back when 
the rubber is harvested. The province has started a cassava processing factory and 
many households are selling cassava. They are planting a new variety, provided by 
the NGO project at the University, which grows bigger and is mainly used for fodder 
as it is not as nice to eat. Mr Vuong in Con Tom village says that this new cassava 
has given him an income of one million VND (65 USD) from 2000 m2
199. The 
paddy harvests have not been good because of drought and insect attacks. They are 
hoping for improvement when the repair of the Khe Ca Te irrigation system is 
finally completed in 2003. The dry land rice area has expanded with the help of the 
new short-term seed varieties from the University
200. 
 
The households interviewed had all invested in stronger houses.  
Mrs Kan Mua says
201:  We got a bank loan of three million VND (200 USD). 
Together with a loan of two million VND from relatives we have been able to 
strengthen the house. We got an income from collecting rattan in the forest last year 
of three million VND, but this year we will not go to the forest. The work is too hard. 
We still do not have any paddy land, but we will have 600 m2 next year, when they 
have finished repairing and improving the Khe Ca Te irrigation system. Our main 
income is still from the old swidden fields.  
                                                           
196 22 and 23 Feb 2001. Groups of 10 people in each village assess the recovery situation in 
their village. 
197 Both stories of Mrs Lan and Mrs Xuong are from the group meeting 23/2/01 
198 Commune meeting 24/11/02 
199 Interview 24/11/02 
200 Commune meeting 24/11/02 
201 Interview 24/11/02   103 
 
Recovery situation 2004 
According to the commune People’s Committee, the number of poor households was 
now down to 40 percent from 63 percent in 2000
202.  
 
Mrs Xuong in Con Tom village says
203: I have stopped collecting forest products. It 
was too hard. I got a loan from a trader in fruit tree seedlings and have planted fruit 
trees in the garden. The garden is at risk to floods, so I will try to gradually invest in 
a drainage system around the garden. I and my husband have planted 3.5 hectares 
of rubber and we have received 2.6 million VND (175 USD) for 130 labour days per 
hectare. This is a credit, but it is alright. When the rubber trees give harvest we will 
be able to pay back. 
 
Mrs Kan Bang, Con Tom village says
204:  I received permission from the Forest 
Station to collect wood and have just built a wooden house. I sold cassava for 
400 000 VND (26 USD). Last year I sold cassava for 1.9 million VND, but this year 
I have been sick, so I did not plant so much. My husband is still in the ‘new area’ 
working. We have one hectare of rubber there.  
  
In 2004 several households received state support to build a wooden house, with a 
tin roof. In Pa Rinh village there were only three households left who did not yet 
have wooden houses.  
 
The situation in Hong Ha has improved partly because of income from labour days 
planting rubber and from selling cassava. Over half the households in Hong Ha are 
now involved in planting rubber. This income is risky, as it is a credit to be paid 
back after harvest. It is not clear what will happen if the rubber harvest is poor. 
Several households reported that they prioritise the use of the fertiliser supplied for 
the rubber for the rice instead. 
 
To sum up: After the first year of hardship after the floods the situation returned to 
‘normal’ for the majority of households in Hong Ha. The households who suffered 
long-term difficulties and change in their livelihood conditions were the eight 
households who lost their paddy land. For the majority, the struggle to make a living 
with meagre resources continued in ways similar to the situation before the floods. 
The difference was an increased awareness of the vulnerability of having most 
production in the river valley, and an increased demand for access to hill land for 
production. 
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7. Vulnerability and Access to Resources  
 
In this chapter the aim is to structure the different aspects of coping and recovery 
discussed in the previous chapters, focusing on differences in geographical 
conditions, access to resources and the linkages between poverty and vulnerability. 
Differences between collective and individual access to resources are discussed as 
well as the balance between the responsibilities of the state, the village and the 
individual household. 
 
While government support for recovery was accessed quite equitably across wealth 
groups (people with different income levels), there were differences between 
geographical areas. I argue that there are several areas where structural constraints 
and unequal access to resources have been impediments in the process of recovery. 
Such areas include the health sector, access to land, access to markets as well as the 
insufficient social security system.  
 
7.1 Differences in coping and recovery between the study 
communities 
 
The differences in geographical location result in differences in vulnerability and 
susceptibility between the low land, hill land and mountain villages. Such 
differences are physical geographical as well as socio-economic, cultural and 
institutional.  Table 3 summarises the enabling and constraining factors in coping 
and recovery for the different villages presented in chapter 5 and 6 as a basis for a 
discussion of the different conditions for coping and recovery between the low land, 
hill land and mountain villages.  
 
Table 3: Differences between the study villages: Enabling and constraining 
factors for coping and recovery. 
Factors influencing coping and recovery  Low land  Hill land  Mountain 
Enabling:     
Proactive local leadership.  x  x  x 
Access to minor forest products. 
 
 x  x 
Food relief   
 
Four 
months 
Four 
months 
Seven 
months 
Government credit for production.  
 
x x  
Migration and remittances.  x  x   
Day-labour opportunities.    x   
Active local organisations  x  x  x 
Constraining:      
Very labour-consuming recovery of land      x 
Not enough land for food security.      x 
Seasonal stress in the following crop seasons (like 
rains, insects) 
x x x   105 
Post flood animal epidemics   x  x   
Loss of perennial crops, for which it takes several 
years to regain income. 
 x  x 
Damaged houses had mainly to be rebuilt with 
private funds 
x x  
 
The range of possible production and income influences coping and 
recovery.  
Physical geographical differences and the consequent differences in production, 
influences what type of income is possible in the coping period. Low land 
dependence on paddy rice production means a dependence on income at only two 
main points in time every year. The time span after the flood losses to the next 
harvest was seven months, which was a difficult period to bridge. The recovery 
period was prolonged by the fact that several rice harvests in the years after the 
floods were reduced due to heavy rains during the crop season. Costs of production 
in paddy cultivation were high, which made people especially vulnerable to crop 
losses. Input costs, especially fertiliser and water management costs, frequently 
amounted to almost as much as the output value
205. This agrees with one of the 
conclusions from the ‘participatory poverty assessments’ organised by the World 
Bank in Vietnam, that dependence on a narrow range of activities and sources of 
income is highly significant as a factor of vulnerability (Conway and Turk 2002). 
 
In the hill lands people have a broader spectrum of income, which includes a broader 
range of crops, land for fodder production, more animal husbandry as well as tree 
planting, the collection of firewood and other minor forest products. There were thus 
more sources of income for coping and recovery, spread over different points in time 
and less problems of long periods of food shortage. The total income over the year 
was often lower for the average household in the hill land villages, compared to the 
low land villages, but the spread of different sources of income makes it easier to 
cope with sudden losses.   
 
For the mountain commune, the physical geographical conditions combined with 
political restrictions in land use, meant that the main part of production is on land 
close to the river and was thereby seriously affected by the floods. The main food 
crop is cassava, which took nine months before it could be harvested again after the 
floods.  
 
Market orientation versus subsistence production influence coping. 
The hill land village is the most market oriented. Households here have less of their 
food requirements satisfied by production for consumption compared to the low land 
and mountain villages. The low land households had their food requirements for the 
year stored in the house when the floods came. The mountain households had their 
‘storages’ of cassava in the ground, where they were destroyed by the inundation of 
water. The more market oriented livelihoods in the hill land village meant that more 
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of their normal sources of income were still available after the floods, such as day 
labour, firewood collection, tree planting. The cultivation of short-term crops for the 
market, like groundnuts and beans, could be resumed within a few months. The loss 
of perennial crops, like pepper and fruit, was however a major blow to the household 
economy in the hill land village. This source of income takes five years to recover. 
 
Government policies for disaster response favour the low land areas 
  The basic humanitarian assistance received was similar for the different areas, 
which all got government-organised food relief for the first four months. The 
agriculture section provided subsidised seed for vegetables and rice in Hai Lang, and 
seed grants in the mountains. 
 
Government disaster response was more comprehensive on the low land, as this area 
is normally hardest hit by floods. The impact in the hill land and mountain areas was 
however greater than during previous floods, because of the changes in production 
systems. Hill land production has developed strongly in terms of perennial crops, 
and mountain production has transferred from the hill slopes to the river valleys, but 
these aspects got less attention in government support for recovery.   
 
The farmers in the mountains had to spend months manually digging away stones 
and sand from the fields, without any government support with bulldozers or other 
machinery. On the low land the army and police were called in to help with repairing 
houses and infrastructure.  
 
Government credit for recovery focused on paddy production, which is the basis of 
most people's livelihood on the low land, both for consumption and income. The 
focus on paddy however, meant less credit for the hill land population and no credit 
to the fishermen communities. In A Luoi district the focus was on the loss of 
marketable production, mainly fish raising. Farmers in Hong Ha commune received 
very little credit, although they also had losses of animals bought on credit and 
garden crops for income.  
 
The difference in provincial state attention to the low land and mountain areas can 
partly be explained by the circumstance that the mountain communes are remote, 
and information travels more slowly. The low land gets more attention as it is more 
densely populated and the number of people in need is much greater. Policy 
documents on disaster response and mitigation show a certain bias, in that flood 
problems are mainly associated with inundation of the low land, whilst the effects of 
flash floods in the mountains have been underestimated and less understood. This is 
changing in more recent documents (Govt of Vietnam 2001). 
 
The homogeneity of livelihood conditions within the community influences 
solidarity between households 
When external relief supplies had subsided in Hong Ha, the commune leaders 
continued to travel around to ask organisations and companies for support to the 
commune population. Similar commune initiatives did not occur in the Hai Lang   107 
communes. A reason for this could be the more homogenous economic structure in 
Hong Ha, where most people were poor, and in need of additional assistance. In the 
Hai Lang communes, a larger percentage of the population were able to mobilise 
income, food or support through their own networks. The commune or village 
leaders did not see it as their task to mobilise food relief for the remaining 
households, who had no other source of food than to take informal loans at high 
interest.  The culture of community responsibility for the welfare of all households 
was strong in the immediate disaster response. After the first four months after the 
floods, the capacity to cope and recover was more related to the ‘normal’ structures 
of differentiation and poverty in the villages. Commune leaders in Hai Tan 
expressed the view that disaster response was not a poverty alleviation program
206.  
 
7.2 Coping and the importance of different types of assets 
 
The types of assets that the households have are vital for the possibilities of coping. 
The important assets are not necessarily those that can be sold, but rather those that 
can provide a small daily income during the critical period until regular sources of 
income and food security are re-established. 
 
Start and Craig (2004) discuss household coping strategies in terms of assets, 
activities or consumption moderation. According to the interviews, most people did 
not seem to be adjusting consumption in a detrimental way. Children were still kept 
in school, health costs were paid and food consumption levels were kept stable. The 
interviewed households did not sell productive assets (if they had any left after the 
floods). According to staff of the Hai Lang district Agriculture Section, it is common 
for households to make savings in gold. Households may have had jewellery to sell, 
although it was not mentioned in the interviews. Another resource that was rarely 
mentioned in the interviews was remittances from relatives abroad, although 
members of staff accompanying me during the interviews maintain that it is quite 
common. In Hong Ha commune however, it is unusual for households to have 
remittances, either from abroad or from within Vietnam. According to staff of the 
Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry it is more difficult for people from the 
ethnic minorities to get jobs in the cities. 
 
In Adger’s (1996, in White 2004) discussion of different coping strategies he speaks 
of a sequence where insurance mechanisms (e.g. selling jewellery or taking loans) 
comes first. Secondly the household is forced to sell productive assets to survive. 
The last stage is when the household is forced to break up, with individuals joining 
other households, or distress migration. In the study villages it was mainly the first 
of these strategies that were used, i.e. selling liquid assets and taking loans. 
 
Household interviews and comments from village leaders in Hai Lang suggested that 
a large percentage of households took loans to satisfy basic needs. The interviews 
suggest that the decision to take loans was prioritised compared to reducing 
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consumption or selling productive assets. For example, the family of Mrs Binh in 
Xuan Loc took out a loan rather than selling cattle, which were meant to be kept for 
e.g. wedding and funeral expenses
207. In Xuan Loc and Hong Ha loans were mainly 
between relatives and interest free. In Van Tri and Phuoc Dien (both low land) 
however, both poor and middle-income households took loans from money-lenders 
at high interest rates. Money-lending seems to be a mainly low land phenomenon 
and reflects an economy where household income is concentrated to two occasions 
per year at rice harvest.  
 
Moser (1998) sees assets as a primary factor in determining vulnerability and 
resilience. She follows the Sustainable Livelihoods framework when discussing 
assets in terms of ‘human capital’, ‘financial capital’, ‘social capital’, ‘natural 
capital’ and ‘physical capital’. Bebbington (1999) adds ‘institutional capital’ and 
emphasises the distinction between access though institutional relations as compared 
to individual social relations. Start and Johnson (2004) stress especially the assets 
that are easily convertible into cash to solve urgent needs. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, people did not primarily sell assets for cash. The coping strategies 
that were found to be dominant in Xuan Loc (hill land) and in Hong Ha (mountains) 
included the collection of minor forest products and cultivating marginal plots. 
‘Natural capital’ was thus crucial for coping. As the floods hit hard against the land 
resource in Hong Ha, the means of coping were very much related to recovering 
land or acquiring access to other land as a temporary means of food production.  Our 
findings agree with research in other areas, which shows that the poor often depend 
on some element of open access common property resource for their livelihood, e.g. 
access to the possibility of collecting firewood for sale. (Devereux 2002).  
 
Apart from access to ‘natural capital’, such activities also depend on having 
intangible assets, like human resources and social and institutional capital. Coping in 
Hong Ha required heavy labour to recover the paddy field, and to open up new land 
and re-cultivate the sugarcane fields. In Hai Lang, seasonal migration to work in the 
coffee harvest in the Central Highlands (Tay Nguyen) or the nearby Huong Hoa 
district is an important supplement to household income even in ‘normal’ years, but 
increased in the years after the floods as part of recovery.  
 
Human capital, which includes manpower and good health, seemed to have been the 
most important asset in all the study villages. Given that access to land and 
government support for rehabilitation was relatively evenly spread within each 
village, human capital seems to have been an important differentiating factor 
regarding coping and recovery for different households. The interviews suggest that 
health problems were a serious constraint to recovery from the floods, both because 
of the loss of labour capacity and because of the high costs of medical care.  
 
‘Social capital’ is often mentioned as an important resource, because it contributes to 
the access to other resources. ‘Social capital’ can give access to contacts for day 
labour opportunities, production inputs, land, loans etc. Local organisations are an 
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important part of such ‘social capital’ and play a significant role in access to 
resources. This will be discussed further under section 7.4. 
 
To sum up: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework emphasises household assets, 
capacities and activities to cope with crises. Twigg (2003) sees this framework as 
useful for identifying the assets that are most at risk and those that could become 
most valuable in a crisis.  
The experience in the study villages suggests that access to small, but frequent 
income is vital for coping. Households who did not have this took high interest loans 
to bridge the gap in food security. Such loans tend to accumulate and remain a 
problem for the household for a long period of time. Non-tangible assets like human, 
social and institutional capital were crucial for coping. Labour capacity to recover 
land, to collect minor forest products and to work as day labourers could provide 
food and income for coping. This did not only require labour but also social and 
institutional capital. In Hai Lang, the access to minor forest products and day labour 
was mainly available to the hill land households. They had previous contacts for 
such access, as it is part of their ‘normal’ ways of making a living, as a supplement 
to their farm income.  
 
7.3 Poverty and vulnerability 
 
The World Development Report 2001/2 draws attention to the link between poverty 
and vulnerability by pointing out that the conditions of ‘stable employment, 
insurance, credit and assets help the upper and middle classes to recover faster from 
disaster. The low-income group has fewer options for coping with a disaster. They 
have fewer assets, almost no insurance and less diversified sources of income, and a 
disaster can push them into destitution’.  
 
Poverty and vulnerability are the result of similar structures and livelihood 
conditions, but the two concepts are not identical. This section looks at the aspects of 
poverty, which tend to reinforce vulnerability and the degree to which vulnerability 
leads to, or reinforces poverty. 
 
The time dimension is important in understanding vulnerability.  
The World Development Report 2000/01 defines vulnerability in terms of the 
likelihood that a shock will result in decline of well-being. According to this report 
people are not vulnerable unless it leads to such a decline, but the definition does not 
specify the time perspective. We need to discuss vulnerability not only in the short-
term (one year) but also in the medium-term (2-3 years) and long-term perspective.  
 
Hulme et al. (2001) discuss in terms of the 'transient poor', as distinct from the 
‘chronically poor’. Transient poor are people who fluctuate above and beneath the 
poverty line and occasionally dip into poverty due to an extreme decline in income. 
The 1999 disaster floods pushed many people below the borderline of poverty for a   110
period of time (one-three years). The poverty level
208 in Hai Lang district was 15.9 
per cent in 1998 according to district statistics
209. In 2000 this had increased to 23.4 
per cent, but from 2001 the poverty level has steadily decreased. In 2001 it was 20.8 
per cent and 8 per cent in 2005 (DPC 2005). According to official data
210, the level 
of poverty in 2005 had decreased in all the fieldwork villages and in the two districts 
as a whole. The poverty level in Hong Ha commune decreased from 60 per cent 
1999 to 47 per cent in 2004, according to district data
211.  
 
In Van Tri village the number of poor households had been reduced year by year 
down to 20 before the floods. In 2000 the number of poor households was 26 
according to the village head
212 and 10 poor households in 2004. The 10 poor 
households may have fallen deeper below the poverty line compared to before the 
floods as they were indebted to the cooperative. This is an indication of a serious 
household economic situation, because it implies that they had to give up part of 
their land (formally for two years) to the cooperative for rent to other farmers in 
order to pay the debt. According to households interviewed, giving up land is 
considered as a ‘last resort’ even if it is temporary. 
 
According to the district People’s Committees in Hai Lang 2004
213, the livelihood 
situation for most households in the district is better than before the floods as the 
economic development has continued over the years. This was confirmed by village 
leaders in the study villages in 2004. In November 2002 the pattern was that most 
people had recovered from the floods disaster, while a limited group of poor 
households had difficulties in recovering. The interviews suggest that such 
difficulties are a result not only of the floods, but of additional stress in the 
household livelihood situation, mainly health problems resulting in lack of 
household labour, high medical costs and indebtedness.  Other research has found 
that people can often offset single disadvantages, but have less ability to deal with 
multiple, reinforcing disadvantages (Devereux 2002). 
 
The interviews in 2002 suggest that the 'transient poor' had recovered by this time, in 
the sense that their household economic situation was more or less similar to their 
situation before the floods according to their own perception. The households did 
admit to having a continued feeling of vulnerability to seasonal stress, low prices 
and health problems.  
 
The district and commune officials tend to see the floods disaster as a problem of 
transient poverty. Chronic poverty is considered to have other reasons. According 
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the district staff responsible for poverty classification in Hai Lang district, the 
reasons for poverty include lack of knowledge, lack of funds, lack of labour and lack 
of land, as well as having many children
214. The Hai Thanh commune chairman 
stresses health problems, lack of knowledge and lack of funds as the reasons for 
poverty. He notes however that households with health problems have had particular 
difficulties in coping with the impact of the floods
215. The conclusion from the 
interviews is that it seems likely that the poor are at risk of sinking deeper into 
poverty because of the floods disaster. This suggests the need for combined efforts 
of poverty alleviation and disaster response.  
 
The importance of the family health status is also emphasised in the ‘Participatory 
Poverty Assessments’ (PPA)(World Bank 1999). A serious or long-term illness or 
accident, particularly of an economically active member of the household, is one of 
the most common shocks that a household can face. The Ha Tinh
216 PPA found that 
57 percent of households where the standard of living declined had reported that ill 
health was the cause (Conway and Turk, 2002). Conway and Turk present statistics 
from all the PPAs which suggest that the poorest quintile of the population spend on 
average 33 per cent of non-food expenditure on health care annually. The report 
concludes that mechanisms to meet the costs of medical care for poor and vulnerable 
groups are potentially among the most important of social protection instruments. 
Since 2000 the Vietnam Health Insurance Authority (VHIA) has provided cards for 
free health care but these have a limited outreach (ibid).  
 
Vulnerability leading to poverty? 
Cook (2002) distinguishes between two types of relations between vulnerability and 
poverty. Vulnerability can be a gradual process, slowly leading to poverty through 
long-term erosion of security, entitlements and resources. In other cases people are 
vulnerable to sudden shocks, throwing them into poverty. In the study area, the 
number of people who were ‘thrown into poverty’ as a result of the floods was quite 
limited. This would apply to the eight households in Hong Ha who lost all their 
paddy land. Their livelihood conditions were abruptly changed in a way where relief 
and rehabilitation could not make a significant difference. The interviews suggest 
that for most of the vulnerable households increased poverty is a more gradual 
process, where the floods disaster is a contributing but not the only factor. 
 
Miller (2003) suggests in her study of floods in the Mekong delta that when 
resources have been depleted by crop losses, debts and high medical costs, a serious 
flood can be the event that pushes a household further into debt, out-migration or the 
further erosion of their livelihood base by selling vital assets. Miller quotes one 
villager who estimated that many of his neighbours would have to mortgage their 
land because of the 2000 flood losses. In Hai Lang and Hong Ha, the interviews 
suggest that people did not sell productive assets in response to the 1999 disaster. 
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The situation for the indebted households however, serves as a warning that 
conditions may be declining as suggested by the experience from the Mekong delta. 
 
It is not necessarily correct to assume that households are ‘stuck’ in poverty. The 
recovery period may just be longer, as studies from China by Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2000) and Jalan and Ravallion (2004) suggest. They find no evidence of poverty 
traps, but conclude that it takes many years to recover from shocks and that the 
recovery period was longer for the poor (referred to in Dercon 2005). Dercon’s 
experience from Ethiopia suggests that the recovery period can be very long. It took 
on average ten years for livestock holdings in rural Ethiopia to recover to the levels 
seen before the 1984-85 famine. Dercon acknowledges that there is too little data 
available regarding the long-term effect of such major shocks in general.  
 
Of the interviewed households only few had fallen from being middle-income to 
becoming poor after the floods. A fishing household in Van Tri is such an example. 
They did not become poor as a result of the floods alone, but in combination with 
other livelihood shocks, particularly health problems. The husband tells us in 
2002
217:  Our situation is difficult. My wife is still sick, and we have had to take 
informal loans for the hospital costs for several years now. Our debt is now six 
million VND (400 USD) with 5 per cent interest per month. In combination with the 
flood losses and private loans to re-invest in nets and boat repair, this is a heavy 
burden for the household economy. Two years later in 2004 he said: We now have a 
poverty card, which reduces the hospital costs. But the costs are still high. All the 
fishermen are raising fish in cages quite successfully now. We also have a cage, but 
only 100 fish because of no money to invest. I have sisters and brothers in Saigon, 
but they do not send any money, except for the parents’ grave and other common 
family matters, and only a little for the hospital costs.  Sometimes I can do day 
labour, but very little. If I could I would invest in fish raising. 
 
Poverty that increases vulnerability 
Wisner (1993) focuses on how individuals and households are vulnerable to hazards 
in different ways. People at the same income level do not suffer equally in disaster 
situations nor do they encounter the same handicaps during the period of recovery. 
The poor can thus not be categorised as one group, in terms of understanding their 
vulnerability. 
 
Poverty can increase vulnerability in terms of increased exposure and/or decreased 
capacity to cope and to recover. Sinha and Lipton (1999) draw attention to situations 
when low levels of assets increase vulnerability in terms of unsafe conditions, like 
low quality of housing, access only to marginal lands, poor quality of livestock etc., 
factors that are directly correlated to poverty itself. 
 
In the fieldwork villages we could observe that the poor often experienced damage 
to houses because of simple construction. The force of the water was such that even 
some of the better-off households had their houses destroyed. The better-off lost 
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more in absolute terms, while the interviews suggest that the losses of the poor, 
though not as heavy, have had a relatively greater impact on their livelihoods. 
 
Most households in Hai Lang district have investments in animal husbandry. In the 
1999 floods, all social groups experienced loss of their animals.  The epidemics after 
the floods affected both rich and poor. The poor however experienced losses for a 
longer time period because of fewer resources to invest in pig sties and fodder
218. 
 
The family of Mr T in Van Tri village were poor even before the floods.  Their 
poverty and vulnerability are tightly interwoven. In 2004 their situation was worse 
than it had been before the floods. 
 
In November 2002 Mr T said:  I am often sick and it is difficult to work in the fields. 
We have to hire labour and we get help from our brothers and sisters. We have an 
old debt of six million and a new debt of two million. We have not yet paid back the 
flood-recovery-credit. Recently we got a new bank loan of one million VND. We 
were surprised. Maybe the bank did not check properly? We have borrowed 3500 
m2 of land in Van Quy village from relatives, in addition to the 3500m2 of land 
which is our own. The spring crop yielded 1750 kg but the autumn crop was only 
700 kg because of insect attacks, and it was very dry. We still owe the family two 
tons of rice, but without interest. We have sold two pigs and two others perished. 
Our rice was finished two weeks ago, which means that we will be short of rice for 6 
months. We will borrow rice and pay back at130% after harvest. We are not in debt 
to the cooperative, so we have not had to give up any of our land. Two years later in 
2004 he reported: Now our debt to the bank is 10 million and private debts are 3 
million. We have paid back our loan from the Women’s Union, and got a new loan 
of 2 million. The spring crop this year was bad, so we had to borrow a few million 
through the cooperative. The autumn crop was ok. We have received a cow in a 
poverty alleviation project through the Farmers Association. Our hopes for the 
future are basically to be able to have enough food and gradually to invest a bit 
more in animal husbandry. 
 
Insufficient paddy land, poor health, frequent crop losses, and animal husbandry 
losses make the situation very difficult even without the floods. The increased need 
to take loans for subsistence after losing the rice, and the loans for repairing and 
strengthening the house put Mr T’s family in a volatile situation of debt, which 
means that whatever surplus they have goes on paying the interest. They have 
received support, both formally and informally, which keeps them afloat, but they 
continue to be at risk to losses that could deepen their indebtedness. Their 
vulnerability is linked to lack of resources for generating income, like land and 
labour, in addition to the flood losses. The condition of lack of resources which has 
resulted in their poverty before the floods continues to be a constraint to their 
recovery from the flood losses.  
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The needs of the chronically poor are different from those of the transient 
poor 
Government disaster response may have been adequate for the majority of 
households.  It was less able however to address the needs of the chronically poor 
households in the aftermath of the disaster. Many of the latter resorted to taking 
informal loans with high interest, which were destructive to their household 
economy. This was especially so for households who were previously indebted for 
instance due to high medical costs.  
 
In the Vietnamese discourse, there is sometimes a distinction made between the 
productive poor, who can be helped by investments in production, and the so called 
non-productive poor, who are people who are too old, sick or handicapped to make a 
living from production. If the handicap is a result of war injuries, they are covered 
by the social security system and receive monthly state support. For other groups, 
the social security support is very limited (Conway and Turk 2002).  
 
The distinction between the productive poor and the ‘non-productive’ is difficult to 
make, as practically all households have some productive resource, even if they are 
old and sick. In Hai Lang they often have a formal allocation of paddy land, which 
entitled them to the ‘flood-recovery-credit’ even though they may not be cultivating 
it themselves. The interviews suggest that households with reduced productive 
capacity have difficulties in coping with a shock like the 1999 floods, as the means 
for recovery are so much linked to the labour capacity of the family.  The limitations 
of the social protection system leave the old, sick and disabled in difficulties when it 
is a question of how to mobilise resources for house repairs and replacements of 
losses. 
 
Christoplos et al. (2004) illustrate the arena of relief and development interventions 
as two intersecting axes; one with chronic vulnerability versus temporary crises and 
one with safety nets versus safety ladders.  
 
The Vietnamese government response to the floods was primarily to treat it as a 
temporary crisis, which was addressed by providing ‘safety ladders’ with which the 
transient, productive poor could climb out of the difficulties. For the chronically 
poor, however, the crisis was not temporary. They would have needed ‘safety nets’ 
to stop them from falling deeper into poverty as a result of the floods.  
 
To sum up:  
Hulme et al. (2001) distinguish between the 'transient poor' and the ‘chronically 
poor’. Transient poverty is when people fluctuate above and beneath the poverty line 
and occasionally dip into poverty due to an extreme decline in income. A large 
number of people in the study villages are transient poor. The 1999 floods pushed 
them below the poverty line for 2-3 years after the floods but they have since then 
improved their situation. The interviewed households who said that they were 
worse-off in 2002 compared to before the floods, were those who were poor and 
indebted before the floods. The needs of the chronically poor, I argue, are different 
from the needs of the transient poor as they struggle with additional difficulties, like   115 
health problems, which constrain their capacity to recover. The focus on 
rehabilitation of production was important for the transient poor. The chronically 
poor however, tend to have reduced productive capacity, while they still need 
resources to replace their losses of food, animals, shelter and belongings. I argue that 
the social security system is not adapted to their needs. Only one percent of the 
national social security budget goes to disaster relief (Conway and Turk 2002).   
 
7.4 Collective and individual forms for access 
 
In this section household access to resources through formal and informal channels 
is discussed. I argue that the strong collective components in the provision of inputs 
for production increase access to resources for the poor. Access which is dependent 
on social networks and market contacts tends to be more differentiated according to 
household wealth groups. The types of assets and resources tending to depend on 
‘social relations’ are discussed and also in which cases such ‘relations’ are of less 
importance.  
 
The vulnerability to shocks is not just related to individually controlled resources but 
to the resilience of the community as a whole, as argued by Adger and Kelly (2001). 
High disparities in wealth and high levels of indebtedness and landlessness weaken 
kin and community support mechanisms and put pressure on local institutions and 
cooperative structures. Miller (2003) finds that the nature of the relationship 
between rich and poor and the availability of local employment, fair credit and 
emergency assistance contribute to the resilience of a community to withstand risks.  
 
I argue that the conditions for community responsibility for rehabilitation were 
conducive in the study villages, due on the one hand to the relatively even 
distribution of land and resources, which provides an enabling environment for 
strong local organisations and mutual assistance. On the other hand there are 
indications of growing differences in wealth, which may influence community 
support mechanisms in future.  
 
Social relations for access 
Bebbington (1999) distinguishes between collective or institutionalised, and 
individual forms of social capital. The former is institutionalised for the community 
and thereby not dependent on the individual social capital. The term ‘social capital’ 
can in this context also be replaced by ‘social relations’. Bebbington discusses social 
capital as the relations which mediate access to other types of resources.  
 
Access to relief supplies after the floods in Hai Lang and Hong Ha can be said to be 
built on institutionalised social capital. The community norms appeared to ensure 
that distributions reached everybody, independently of relations or status. Relief is a 
humanitarian action based on need, without any expectation of counter action from 
the side of the recipients, which favours access of the poor. In contrast my 
experience is that in cases of distribution for income-generation, the access of the   116
poor can be constrained by the negative expectations that they would not be able to 
use the resources efficiently (Beckman 2001). Similar observations have been made 
by e.g. Jörgensen (2006). The chances that the poor will be able to access resources 
increase when distribution is based on broad general principles that are independent 
of individual assessments. The state 'flood recovery credit' was more accessible to 
the poor in Hai Lang because it was based on title to paddy land. 
 
Social networks 
When relief supplies had subsided, social networks became more important for 
access to resources. People became more dependent on family and relatives and their 
'normal' set of relations. The interviews show that the difference between households 
regarding access to resources increased at this later stage.  
 
Cook (2002), who has studied social safety nets in China, stresses the importance of 
support arrangements between rural households as determinants of capacity to cope. 
Households without networks may be in a more desperate situation, even though 
they may be less poor. Cook refers to Feuchtwang (1995) who looks at the social 
networks as a source of support in everyday solving of problems e.g. in the event of 
illness, paying school fees and finding work. He argues that this type of support 
becomes crucial, also for coping after a disaster. This is in line with my interview 
results.  
 
As Tudawe (2001) points out that the social networks of the poor are mostly with 
people who are equally poor, and are thus only in a position to provide limited 
support. They are therefore not so useful for covariate shocks when 'everybody' has 
suffered losses. The informal loans from money-lenders were mostly taken from 
traders or rich households with whom the poor household did not otherwise have a 
social relation. It was thus not a 'patron-client' relation according to staff of the 
Agriculture Section. 
 
The social obligations between relatives to support each other in need are 
traditionally very strong in Hai Lang and A Luoi and in Vietnam as a whole
219. 
Which relatives people actually can rely on in practice varies. Many people have 
wide family networks in the same village.  Family relations with village- or 
cooperative leaders can be beneficial as such relations tend to increase access to 
information, which in turn may lead to access to other resources.  
 
It can be difficult for people without a family network in the area, for example if 
they have moved or if a woman is not accepted in her husbands family. According to 
Vietnamese tradition a married woman belongs to the husband’s family, and her own 
family and relatives do no longer have obligations towards her (Jamieson 1993). In 
cases of divorce, which are rare in rural areas, the woman may find herself outside 
the social network of both her original family and her former husband's family, 
which was the case for one interviewee in Van Tri.  
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Formal and informal sources of support and coping strategies 
Table 4 illustrates the different sources of assistance and coping mechanisms 
available to households, divided into formal and informal mechanisms. The formal 
access to resources is organised by the state, the cooperatives or the mass 
organisations. The formal/informal categories are in turn divided according to 
whether access is mainly dependent on individual social relations or whether the 
access in question is part of collective and institutional patterns of distribution with 
transparent regulations for access. Often the individual relations for access also have 
an institutional dimension, and vice versa, but I find that it is still meaningful to 
make a rough distinction. 
 
Bebbington (1999) is interested in the importance of different types of relationships 
for access in the institutional context of state, market and civil society. In his 
example from the Andes, the medium-sized farms access resources through the 
market and kin networks, while small producers depend more on formal and 
externally supported access to knowledge, credit, irrigation, markets etc.  
 
In line with Bebbington’s experience, my data also suggests that the poor tend to 
have better chances of access to resources when these are institutionalised and 
collectively organised, while the better-off have access both through collective 
channels and individual contacts.  
 
Table 4: Informal and formal mechanisms for access to resources for 
coping and recovery 
  Individual household 
access 
Collective or 
institutionalized access 
Informal   Day labour; Cultivating 
marginal land; 
Remittances; Loans from 
relatives; Labour 
migration; Credit from 
local traders; Mutual 
support groups; Individual 
market  contacts for access 
to fingerlings, piglets, fruit 
tree seedlings etc. 
Support from Buddhist 
societies and other welfare 
organisations; Access to 
common property 
resources. 
Formal  Credit through the mass 
organisations; Renting 
extra land; State allocation 
of hill land. 
Food aid; Mutual support 
organised by the mass 
organisations; reduced tax; 
consumer price subsidies; 
State support for house 
repair; Red Cross support 
for housing; State recovery 
credit; Pensions; 
International tree planting 
programs; Infrastructure 
repair and investments; 
Cooperative input supply; 
Subsidised inputs;  
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Access to common property resources was at the time of the floods an important 
resource for the poor. It was a right that did not depend on individual relations. The 
possibilities for the poor to have cattle grazing on forest land and to be able to 
collect minor forest products was particularly important for coping and recovery in 
Xuan Loc and Hong Ha, but such access is diminishing. According to staff of the 
Hai Lang Agriculture Section, the free grazing of cattle in the hills is discouraged in 
line with policies to encourage the establishment of hill land farms. The former 
common property land is being allocated to individuals and groups of households for 
investment in forest planting, gardens and stall-fed animal husbandry. Not many 
households have the possibility to invest. According to the head of the cooperative 
in Xuan Loc in 2004, there are only seven households from the village that have 
received land. There are a few rich people from outside the village who have 
obtained contracts involving large areas of land, as reported informally to me by 
villagers.  
 
Access to land is the most important resource for coping and recovery in Hong Ha 
commune, according to the villagers and commune authorities (chapter 6). It is only 
paddy land which is formally allocated to the households. The flat land in the river 
valley is under commune management and informally allocated to the households. It 
is difficult to get a clear picture of the household access to the sloping land of the 
commune.   The Bo River Management Board and the district Forest Station have 
authority over land use, but the rules for household access are unclear and dependent 
on individual negotiations for short-term land use.   
 
Collective access and the role of the cooperative 
I argue that the cooperatives in Hai Lang are crucial institutions for the access of the 
poor. Through the cooperatives the access to irrigation and drainage is 
institutionalised for the community. Paddy land is distributed in several plots to each 
household in order to spread the risks and access to water regulation. Production 
conditions are therefore relatively equal between households, each having plots both 
in areas covered well by irrigation and drainage and in those which are not
220. 
Access to community water management services is thus not dependent on 
individual social capital, as can be the case in other areas of Vietnam (see Tim 
McGrath 2002).  
 
Many people in Hai Lang used the concept of “chủ động” to signify a sense of 
control over access to means of production and income. “Chủ động” means to be 
able to control things oneself, not to depend on outside forces. The opposite is to be 
“bị động”, which means being dependent on factors outside ones own control. The 
individual and collective “chủ động” are not distinct from each other. I most often 
heard the concept of “chủ  động” when water management was referred to. The 
frustration of not having enough capacity to drain the water to get going with the 
planting for the new crop season is mostly a collective frustration. People want the 
village to have better collective capacity, which will benefit everyone. In other cases 
the frustration concerned e.g. lack of access to credit, where people could feel “bị 
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động” and at the 'mercy' of the cooperative. The fact that bank credit
221 is often 
mediated through the cooperatives means that people sometimes feel that they 
cannot argue their own case, but depend on cooperative goodwill. This was 
indicated by a household in Van Tri.  
 
The households interviewed perceived the cooperative organisation of the purchase 
of inputs as an increase in “chủ động” in the disaster situation, where more or less 
the whole village had similar urgent needs. Under ‘normal’ circumstances the 
system also enables households to purchase inputs on credit, which is appreciated. 
Many poor people reported to be hesitant to deal with the private suppliers because 
of fear of being cheated over quality and price.   
 
Other than for rice, the households make their own production input purchases on 
the market. After the floods there were shortages of piglets, fingerlings, seedlings 
etc. Local traders had to travel far and prices went up. Several households reported 
that they waited until the Agriculture Section and mass organisations organised the 
supply of seedlings in 2002, before re-investing in pepper and fruit trees.  
 
The cooperative also mediates changes in land tenure 
In some areas of Vietnam the right to lease out land has resulted in increasing 
differences in the size of land holdings (Kerkvliet 2006). According to the Hai Lang 
district People’s Committee, there have not been significant changes of land 
holdings in Hai Lang since land allocation 1993. In the interviews, several 
households explained that they had temporary changes in their land holdings through 
bidding for land or temporary letting land for others to bid for. Van Tri cooperative 
leaders confirmed that there are certain opportunities for households to extend their 
production by bidding for land. The cooperatives also have some land, around 5 
percent of the total area, which is rented out to give an income to the cooperative for 
common purposes. People can bid for land from other cooperatives as well, not only 
their own. There are different reasons why households bid for more land. The 
fishermen as well as newly established households, who have too little or no paddy 
for subsistence, bid for land. Some better-off households, who have labour and 
draught capacity to expand their production also bid for land. The fact that both rich 
and poor are involved in bidding for more land can be expected to lead to the better-
off getting the better land. The two poor households interviewed in Van Tri who 
were involved in bidding for land received plots that were at high risk to either flood 
or drought.  
 
Households who are indebted to the cooperative have to give up part of their land 
for bidding through the cooperative for a (hopefully) limited time period. According 
to staff of the Agriculture Section, most co-operatives in Hai Lang use a system of 
sanction against households in debt whereby they claim part of the household land in 
order to lease it out and use the money to cover the debt. The co-operative in Phuoc 
Dien is however unable to use such means of sanction as the frequent crop losses 
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result in too many households being unable to pay their debts. In Van Tri village six 
households where affected by this arrangement in 2001, which is similar to before 
the floods. In 2004 the number of households who had to give up part of their land 
for bidding had risen to 10, according to the head of the cooperative.  
 
In the hill land villages, the cooperatives fulfil a similar function as on the low land 
for paddy production, but as paddy is a minor part of the household economy, the 
role of the cooperative in the community is also less. Each household is more 
dependent on their own relations for access. In Hong Ha commune (mountain) there 
is no co-operative. Here the main mediator of resources for the households is the 
commune People's Committee.  The role of the cooperatives is discussed further in 
the next section. 
 
Diversification is dependent on market contacts 
Whilst the cooperatives ensure a relatively equal access to inputs for paddy 
production, there is a greater difference in access to resources for diversification of 
production, for which individual market contacts are more important. Better-off 
households diversify their production more, both because they have the resources to 
do so, but also because they have the required knowledge and market contacts. 
Many households seemed to feel hesitant regarding market contacts. When poor and 
middle-income households try new crops it is mostly in the context of a government 
campaign for e.g. green beans, groundnuts and pepper in which subsidised inputs are 
provided
 222.  
 
The so called diversification projects in Hong Ha commune are actually government 
campaigns for bulk production of a particular cash crop. 80 per cent of households 
in Hong Ha took part in the sugarcane-planting project 1998-99 according to the 
commune People’s Committee. A current campaign concerns the planting of rubber 
trees with inputs provided on credit and in which around 50 percent of the 
households are taking part. Presently rubber looks like a very good investment, with 
high world market prices. No-one knows what the prices will be in seven years time 
when it is time for harvest. The rubber trees are sensitive to storms as was witnessed 
in 2006, when parts of the rubber plantations in the neighbouring Nam Dong district 
were destroyed in a storm
223. It can therefore be a risk for poor households to 
become indebted in such projects. The interviews suggest that households are 
sometimes not aware that they have to pay back the costs of the inputs; but the 
sugarcane debt was partly cancelled because of the floods.  
 
Some government projects have been quite inclusive of the poor
224, for instance state 
support for planting a certain crop. These projects have quantitative targets and are 
set on including as many people as possible, but training is often a limitation. Fewer 
resources tend to be available for such projects than for material support, and the 
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people selected for the training courses are frequently not the poor. The extension 
staff and commune leaders expect them to have less capacity to take in and make use 
of the training (Beckman 2001). In A Luoi it has been more common for the poor to 
take part in training courses provided by the district Agriculture Section
225. The 
households interviewed however commented that the training was quite theoretical, 
difficult to remember and apply in practice. With the support of the NGO project at 
Hue University the training methods are changing and becoming more field oriented 
(Beckman 2004).  
 
The remoteness and transportation costs reduce the market contacts for most people 
in Hong Ha. The staff members of the commune People’s Committee spend time 
arranging deals with suppliers of inputs in Hue city and A Luoi town, both private 
and public. The chairman Mr Hua’s mediates contacts with suppliers of fruit trees 
from Hue. Mr Xuong in the commune People’s Committee has both agriculture and 
veterinary education. He raises fingerlings for sale to people in the commune for fish 
raising, works as a commune veterinary and organises agriculture training. Earlier he 
used to sell fertiliser and pesticides on credit in the commune, but he has stopped 
since people had difficulties paying back the credit
226.  
 
Engagement in mass organisations as a means of access 
Formally government projects are open for all who register, but when resources are 
limited there is still a selection process. Being active in the mass organisations is a 
way of keeping up to date about government extension projects in both Hai Lang 
and Hong Ha.  The social networks that arise from regular meetings in the mass 
organisations tend to give an advantage in distribution of resources, as suggested by 
several households.  
 
Mr T in Xuan Loc tells us: We are related to Mr Do (in the cooperative leadership). 
He helps us with information about the state programs and such. I took part in two 
training courses last year by the Bank for the Poor and I take part in meetings of the 
mass organisations. Another cooperative member of staff laughs about the reference 
to family relations with Mr Do and says: Mr. Do is related to 70 percent of the 
people in the village.  
 
The staff of village- and commune organisations in Hai Lang district almost 
exclusively consists of men. The staff of the Women's Union are of course women, 
and they are represented in the People's Committees, but otherwise the political and 
organisational life in Hai Lang is dominated by men. This appears to give an 
advantage to the men in the village in that it is primarily men who are selected for 
training courses and who go to meetings. The women go to Women's Union 
meetings and receive training in pig raising, which is the women's niche. In Hong 
Ha there are more women active in the commune level activities, for example the 
chairperson of the commune Farmers’ Association has been a woman for many 
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years, and for a time the vice chairperson was also a woman. In general, the bias 
towards the dominance of men in commune activities is also prevalent in Hong Ha.  
 
'Envelopment' 
The term ‘envelopment’ was invented by my Vietnamese colleague, when working 
in northern Vietnam, and is a phenomenon all over the country. Decisions by people 
in leadership positions can influence individual access to land, access to credit for 
private investment, access to construction contracts etc. This gives rise to a culture 
of 'envelopes' (containing money), as a regular part of relations with political 
leaders, which is spoken about quite openly. It is becoming more common as more 
money is in circulation in the economy than ten-fifteen years ago. As it is so 
widespread, one may assume that there are too many people who have already 
benefited from the system, which makes them reluctant to draw attention to fighting 
the practice.  
 
For village- and commune level leaders there seems to be a saturation point at a 
certain level of living standard. One villager in Hai Ba commune expressed it as: 
"There is no point in replacing the cooperative leader on the basis of his receiving 
envelopes. Now that he has received enough to build a good house he is satisfied. If 
we replace him with a new leader, then that one will require envelopes until he also 
has a good house". I did not hear of any indication of corruption in the context of 
flood relief. It seems that the social norms are strong enough to avoid diversion of 
funds when the recipients are in an emergency situation.  
 
Food relief, recovery-credit and support for house reconstruction also seem to have 
been distributed without any bias toward social relations. Reasons for this may be 
that the need for speed meant that the establishment of general principles for 
distribution avoided selection processes that could suffer from bias. In the 
succeeding phases of recovery however, the interviews suggest that access to 
resources was more influenced by social relations.  
 
To sum up:   
Adger and Kelly (1999) argue that vulnerability to shocks is not just related to 
individually controlled resources, but also to the resilience of the community as a 
whole. An important aspect in this respect is the homogeneity of the community. In 
Hai Lang district the relatively equitable distribution of land, and the circumstance 
that paddy rice is the base for most people’s livelihood, provides conditions for a 
collective approach to water management and production services. This collective 
structure was also the base for organising disaster response.  
 
Bebbington’s (1999) experience from the Andes suggests that institutionalised 
access to resources is an advantage for the poor farmers compared to access through 
the market and kin networks. Small producers tend to depend more on formal and 
externally supported access to knowledge, credit, irrigation, markets etc. I draw 
similar conclusions from my study area. The inputs and services through state 
channels or the cooperatives are more accessible to the poor, compared to resources 
for other lines of production, which are more dependent on individual market   123 
contacts. The interviews suggest that humanitarian assistance and credit for recovery 
did to a great extent reach the poor. Long-term recovery and adaptation through e.g. 
diversification appears to have been more dependent on market contacts, which led 
to a differentiation in favour of better-off households.  
 
The importance of relations between the households, local government and local 
organisations in developing resilience is discussed further in the next section. 
 
7. 5 The relation between state and 'civil society'  
 
Christoplos (1998) emphasises the point that the role of the organisations in the 
context of disaster must be understood as part of the ongoing process of construction 
of the relation between organisations and villagers in development. The relations in 
the everyday development process are important for risk reduction and resilience. In 
the following section I discuss relations of access both in direct relation to the 
disaster response as well as the relations that influence recovery in the longer 
perspective. 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, Vietnam has high capacity for disaster 
response. The interaction between local government and 'civil society' in Vietnam 
was important in handling the 1999 floods disaster and in the process of coping and 
recovery. What can we learn from these experiences? The Vietnamese experience is 
special because of the high level of organisation in society. The disaster response 
builds on an organisational culture where there are routines for organisation of 
community action also under normal conditions. This culture is to some extent 
changing with the economic reforms (đỏi mới). Adger (2001), who has studied areas 
in the north of Vietnam, is concerned about what he sees as an erosion of such 
organisational culture, which in turn leads to an erosion of community capacity for 
disaster preparedness and response. At the same time he finds a spontaneous re-
emergence of civil institutions, which forms a counterbalancing institutional 
adaptation. An example is the expansion of informal credit systems and reciprocity. 
Adger refers to Malarney (1997) who also sees a re-emergence of institutions 
associated with local collective action. 
  
In Hai Lang and A Luoi districts the reforms have not led to erosion of collective 
organisation. The cooperatives in Hai Lang did not collapse, but are adapting to the 
changing society. They still play a central role in the management of infrastructure, 
credit and disaster response. Collective action in Hong Ha commune appears to be a 
mixture of traditional community structures and the more recent emphasis on the 
mass organisations. 
 
The disaster response was an example of the positive aspects of the high level of 
organisation with clear lines of authority in the Vietnamese society. The previous 
section discussed how this high level of organisation influences access to resources 
both positively and negatively. This following section further examines the relations 
between the state, households and local organisations. The mobilisation in disaster   124
response involved a high degree of 'civic engagement'. People did not just sit and 
wait for relief, but took active part in the mobilisation of resources and in 
reconstruction. How do we understand this 'civic engagement'?  
 
Synergy effects in the coordination of disaster response between state and 
‘civil society’ 
Vatsa (2002) defines ‘governance’ as referring to norms, traditions and processes 
that impinge on the exercise of formal power and authority. Governance is discussed 
in terms of the relation between formal authority (government) and other actors in 
society at local level as well as in terms of structures with informal authority.   
 
Wisner et al. (2004) summarise what they see as characteristics of social relations 
and governance that seem to explain successful disaster mitigation in a 'golden 
dozen' list (p.346)
227. This list includes  
•  trust between the authorities and civil society; 
•  social cohesion and solidarity; 
•  good cooperation and information-sharing among institutions involved in 
disaster risk reduction; 
•  a political commitment to disaster risk reduction; 
•  investments in economic development that take into account the potential 
consequences for disaster risk reduction; 
•  investment in human development and social capital.   
 
Tendler (1997) points to experience where good governance has contributed to the 
development of strong civil society, supporting norms of co-operation and networks 
of civic engagement among citizens. Putnam (1993) has highlighted how civic 
engagement nurtures good governance and vice versa. Evans (1996) uses the 
concept of "state-society synergy" for situations whereby government and 
communities actively enhance each other’s efforts.  
 
In a review of international experience Evans concludes that synergy is most often 
fostered in societies characterized by egalitarian social structures and robust, 
coherent state bureaucracies; factors which characterise the Vietnamese society, at 
least in comparison with many other countries. The Vietnamese society is complex, 
and is partly moving away from egalitarianism with increasing market orientation. 
There is however a political economic and cultural base of egalitarianism e.g. in the 
distribution of land in the north and central parts of the country (Kerkvliet 2006). (In 
the south it was never possible to reinforce an egalitarian land reform.) The 
relatively equal distribution of land makes it easier for a village to act as a 
                                                           
227 Wisner has studied Cuba's management of the hurricane Mitchell 2001 as an example of 
good governance. The deaths in the hurricane in Cuba 2001 were limited to just five. This 
success has been attributed to thorough preparedness training and planning, an effective cadre 
of local personnel, effective communication of early warning and instructions, which people 
trusted and acted upon, and political commitment to risk reduction with attention to the most 
vulnerable people. (Wisner et al. 2004) 
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community, because people have relatively similar interests. There are however 
other differentiating factors, like knowledge and remittances, which lead to income 
gaps between the households. There is an ongoing differentiation between business 
oriented households and households who produce mainly for subsistence. 
 
Tradition of disaster mitigation 
The broad participation in reconstruction after the disaster floods in Hai Lang is 
based on a tradition and routine for urgent community action when there is a risk of 
flooding affecting the crop. During my previous work in the district I noted for 
example how the chairman of Hai Duong commune People's Committee proudly 
reported that he had been able to mobilise almost a thousand people in the commune 
within an hour, to mend and secure the dike when it threatened to give in to the high 
water level of the river in 1998.  
 
According to Le Bach Duong et al. (2001), the high level of organisation in the Kinh 
villages originates in traditional structures like kinship networks, groups, guilds and 
associations of common interests. The codes of practice of these institutions (Hướng 
Ước) provided a basis for the regulation of agriculture needs, mobilisation against 
disasters, invaders etc. The present day village regulations build on these traditional 
codes of practice and are often important in mediating between the interests of the 
state and the village communities (Bui Xuan Duc 2003).  
 
It was often difficult to distinguish what was the initiative of local government from 
other types of local action in the disaster response. Formal and informal institutions 
interact and intersect. Village practices are based on traditional village norms and 
practice, but they are also influenced by government policies. Adger (2001) calls it a 
Vietnamese 'synergy' between state and society, a hybrid of state planning and 
traditional Vietnamese collective action and culture. He notes the difficulties in 
distinguishing between the Confucian tradition of strong communities, which follow 
the guidance of local leaders, and the present day strong state.  
 
Local organisations as mediators between state policy and village practice 
The commune level is the lowest level of government administration, which leaves 
village level with some leeway in which policies they choose to integrate. The 
commune level government is obliged to anchor decisions through village leaders, 
mass organisations and village meetings as stipulated in the 'grassroots democracy 
decree' (Govt of VN 1998). The Vietnamese proverbs: "The emperor's rule stops at 
the village gate" and "the mountains are high and the emperor is far" are still valid as 
local leaders have always had (or taken) substantial margin for in practice to 
'reinterpret' centralised guidelines in ways acceptable to the locality (see e.g. 
Jamieson 1993 and Adger 2001).  
 
Vietnam does not have so much 'civil society' in the sense commonly used, as 
organisations independent of government, which can monitor government action. 
The civil engagement and high level of organisation at local level however, does   126
result in an interactive discourse on local development, where local policy 
implementation is adapted according to local conditions and local political debate. 
Le Bach Duong et al. (2001) have likened ‘civil society’ in Vietnam to being a 
'society of mediating organisations' whereby these groups serve to bridge the gap 
between the state and society. In Hai Lang and Hong Ha, the main organisations at 
local level are the mass organisations. They have close links with the government 
structures and are loyal to the government policies, but are also accountable to the 
community. The balance between these loyalties varies between different areas and 
different situations. The mass organisations have a strong role in the process of 
nomination of candidates to the Commune People's Council through which the 
community influences policies at local level.   
 
The high level of integration between local government and local organisations may 
result in an individual having a negative relationship with one side which may spill 
over and affect relations with other local actors.  
 
Apart from the mass organisations, the most important organisation at village level 
in Hai Lang is the cooperative, which will be further discussed below. There are also 
professional organisations and religious bodies. The Buddhist societies played a 
major role in mobilising and distributing relief supplies of basic necessities. In Hai 
Lang there are also several Christian groups, which were also active in the relief 
work.  
 
The ethnic minorities in the mountains have traditionally been quite independent of 
the national structures in the Vietnamese society, and have their own community 
practices. I did not have the opportunity to spend the time needed to understand 
these practices in any depth. The structures of local government and mass 
organisations are the same as in the Kinh villages, but the villages tend to have less 
frequent contact with district and province level.  
 
The relation between the public and private sector 
Evans mentions a second factor that stimulates synergy, which involves the links 
between the public and private sector. This relation is quite complex in the 
Vietnamese context. There are few larger private companies in the rural areas. The 
private sectors in Hai Lang and A Luoi mainly consist of individual entrepreneurs. 
Many people employed in the public sector are also active in a private capacity, and 
informal relations play a significant role for market contacts. For example, it is 
common for individual district and commune staff to have  private businesses 
producing seedlings, which are required by the public support programs and bought 
by the district authorities
228.  
 
The linkages between the state and private capital are however not as developed in 
Vietnam as in China, where there are strong local ties which connect local state 
officials and entrepreneurs to joint projects of rural industrialisation. (Oi 1992) 
                                                           
228 E.g. the forest staff of the Hai Lang Agriculture Section, June 2004 
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Evans cautions us that ‘when individual officials are enmeshed in close relations 
with elites who command private resources, there is a high risk of rent-seeking 
behaviour. Unless such behaviour is constrained by powerful internal norms and a 
dependable rewarding system of long-term career benefits, corruption is likely to 
become the prime consequence of such ‘embeddedness’ ’. In Hai Lang and A Luoi, 
my understanding is that a certain degree of ‘kick-backs’ are provided in the state-
private relations, as staff salaries are low, but norms in society at local level prevent 
such ‘kick-backs’ from becoming too dominant.   
 
In both Hai Lang and Hong Ha there tends to be a strong correlation between 
political and economic strength.  People who are economically successful are 
admired by the villagers, which gives them credibility for leadership positions. This 
can be both positive and negative for the village, depending on the personal 
characteristics of the leaders in question. A case, in which the entrepreneurial force 
of an individual also benefits the village, is that of the cooperative chairman of Cau 
Nhi village, Hai Tan commune. Under his leadership the village produces high 
quality seed for sale to other villages. Cau Nhi is always first to try new economic 
crops and options, often successfully. They attract a lot of district investment in 
infrastructure and training and are praised by the district staff as being resilient in 
face of the floods. They had good storages of necessities, including seed and good 
commercial relations with blacksmiths, carpenters, construction companies etc. for 
quick rehabilitation of both community and household property
229.  
 
On the other hand, there is the case of a successful farmer and businessman in Van 
Tri village who used to be in the commune leadership at the time of the 1999 floods. 
He was seen by many villagers as mainly using his position to promote his own 
business. During the 1999 floods, he failed to play the role that was expected of a 
leader in terms of paying attention to the welfare of all the villagers, and being 
generous in support. In 2000 he lost his leadership position. The cooperative leader 
of Xuan Loc village lost his position in 2003 due to prioritising his own economic 
interests before that of the village.
230 
 
The discretion of local government 
Evans third point is that a strong state bureaucracy is an enabling factor for state-
society synergy. Tendler's (1997) experience from Brazil suggests that an important 
factor behind the effectiveness of government programs was the creation of 
municipal councils, with broad representation from different sectors, which enabled 
co-ordination and monitoring of activities. 
 
This agrees with the organisation of disaster response in Hai Lang, where the district 
authorities co-ordinated between the different sectors like agriculture, forestry, 
education, health and poverty alleviation programs as well as the activities of the 
                                                           
229 According to staff of the district Agriculture Section, and my own contacts with Cau Nhi 
cooperative. 
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Red Cross and mass organisations. The strength of Hai Lang district People's 
Committee is said by many actors
231 to be related to the leadership skills of the 
chairman, who is often called upon to mediate in conflicts between different interests 
at all levels in the district. 
 
Hai Lang district had a broad mandate of decisions on resource allocation in disaster 
response, as actions had to be done urgently. There are disaster preparedness plans, 
which means that the district authorities know in advance what type of actions they 
have mandate for; for example calling the army to help with rebuilding houses, 
infrastructure and sanitation. The province authorities monitor the work of the 
district, but do not have to approve actions in advance.  
 
The role of public staff  
Lipsky (1980) discusses the importance of understanding the behaviour of the 
frontline staff. They mediate the relationship between the citizens and the state, and 
thereby influence the implementation and outcome of policy. In Hai Lang we could 
observe a high level of staff engagement and action in disaster response, as reported 
in chapter 5. How do we understand their motivations? Tendler suggests trust and 
responsiveness as key factors. She argues that the extent to which government 
programs are able to combine social capital formation with the delivery of services, 
is a strong factor behind success in development efforts. In her Brazilian example 
the local staff received strong recognition for their actions both from below and 
above. Evans also concludes that an important outcome of public-private 
cooperation is the social capital that is formed or enforced, and becomes an 
important factor in development.  
 
In Hai Lang the social relations between district staff and the local population are 
often strong. Many of these relations derive from the fact that the district staff come 
from, and are part of the communes in the district. Even if they now live in the 
district town, their parents and relatives reside in the rural communes. Local officials 
have such strong linkages with the commune population that it is difficult for them 
to escape from public opinion about their performance. This is also the case in other 
areas of Vietnam as reported by Shanks et al. (2003). Shanks et al. refer to authors 
like Sikor & Dao Minh Truong (2001) who argue that commune and district officials 
function as intermediaries, who rather than directly implementing state policy, play 
an important role in negotiating it with the local communities.  
 
Government staff, especially at commune level, may at times have a difficult 
balancing act in their role as representatives of the government in relation to the 
commune population, as well as representatives of the commune population in 
relation to higher levels of government. In Hong Ha commune, this is especially so, 
in the case of state policies on restricted land use and forest protection, where the 
commune authorities have different perspectives compared to province level 
government (see section 8.2). 
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Evans stresses the importance of the day-to-day public-private interactions and the 
norms and loyalties that develop in that process. He refers to Lam's work on 
Irrigation Associations (IA) in Taiwan, in which he concludes that ‘the dense 
network of social relationships which exist among IA staff and IA members is the 
key to the system's effectiveness at the local level’. ‘IA's are overwhelmingly staffed 
by people who are born in the locality, have lived there all their lives, and in many 
cases also farm there’. Lam argues that officials who make their careers in the 
locality rely on the experience and knowledge of local farmers. Farmers and officials 
are engaged in a shared project to ensure that services are delivered.  
Lam's experience echoes the situation in Hai Lang, where government staff and 
leaders of local organisations have strong ties with the village population. As Lam 
also concludes, this ensures a significant level of accountability by the staff and 
leaders to the community. This accountability, however, may sometimes not to the 
community as a whole, but focused on the more successful farmers and 
entrepreneurs.  
 
The role of the cooperatives is continuously changing 
Before the market reforms, which started in 1986, the cooperatives were almost like 
a level of government and were given duties accordingly. The old cooperatives used 
to collect government tax from the villagers, but this duty has been transferred to the 
commune authorities. The role of the cooperatives changed when the paddy land 
was allocated to the individual households, which was completed in 1993 in Hai 
Lang. The cooperative law of 1996 provided space for a new type of cooperative, 
emphasising their role as an economic association of voluntary members, and the 
autonomy of the household as the basic economic unit. From 1999 the role of the 
village head is being strengthened, which relieves the cooperative of part of its role 
as representative of the village. There is a division of responsibility, in which the 
village head is responsible for social issues in the village, and the cooperative 
responsible for production issues. Government policies and proposals for economic 
development in the commune are anchored and discussed through the cooperative, 
which organises village meetings. In many parts of Vietnam the village management 
of irrigation, drainage and flood protection suffered when the cooperative system 
was reformed. In some cases the cooperatives collapsed and new organisational 
forms for water management had to be created.  
 
In the Mekong delta, the cooperatives never took root in the first place. Miller 
(2003) discusses why farmers in her fieldwork area in the Mekong delta resist the 
formation of cooperatives, although the intensification of agriculture production and 
more advanced water control systems would be expected to encourage such 
organisation. According to Miller the resistance is related to the fact that the modes 
of cooperation are perceived as government constructs. They are likely to be resisted 
as long as they are not based on the pre-existing rules, norms and relations. The 
relation between the state and the farmers is historically different in the south of 
Vietnam, with less state authority, compared to the rest of the country. Miller also 
sees constraints for cooperative organisation in the inequalities of access that exist in 
the current water control system in the Mekong delta, which she argues, undermines 
resilience to risk scenarios.   130
In line with Miller’s analysis, my understanding of why cooperative management of 
irrigation, drainage and flood protection in Hai Lang functions better, is related to 
the more equal distribution of land and access to water, compared to that of the 
Mekong delta. In Hai Lang the perceptions regarding the collectivisation of land in 
1975, as reported to me by villagers, were generally positive as unequal structures of 
ownership and political influence were dismantled
232. The cooperatives were based 
at village level, which makes them smaller than in many areas of the north and 
south, where they often are based at commune level. This makes it easier for the 
villagers to feel that it is their organisation, which they control. The late introduction 
of the cooperative system, as compared to in the north, contributed to the 
cooperatives in Hai Lang seemingly becoming more pragmatic and ready to change 
with market reforms. However, I understand the system has a long way to go before 
the cooperatives really are 'economic organisations of voluntary members', as 
prescribed in the cooperative law of 1996. At present it is difficult to be independent 
of the cooperative, as access to resources is to a great extent mediated by them.  
 
Staff of the cooperative union at province level are also concerned that it is a slow 
process supporting the cooperatives in their activities related to broader production 
issues and business orientation
233. Although cooperative business development is 
said to be in the interest of the village as a whole, I see a risk that a shift in 
cooperative focus to business would mainly serve economically strong members.  
 
To sum up:  
The thesis draws on work by Evans (1996),Tendler (1997) and Lipsky (1980) who 
all emphasise the importance of understanding the relation between government staff 
and their clients, in the case of this study, the villagers. They point to the norms and 
loyalties that develop in the process of day-to-day public-private (household) 
interactions. Evans’ analysis of state-society synergy lifts forward how government 
and communities can actively enhance each others' developmental efforts. He argues 
that such synergy is most often fostered in societies characterized by egalitarian 
social structures and robust, coherent state bureaucracies, characteristics which fit 
the study area. I argue that the nature of relations between government staff, local 
organisations and households in Hai Lang and A Luoi strengthen the resilience in 
the studied villages.  
 
As argued in Lam's (1996) work on Irrigation Associations in Taiwan, the fact that 
the members of the district staff and their families come from the rural communities 
increases the engagement in collective efforts. This is also the case in Hai Lang, 
where there is a high degree of integration and interaction between local government 
and the village population.  
 
The feelings of trust in staff-citizen relations are not unproblematic. Lipsky suggests 
that such relations may lead to favourisation of some clients over others. The staff 
members get more job satisfaction from working with people who they know and 
trust, which means that they focus on a few relations and hope that they in turn will 
                                                           
232 according to comments from many people during my years in Hai lang 
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spread the communication. This is also a feature in the villages in this study, where 
the members of staff tend to have closer relations with leaders and successful 
farmers. The way the village institutions function in the spreading of information 
and access to resources is crucial. The cooperatives in Hai Lang have both positive 
and negative roles in this interaction. The strengths involve the organised access to 
inputs and water management services, which facilitates access to resources for the 
poor on equal terms with other villagers. The relation of the household to the 
cooperative leaders may however become too important, as so many resources and 
contacts are mediated through the cooperative, which can cause stress if the 
relationship is strained.   
 
In the following chapter the content of relations between government, local 
organisations and households are discussed from the perspective of strategies to 
reduce risk.    132
8. Disaster mitigation, adaptation and risk 
management 
 
This chapter looks at efforts of disaster mitigation and vulnerability reduction at 
household, commune, district and to a limited extent at national level. Government 
policies are touched upon, but not discussed comprehensively. 8.1 looks at actions 
for flood mitigation, mainly through infrastructure, and the trade-off involved 
between disaster mitigation and mitigation of seasonal risk. In 8.2 forest protection 
is discussed, and the balance between reducing vulnerability through environmental 
protection and through household access to natural resources for their livelihoods. 
This brings us to issues of resettlement in 8.3. Production strategies and attitudes to 
risk are discussed in 8.4 for Hai Lang and in 8.5 for Hong Ha. In 8.6 the role of 
community management in building resilience is commented on. Finally in 8.7 the 
relation between social protection and livelihood promotion is discussed, and the 
options available to strengthen social protection and reduce risk.  
 
8.1 Flood protection and disaster mitigation 
 
In this section I argue that disaster mitigation and protection against seasonal stress 
are strongly interlinked and need to be discussed in the same context. Risk reduction 
in production is vital to building resilience to disaster and to enable a quick 
recovery. 
 
The Red Cross pays a major role for disaster preparedness 
Disaster preparedness in Hai Lang and A Luoi, includes a twenty-four hour watch at 
the district and commune People’s Committee’s during the period of autumn storms. 
Boats are kept at strategic places for rescue operations. State and donor resources 
have been made available to the communes to construct two story school buildings, 
where people can take refuge during high floods. 
 
The communes have disaster mitigation plans for organising rescue operations, with 
a network of access to boats and stores of food, blankets, kerosene and other 
necessities. Commune authorities however emphasise that it is still the household 
responsibility to keep stores of essentials in a high place.  
 
The Hai Lang district Red Cross organises training courses for the village population 
in disaster preparedness and how to act in a disaster situation
234. They also train 
school teachers in how to include disaster preparedness in the curricula. The Red 
Cross has made boat arrangements with the fishing communes about bringing the 
boats quickly to the flooded areas for rescue purposes.  
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At household level, almost all of the households interviewed had built storage for 
the rice under the roof and kept stores of basic necessities during flood season. 
House construction was a major part of household efforts to protect themselves and 
their belongings against future floods. Almost all interviewed households spent 
significant amounts investing in their house. The loans taken to invest in house 
construction however, represent a risk to the household economy. Like with the 
consumption loans, it was mainly the low land households who took informal loans 
with high interest to invest in their house. In Xuan Loc and Hong Ha, people mainly 
used loans from relatives and sale of assets. (See previous chapters). 
 
Protection against seasonal production risk is an important part of reducing 
vulnerability also to disasters. 
In January and February 2000, there were heavy rains causing high drainage costs 
and costs for seed and fertiliser which had to be reapplied after being swept away by 
rains. The combination of the losses during the November floods and the repeated 
production constraints after the disaster, made the recovery difficult and prolonged.  
 
Apart from the problems mentioned above there continued to be production 
constraints, which included that the autumn crop in 2000 in Hong Ha was damaged 
by insects, the spring crop in Hai Lang in 2001 suffered from heavy rains in May 
and the autumn crop in Phuoc Dien 2002 suffered from rat attacks. In February 2006 
there were heavy rains and flooding in Hai Lang, which swept away the newly 
planted crop. It is unusual with flooding at that time of the year, and it gave rise to 
speculations in Hai Lang about what is perceived as the increasingly unreliable 
weather. In August 2006 there were again heavy rains two weeks before harvest, 
which damaged part of the crop. 
 
In some cases, households would get frustrated and report that they had ‘lost their 
crop’ (mất mùa) when the harvest was reduced by ‘only’ 10-20 per cent. This is an 
indication that even a limited reduction in yield causes significant problems to the 
household economy. The costs of seasonal risk involve not only the crop loss 
incurred, but also pumping costs to try to save the rice, higher costs of harvesting, 
drying the rice and threshing of the wet rice. The rice cannot be easily stored and 
must be sold immediately, resulting in price losses.  
 
To understand the threats to people's livelihoods, and the measures people take 
against risk, we need to discuss disaster and routine risk in the same context. We 
cannot understand the process of recovery from disaster without understanding the 
frequent seasonal stress, which can undermine people's livelihood as much as 
disasters. Lewis (1999) draws attention to this type of ‘small disasters’, which occur 
regularly and undermine the livelihood conditions of many people. How people cope 
with long-term stress largely influences their resilience and capacity to recover from 
sudden shocks.   
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Major infrastructure investments to reduce risk 
After the 1999 floods there was a major initiative established by donors and the 
Vietnamese government called ‘the Central Province Initiative to Mitigate Natural 
Disasters in Central Vietnam’(CPI). It is coordinated by the UNDP Disaster 
Management Unit and includes investments to reinforce infrastructure for disaster 
mitigation, and to support flood preparedness systems. According to a CPI report 
(UNDP 2000) the infrastructure for disaster mitigation involves the strengthening of 
water reservoirs, dams, dikes, drainage structures as well as new roads on higher 
land, higher bridges and concrete walls on the hill slopes to protect the roads against 
landslides. Non-structural initiatives include the improvement of systems of 
warning, emergency planning and village level disaster preparedness training.  
 
The focus in the CPI is concentrated on mitigating the flood hazard itself. It does not 
discuss vulnerability in terms of which groups are particularly at risk, or the capacity 
to cope and recover. The proposed infrastructure investments do however implicitly 
impact on conditions for recovery. Many of the projects involving dikes and dams 
are perhaps even more important for the protection of production in the regular, 
yearly floods, rather than protection against disastrous floods. This is also disaster 
mitigation, as my data suggests that recovery from disaster is highly influenced by 
production conditions under ‘normal’ years.  
 
Trade-offs between different types of risk 
There are however certain trade-offs between controlling the seasonal floods and 
handling the disastrous floods. Hewitt (1997) draws attention to how human 
practices may reallocate the dangers to which they are exposed. Societal decision to 
invest in relation to certain risks may affect other areas of risk.  
 
Infrastructure construction often affects water flows, which may lead to 
unintentional consequences. A historical example from Broucheux (1995) quoted in 
Miller (2003), concerns the public works designed by the French during the colonial 
era, which aggravated the flood problem when building roads perpendicular to the 
flow of the flood water. Construction of canals during the Nguyễn and French era 
allowed for drainage of floodwaters from some areas, but increased the floodwaters 
in other areas, previously little affected. Canals connecting the main waterways to 
the coast created new channels for the inflow of saline water.  
 
The problem of dike protection of one area, causing increased floods in another area 
is also prevalent in Hai Lang, farmers and staff of the Agriculture Section told me
235. 
Infrastructure development on the low land is part of a long process of creating and 
ensuring production and living conditions for a growing population. Dikes and 
canals have gradually been constructed to protect the crop against the heavy rains. 
The autumn flood storms overflow the dikes, and should do so in order to drain 
more quickly. The uneven development of the dike system can however make the 
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situation worse for the communes that lag behind. The water 'bounces' on the dikes, 
which creates currents and backflow of water. When Hai Hoa commune built their 
concrete dike in the 1970's, it created problems for Hai Truong-Tho-Thien 
communes.  The water back-flowed on their land, and their low mud dikes broke 
more often. Now they too have constructed concrete dikes. According to the 
chairman of Hai Thanh commune, the dike system in Phuoc Dien village and the 
whole commune is low compared to the neighbouring communes, which increases 
their exposure to heavy rains during crop season. When the dike was built it was the 
same height as the dike of the neighbouring communes on the other side of the river, 
but since then Hai Duong and Hai Hoa communes have raised their dikes, so that the 
water flows more easily into Hai Thanh
236. 
 
Phuoc Dien village would need a very long and strong dike around their area as they 
are in a 'basin', the lowest lying area in Hai Lang, but this has not yet been possible. 
There are however plans for a dike protecting the whole low land area of the district, 
which would create more equal conditions between the different villages
237.  
 
The government water management development plans mainly follow administrative 
boundaries, rather than watershed boundaries
238. Investments have been made 
commune by commune, depending on the ability to mobilise funds. It was not until 
an ADB project initiated investments in Hai Lang in 2005 that the funding was 
substantial enough to address dike protection and drainage for the whole low land 
basin, not just for individual communes. 
 
Another issue concerns the amount of money which should be invested in 
infrastructure protection, as it is easily damaged by the autumn floods and cost a lot 
to repair.  Autumn storms caused a great deal of damage in 2004 and 2005 as well as 
in 2006. The district authorities try to mobilise extra resources for repairs, but unless 
they get external support the costs will burden the households through increased 
water fees.  
 
To sum up: Infrastructure investments in dikes and drainage cannot prevent major 
flood hazards. Although infrastructure for drainage is vital to reduce the impact of 
floods, the function of infrastructure investments is also to mitigate ‘normal’ stress 
during the crop season, which again increases resilience to disaster. The water 
management plans by the province and district authorities are primarily development 
plans within their respective administrative boundaries. In cases were the watershed 
crosses such boundaries, there appears to be limitations in the planning and 
administrative processes. Direct disaster mitigation investments are related to 
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strengthening the access to safe refuge for people and their belongings, through 
housing, boats, storage and preparedness. Enabling households to strengthen their 
houses by providing long-term subsidised credit is a local demand which has not yet 
been dealt with.   
 
8.2 Management of Forestland  
 
The development of production- and living conditions in the mountains also face 
trade-offs, with different perspectives on risk and vulnerability. The tension between 
risk reduction through forest cover and risk reduction through production 
development is also an institutional tension between different levels of government.  
 
Forest protection policies increased the vulnerability of the mountain 
population. 
Since the establishment of ‘program 327’ in 1992 the Vietnamese government 
policies have had a major focus on reforestation of the hill slopes. Watershed 
management policies prioritised comprehensive forest cover, with the aim of 
reducing the risk of dangerous flood levels on the low land. Forest management of 
major areas of A Luoi district was allocated to the Bo River Watershed Management 
Board under the province Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Between 1994 and 2000 the Board organised the planting of a major part of the hill 
land in Hong Ha commune, mainly with acacia. Agricultural production has 
gradually been transferred to the river valleys instead of the hill slopes, in order to 
protect the forest. The immediate reaction of the government after the floods was to 
call for an intensification of tree planting. The Vietnamese newspaper Lao Động 
reports from a meeting for flood recovery on 15/11/99 where the prime minister 
announces the implementation of the ‘five million hectare forest program’ in the 
central provinces as being a priority
239.   
 
The perspectives of the mountain population were not taken into account however. 
The settlements and production of Hong Ha commune are at greater risk to flash 
floods now that they are situated in the river valley. The lack of access to the hill 
slopes was perceived both by households and commune authorities as the main 
constraint for recovery from the 1999 floods. (as discussed in chapter 6). Limited 
access to land for food production is a general problem for the Hong Ha population. 
According to district statistics the land for food production in Hong Ha decreased 
from 135 hectares in 1996 to 104 ha in 1999
240. 
 
According to the households, the previous mode of production with shifting 
cultivation on small plots in the forest was not at risk to floods, as it was protected 
by the surrounding trees. ‘No one’ is arguing for a return to shifting cultivation, but 
households and commune authorities argue that erosion control and protection is 
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workable with agro-forestry production on the slopes, and in that way combining 
environmental and livelihood needs
241. 
 
During the 1990s the relation between the Hong Ha commune and the Watershed 
Board was still perceived as beneficial to the households, because they received tree-
planting contracts
242.  Now that almost all commune land is planted with forest, staff 
of the commune People’s Committee comment that it is as if they have 'woken up' 
and have started negotiations with province authorities and the Board to diversify 
the land use, i.e. to harvest some of the trees to be able to intercrop with economic 
species and food crops
243.  
 
Hong Ha commune People's Committee argues that household management of the 
forest would increase the effectiveness of protection if it represents an economic 
interest for the households.
244 Hong Ha commune chairman, Mr Hua
245 shows us the 
map of the development ideas for the commune. The low-sloping hill land close to 
the residential areas is presently planted with acacia trees. These areas could be 
harvested in order to make way for agro-forestry gardens with fruit trees, bamboo, 
vegetables and cassava for income generation and food security as well as soil 
protection. Mr Hua also argues that the households should be allowed to enrich the 
forest with indigenous species, as a lot of forest diversity was lost in the US 
chemical bombings. The commune made a proposal to the Province Department of 
Agriculture (DARD) in 2001 to harvest this forest. In 2005 they had not yet received 
a response. According to government directives, all land with a slope more than 25% 
should be covered with forest, but the area under discussion is only a 10% slope. 
According to the commune People’s Committee, there are 100 ha of forest in the 
commune below 20 degrees slope, presently planted with forest
246.   
 
The district People’s Committee backs up the commune perspective
247. The vice 
chairman argues that watershed forest could be allocated to households for 
protection as well as their economic benefit, if it is close to their settlements. Even 
the head of the Forest Protection Station in A Luoi argues that agro-forestry in 
protected forest should be allowed, as people do not have enough food
248. Mr. Son 
from the district Agriculture Section is frustrated by the mismatch between forest 
protection and livelihood development strategies. He says: We develop the forest in 
order to reduce the impact of the floods. But there is too little research into how to 
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plant and in which areas to plant in order to be effective. People will destroy the 
forest if they do not have enough land for agriculture production.
249  
 
In 2004 the NGO project at the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry brought 
the province, district and commune levels of government together with the Bo River 
Board in a workshop, whereby the province representatives for the Department of 
Agriculture acknowledged the need for more integrated land use in Hong Ha 
commune
250. The Board, however, is reluctant to agree to harvest or allocation of the 
forest to the commune under their mandate
251. 
 
Other examples of forest allocation to households in Vietnam show an improvement 
of crop production and living standards as well as forest cover according to Shanks 
et al. (2003) They refer to Sikor and Dao Minh Truong's (2000) study of Black Thai 
villages in the northern mountains, which shows experience of local adaptation of 
policies on land allocation. The village institutions were able to accommodate state 
policy within the framework of their own priorities and communal land management 
practices, with a fairly equitable distribution of land resources and benefits between 
households. 
  
The head of A Luoi Agriculture Section argues that riverbed erosion is a more 
serious problem than hill land erosion, and that bamboo planting along the rivers 
should be encouraged
252. According to household interviews, the people of Hong Ha 
commune had been planting bamboo along the river to protect the riverbanks from 
erosion during the 1980s. They also used to plant bamboo and indigenous forest 
species for protection of agricultural and residential areas. With the transfer of 
control of forest management to the Bo River Board, the incentives for community 
forestry initiatives decreased. There is also increased competition over land now 
when the villagers only have the river valley for cultivation. The riverbanks are thus 
still largely without protective bamboo planting, although some commune initiatives 
for bamboo planting have been started since 2004.  
 
To sum up: Watershed protection policies have mainly related to the interests of 
protecting the low land from excessive floods. The vulnerability of the Hong Ha 
commune population has increased since most of the sloping land has been planted 
with forest. Commune and district authorities argue for limited harvest of protected 
forest to allow for agro-forestry production, with the aim of combining erosion 
control and livelihood security for the mountain population. Such efforts have been 
constrained by the province Bo River Watershed Management Board. The CIFOR 
study points at results that suggest that forest cover is overrated as a means of 
reducing flood impacts (FAO and CIFOR 2005). This speaks in favour of more 
attention to the livelihood conditions of people in areas under forest protection.   
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8.3 Resettlement 
 
Permanent migration and resettlement has not been a major consequence of the 
floods in Hai Lang and A Luoi districts. Resettlement is common in Vietnam, but 
more out of economic reasons or lack of resources in the present location, than in 
response to flood risk. During the past four decades, many millions of people have 
resettled from the low land delta areas of the country to the inlands and mountains, 
and from the northern mountains to the Central Highlands coffee production 
areas
253.  
 
The permanent relocation that occurred in Hai Lang and A Luoi after the 1999 
floods has been over a short distance (a few kilometres). In A Luoi district a few 
villages have been resettled from being too close to the river on to higher land. In 
Hong Ha commune part of Pa Hy village has moved, a few hundred meters up from 
the riverside.  
  
The head of Pa Rinh village Mr. Duong argues like this about the need to move: We 
live close to the river in order to have access to water. If we moved higher up the hill 
slopes, access to water would be difficult. We also continue to plant close to the 
river, as we have very limited access to cultivation on the hills. We should have safe 
places to move animals and people higher up on the hills when there are floods. 
 
In fact, according to the commune People’s Committee
254, Pa Rinh village will have 
to move anyway, as the Province authorities took a decision in 2004 to build a 
hydropower dam on the Bo River, which means that Pa Rinh village will be 
permanently flooded. Commune authorities have protested against the decision. In 
2005 they had not yet been able to meet with province leaders to negotiate. The 
commune leaders are worried about the long-term livelihood possibilities for the Pa 
Rinh population, because the compensation is not enough to make a living from
255.  
 
A few households from different villages, who lost land in the floods, have moved to 
the new production area along the Bo River, a few kilometres to the south east, but 
this area is mainly cultivated by households who have not relocated, they have just 
expanded their production area.  
 
In Hai Lang district the authorities have invested in infrastructure to make it possible 
to resettle households in the hilly areas of Hai Lam commune. 300 families from 
risk-prone locations near the rivers have resettled there
256.  
 
There are also groups of households from the low land communes who are resettling 
in the mountains of Huong Hoa district, about 60 km away. The government 
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allocates land and 4.5 million VND in start-up capital for families who want to move 
to the mountains.  
 
Mrs Hiep is one of 26 families in Van Tri village who has registered to move to Khe 
Sanh (Hương Hóa district). She says: We will live in the same commune as the 
ethnic groups living there already, but in a separate village. There is a cassava 
factory in Huong Hoa, so I can have an income from selling cassava, and I can 
plant forest trees and other species. I will still keep the house in Van Tri as my 
mother has land for her grave here and wants to stay put
257.  
 
Resettlement schemes are often controversial. The most common critique regards the 
impact of the schemes on the existing communities, rather than the difficulties for 
the new-comers.  
 
The areas of the mountains where people from the low land settle to start afresh are 
called New Economic Zones. These policies started already in 1963 in the north 
(resolution no.8/NQ/TW (4-1963) and after 1975 in the south and central parts of the 
country. Experiences from other resettlement areas in the mountains where low land 
people have settled are often complex. There have been conflicts over land when the 
government has allocated land to the newcomers, which has informally been used in 
other ways in the commune. In some cases there have become income gaps, when 
the newcomers have easier access to resources than the minority population. In other 
cases the newcomers lead a very difficult life, as they are inexperienced with the 
mountain conditions (Nguyen Van Chinh 2001). I do not have information from 
Huong Hoa district on whether or not the increased presence and activities by low 
land families in the mountain communes have resulted in tensions or conflict over 
resources.  
 
Resettlement is a response to the whole livelihood situation of poor 
households, not only the floods. 
Davies (1996) distinguishes between positive and negative adaptation.  Positive 
adaptation, she argues, is by choice, can be reversed and is concerned with risk 
reduction. Negative adaptation is of necessity, tends to be irreversible and frequently 
fails to contribute to a lasting reduction in vulnerability. The households from the 
low land villages (10 from Phuoc Dien and 26 from Van Tri) who have resettled 
Huong Hoa district appear to have made a ‘positive’ adaptation. The interviews 
suggest that the households involved are not destitute, although they are poor
258. 
They often maintain a link to their old village, and could possibly move back again. 
Resettlement does thus not seem to be done in desperation, but with the hope and 
ambition to improve the situation of the household, although this may not always be 
the final result.  Seasonal migration does not appear to be done in desperation, but as 
an active income generation strategy.  
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Resettlement is likely to be motivated by more factors than the flood risk. Adger 
(2000) notes that responses can be difficult to distinguish from each other as any 
given response is situated within a whole social economy of responses. The 
interviews suggest that there are many reasons behind household choices of 
resettlement and migration, not only adaptation to the floods, but the floods disaster 
may have been the trigger. 
 
8.4 Production strategies and risk, Hai Lang district 
 
This section discusses production changes in response to the flood risk. Government 
policies regarding production provide a strong framework for what households do in 
practice. Household production choices often follow policy guidelines quite closely, 
often encouraged by state subsidies. The main focus in district government 
production strategies is income generation
259. Risk reduction does come in, but 
mainly as a tool to secure income generation. The interview results suggest a 
correlation between level of income and capacity to cope with flood shocks. This 
would support income generation as a general strategy to improve resilience. Among 
the poor the interviews also show that important factors for coping include access to 
minor forest products and access to labour opportunities. This suggests that it is 
important to focus on other aspects of people’s income generation, as well as 
production. This section however restricts itself mainly to a discussion of 
production, while other options of income generation will have to be considered in 
future studies. 
 
Rice production, a source of both resilience and vulnerability. 
In the low land areas, the dependence on one source of income, rice, representing a 
large percentage of the household income is found to create vulnerability (see 
chapters 5 and 7). The head of the Hai Lang district extension service, commented 
that households who only have rice production have great difficulties getting out of 
poverty
260. Policy efforts are focused on adapting the production system to make it 
more diversified (UBND 2005). Rice is however still the basis of the household 
economy and food security for the majority of the low land population, especially 
for the poor. Investments to secure rice production therefore remain a priority in the 
district budget (ibid). Many households commented that rice production is the base 
in food security. Without this base they do not perceive themselves to have the 
possibilities of investing in diversification.  
 
The primary development priorities expressed by households and village leaders on 
the low land concerned risk reduction through investments in strengthened 
infrastructure for drainage and irrigation,  
access to short-term varieties of rice seed and improved post-harvest processing and 
storage. According to the Van Tri cooperative leader, most people sold their rice 
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immediately after harvest in 2001, partly to avoid the flood risk. The price was then 
1500 VND/kg, compared to 1800 VND in November
261. He argued for a system 
whereby the cooperative could store the rice before sale, in order to avoid the risky 
storage in the individual houses. This was also brought up by the district Agriculture 
section
262, which emphasised the importance of the cooperatives for processing and 
marketing. They also emphasised efforts to reduce dependence on seed from outside 
by improving local production of seed. Since 2001 the government policy has been 
to develop seed varieties according to quality and resistance to flood and drought, 
rather than according to quantity
263. 
 
The allocation of paddy land is gradually being reorganised in order to increase the 
'efficiency' of production, although access to paddy land is still seen as a basic right 
for everyone. In the 1993 allocation all households got several small pieces of land, 
spread out in different areas, so that everyone would have both good and poor land 
with both high risk and low risk. There is now a process of land consolidation in 
order for people to get coherent chunks of land in the same place. The process is 
slow and is done through internal negotiations between the farmers in the village. 
According to the cooperative leaders, they oversee the process to make sure that the 
poor do not lose out, but the principle that land resources should go to people who 
have the capacity to make the best use of it, is prevalent and may result in difficulties 
for the poor to defend their interests. 
 
Agricultural diversification increases income, but remains at risk to floods 
There are several types of diversification. It can be the broadening of the number of 
on-farm activities and it can include off-farm activities. The activities can feed into 
the farming economy or they can be alternatives to farming. All these types are 
common in Hai Lang, while in A Luoi the diversification is mainly agricultural. As 
Ellis (2000) notes, there are many different reasons behind livelihood diversification, 
including coping strategies, risk management or capital investments. Diversification 
is commonly seen as contributing to the spreading of risk. In Vietnam the term is 
also used in context of specialisation in new production, which may in fact 
concentrate risk to one major export oriented crop, as discussed in the next section.  
 
Barrett et al. (2001) and other authors have found that livelihood diversification is 
often a preferred strategy for many rural poor to reduce household vulnerability, as it 
may both generate income and improve consumption. This, according to Barrett et 
al., has led development agencies to promote income and asset diversification in 
areas facing repeated income and consumption shocks.  
 
Diversification is not a panacea. Many households may be too poor to be able to 
diversify. The risk of production failure is higher for poor households because of 
lack of resources and knowledge. More importantly, a production failure has a 
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relatively larger impact for the household economy of poor households, compared to 
the better-off.  
  
The interview results suggest that agricultural diversification may increase resilience 
if it leads to higher income levels, but it does include significant risk. Members of 
staff of the district People’s Committee see better knowledge of agriculture 
production as the most important tool to increase people’s resilience to shocks
264.   
 
Diversification into livestock is very common both in Hai Lang and A Luoi. 
Practically all households in Hai Lang raise pigs, and so do almost half of the 
households in Hong Ha. Livestock has the benefit of combining income generation, 
with a type of savings. Buffalo grazing in the hills was frequently mentioned by 
households in Xuan Loc as an important risk management strategy. There, buffalo is 
kept for the income from selling calves rather than for ploughing.  This practice is 
perceived as less risky than other types of animal husbandry and crop production. 
Staff of the people’s committee of Hai Chanh commune concluded that the poor 
who had used credit for buffalo had been successful, while those who invested in 
other types of animal husbandry and garden crops had faced more losses and risk
265. 
 
According to the head of the Xuan Loc cooperative in 2001, 70 percent of 
households in the village had buffalo, compared to 50 percent before the floods
266. 
He also claims that more than 50 percent of household income now comes from 
animal husbandry, but livestock are also at risk to major flood hazards, and takes 
longer to recover from than lost crops. The level of livestock disease is quite high 
and strengthened veterinary service at village level is a prerequisite for income 
generation in animal husbandry, according to the district Veterinary Station. 2004 
Van Tri village expected a village veterinary to come back from training, to work for 
the cooperative
267. Xuan Loc and Phuoc Dien already had village veterinaries.  
 
Crop diversification has included replacing part of the rice with beans, lotus and fish 
raising on the fields. Hai Thanh commune was preparing for 60 hectares of fish 
raising in paddy fields 2001
268. Households who wanted to try this got state support 
with 1.3 million VND per hectare (85 USD). According to the Agriculture Section 
the market for fish is good
269. In Van Tri village six hectares of paddy had been 
changed to dry land crops, like groundnuts and green beans
270. Mushrooms, pepper 
and melons are other important crops, which are becoming more widespread.  
 
Although decisions to diversify are taken by the household, they are highly 
influenced by the collective. Using paddy land for other production cannot be done 
on an individual basis, as the land has a common water regulation system. The 
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changes from paddy production thus need to be done with larger groups of people 
and in agreement with the village and the cooperative. The efforts to move away 
from the mono-culture of rice are mostly done in local government campaigns where 
farmers on a coherent area of land are encouraged to plant for example beans. This 
'encouragement' means that the government take on part of the risk of the new 
production, in the form of subsidised inputs. The risk of weather related seasonal 
stress is not less than in paddy production. Diversification still has the advantage of 
spreading market risks, and hopefully getting a better income. 
 
Diversification not only spreads risk for the individual household. The homogeneity 
or diversity of the economic structure also influences the resilience of the 
community. A more diversified local economy has a better chance of providing 
opportunities of supplementary economic activities during crises.  
 
There is sometimes a tension between different government policies, whereby the 
encouragement to diversify can lead to excessive risk-taking. When the government 
had secured the establishment of an industrial cassava processing plant in Hai Lang 
district in 2003, they needed to encourage as many farmers as possible to engage in 
production. Farmers were encouraged to grow cassava 'everywhere', including on 
ex-paddy fields, where the risk of inundation of water is very high. The cassava on 
the paddy fields was destroyed in the autumn floods 2004
271. 
 
In the hill land village, garden crops are often the base of the household economy. 
Hai Chanh commune officials noted that in 2004 many households had expanded 
production of short-term crops, like green beans and groundnuts, compared to 
perennial plants, like pepper, tea and fruit trees
272. A reason for this, they argue, is 
that beans and groundnuts have good market prices at present, but also that short-
term crops represent less risk to the household economy in face of floods, compared 
to perennial crops. 
 
Shifting investments to higher areas is mainly possible for the better-off 
households. 
So far the residential areas and production of Xuan Loc village (hill land) have been 
concentrated close to the river in order to access water for irrigation. Mr Duoc 
says
273: I would like to plant pepper and fruit trees again, but then we should move 
to a higher area, where there is less risk from the floods. We have some garden land 
higher up, but I do not want to invest until we can build a house to live there and 
protect the garden, as well as drilling a well for irrigation. I still decided to plant 
some fruit trees, as the district Agriculture Section and Commune People's 
Committee supported the planting with 4000 d/seedling (25 US cents). 20 
households in the village registered for planting and received training by the 
Agriculture Section and the Farmers Association.  
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The government offers credit and allocation of land to people who want to establish 
hill land gardens, with a combination of garden crops, forest trees and animal 
husbandry
274. According to the manager of Xuan Loc co-operative, Mr The in 2002, 
it was only himself and Mr Toan and his brother who had established hill land farms. 
In 2005 it was said to be seven households. A constraint seems to be the need to 
build a house and have at least part of the family living at the hill land farm, in order 
to protect it. It is quite a large investment in irrigation as well as in the production 
itself.  According to households in Xuan Loc there are some better-off households, 
with only slight connection to the area, who arrange for contracts for large areas of 
land. The result is that the land still available is quite far away, which makes people 
even more hesitant to move
275.   
 
State allocation of hill land tends to prioritise households who have enough private 
resources to develop the land. Some donor projects have however secured that also 
the poor in the hill land communes have been allocated land for forest planting. A 
consequence of the allocation of hill land is that the free grazing area is restricted. 
Many households who had buffalo grazing in the hills, have to have them stalled on 
the farm instead. This requires more resources for feeding, and becomes less feasible 
for the poor, but a positive consequence of the forest investments may be that it 
provides local labour opportunities.  
 
Non-agriculture diversification is increasing with growing rural welfare 
Families in the most risk-prone areas, like Phuoc Dien village, dream of employment 
or other non-agricultural income, which could reduce their vulnerability to seasonal 
stress in agriculture.  
 
A man in Phuoc Dien village says
276: 
We do not have any other sources of income apart from the rice. We would like to 
try the new breeds of chicken, but we do not dare to take the risk right now. There is 
not enough grazing and fodder for cattle raising. Animal husbandry in general is too 
risky. There is too much disease, even if we vaccinate. My mother has sapodilla 
(fruit) in her garden and we would also like to have fruit trees. My dream is to have 
employment in town, so that I could have a secure regular income. Then we could 
do the farming as a part-time occupation and not be dependent on it.  
 
The interviews suggest that the above household is not representative for Hai Lang 
district as a whole. Most farmers tend to prefer agriculture to employment, but 
farming cannot provide income and sustenance to the entire coming generation, and 
migration for work is likely to increase.  
 
In Hai Lang district development plans (UBND 2005) rural industrialisation is seen 
as important to 'take care' of the part of the population who are not able to make a 
living from agricultural production. Rural industrialisation is a centre-piece in state 
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ideology at present, and is advertised on large signs by the roadside and in 
government speeches. In practice the process is slow and it is difficult to get industry 
to establish itself outside the urban centres.  
 
Non-agriculture diversification into business tends to be a sign of growing welfare. 
Households with a higher income have a higher proportion of their income from 
non-agriculture activities, primarily business and trading, than low-income 
households
277.  
 
As Start and Craig discuss in their India case (2004) agricultural growth and non-
farm diversification tend to reinforce each other. It is not a matter of either growth in 
agriculture or non-farm rural economy,, the areas studied exhibit either healthy 
agriculture and non-farm growth, or stagnation in both. This can also be noted in Hai 
lang district, where diversification is increasing as the agricultural economy 
grows
278. 
 
To sum up:  
Diversification of production and other livelihood strategies are increasing among 
the majority of the population as a result of gradually higher income and therefore 
opportunity to invest. This diversification, I argue, reduces vulnerability because it 
reduces dependence on rice as the main source of income and food security.  
 
In the hill land villages diversification within agriculture requires access to higher 
land. The cash crops presently viable on the market, like groundnuts and cassava are 
mainly suitable on higher land, which is also less at risk to floods. Better-off 
households can invest in farms on the plateau, with forest plantations and animal 
husbandry. The households who depend on low-lying gardens are more vulnerable. 
Access to higher land is thus becoming a differentiating factor between households. 
 
8.5 Production strategies and risk in Hong Ha commune  
 
The policies in the mountains since the 1999 floods have been to support the 
intensification of paddy production and cash crop production. This, I argue does not 
contribute to reducing vulnerability to floods. High investment in one cash crop also 
involves a significant risk of market failure. It occupies scarce land, which increases 
household vulnerability to food shortage in case of crop failure. Alternative 
strategies are argued for by commune and district authorities, pleas which have so 
far met limited response at policy level. 
 
Food security strategies are based on more intensive rice production 
From the way people in Hong Ha talk about paddy rice production, I realise that it 
has rapidly been included in the perceptions of basic needs. When interviewed about 
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risks, households say that the lack of access to hill land leaves them no alternative, 
and therefore welcome the government investments in paddy. Since the 1999 floods 
the government has invested large sums of money to provide irrigation 
infrastructure, in order to expand the area of paddy cultivation. The upgraded 
irrigation system in the Khe Ca Te area enables them to cultivate eight hectares of 
paddy rice, compared to the previous four hectares
279. 
 
There is however a tension in the paddy development strategies. In order to have 
sufficient food security, the output has to be raised. The government is encouraging 
the use of high yielding varieties, which require high inputs of fertiliser and 
pesticides
280. Although many farmers are happy with the higher yields, the 
investment costs remain an unsolved problem as the rice is for household 
consumption, not for sale. 
281 So far rice yields have been low, because people have 
been reluctant to invest a lot in fertiliser. Access to inputs from A Luoi town is 
cumbersome as few households have any transport. The commune is discussing 
plans on how to establish an input supply service at commune level. It would require 
a credit system, whereby the farmers can access inputs on credit and pay after 
harvest as people have very little cash.  This however requires that the households 
have income from some other source, as the rice is only enough for consumption. 
Higher investments make people more vulnerable to seasonal crises and reduced 
harvest. The main attraction of the new varieties seems to be the shorter growing 
period, which reduces risk
282.  
 
Government emphasis on cash crop development 
The government development strategy for the mountains emphasises income 
generation through cash crops. There has been a series of efforts by the state to 
develop profitable export oriented crops. During the latter part of the 1990s 
investments were made in cinnamon and sugarcane, which failed due to insufficient 
market. From 2000-2002 the Department for Fixed Settlement encouraged 
production of pineapple and pepper, which has now also been more or less been 
dropped due to low market prices. During 2004-2005 all effort was put into 
encouraging rubber production. Rubber has previously not been grown in A Luoi 
district, only in the neighbouring district of Nam Dong, so Hong Ha commune is a 
'trial area'
283.  
 
In June 2005, at least half of all households in Hong Ha were planting rubber trees 
according to the commune People’s Committee. Inputs for planting are provided as 
credit in kind. Labour costs are paid for but adds to the credit, which is to be paid 
back by the households as a percentage of the harvest every year, once the trees give 
harvest after 7-8 years. According to staff of the Hue University of Agriculture and 
Forestry, many people did not have a clear idea of the credit conditions, and some 
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were not even aware that they were meant to pay back the money they received for 
their labour. It is not clear what happens to the credit if the project fails to give the 
expected returns.  
 
I expected people in Hong Ha to be sceptical about government cash crop campaigns 
after several backlashes when they have failed to give an income. Interviewed 
households did say that they were sceptical at first, but because inputs were 
provided, they said they would still give it a try. As planting the 'government cash 
crops' is practically the only way to access land, this is also a strong incentive to take 
part. If nothing else, as many villagers commented, at least it provides land where 
they can plant cassava in between the rubber trees for the first two years. The 
commune party secretary
284 was critical of the government ‘campaign crops’ in 
2001, and stressed the importance of supporting households to develop different 
strategies depending on their different situations and conditions. The high prices on 
rubber at present however, encourage many people to want to join in the project.  
 
Cassava is still considered by households in Hong Ha to be the most important crop 
for food security. Now it is also a cash crop since the Thua Thien Hue cassava 
processing industry was established in 2004. The state has established a guaranteed 
price of 300 VND/kg (2 US cent/kg). Production of cassava has expanded greatly 
both on the lower and the higher land areas, i.e. both with and without flood risk. 
The main production however, is still in the river valley, where the risk of 
inundation and risk of roots rotting is high. Cassava is also used for pig raising, 
which is especially important for the poorer households. Many households put their 
hope for income generation in animal husbandry, but the risk of loss due to disease 
is still high.  
 
Risk taking is a bigger problem than risk aversion 
Many authors, (Aliber 2001, Dercon 2005 etc.) suggest that being poor also 
manifests itself in risk aversion, which further exacerbates vulnerability and poverty. 
Benson (1997) sees the risk of vulnerability leading to poverty, because of the use of 
risk-minimising coping strategies that become a poverty trap. According to these 
theories, the poor constrain their own development because they do not invest in 
risky, but profitable lines of production. 
 
Risk aversion does not seem to be the main problem in Hong Ha. My impression is 
rather that people take too large risks, which often lead to failed investments and 
increasing debts. Farmers, especially the poor, reduce their own risk assessments 
when the state provides subsidised inputs in campaigns to encourage the production 
of new crops or animals.  The reinvestments after the floods in Hong Ha suggest that 
people do not avoid investments because of the flood risk. In group discussions in 
Pa Rinh village
285, Hong Ha, many lines of production were considered to be 
difficult for the poor because of lack of knowledge and lack of resources to invest in 
inputs. The discussions suggested a need for more extension support in order to 
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reduce production failure. Many projects have however failed; not only for the poor, 
due to market problems. The extension system is not well equipped to deal with 
market issues.  
 
In the same group discussion, the main line of argument to reduce vulnerability is to 
spread risk. Ways to spread risk include cultivation in different types of places, with 
different risk pictures and cultivation of many different crops. Traditionally people 
have responded to high production risks by not investing so much in any one area of 
production. The present development strategies require higher investments, and it 
seems to be difficult for people not to necessarily follow that trend.  
 
Hill land gardens, a middle way 
The suggestions for agricultural development that are argued by the commune 
authorities and district agriculture section
286 is a middle way between low intensive 
hill land food production and intensive cash crop production. The district People’s 
Committee chairman argued for more trials on sloping land agro-forestry already in 
2000 along with demands for a new government land use plan
287. This was still an 
issue in 2004
288. The commune and district authorities argue for hill land gardens, 
with cash oriented trees (like fruit, rubber, cinnamon etc) intercropped with food 
crops on a long-term basis (not just the first two years until the trees have grown). 
This would make use of the available land resources and improve income and food 
security, without compromising environmental protection and with reduced risk of 
flood damage. The Pa Rinh group meeting mentioned above also argued that this 
was the only viable long-term strategy, as they expected the river to gradually erode 
the river banks and undermine the conditions for paddy production
289. The practice 
of grazing cattle on the hill slopes is also considered to be an income generation 
strategy that is not too much at risk to floods and markets
290. The district Agriculture 
Section stresses the need for processing industry in order to reduce market risk.  
 
To sum up: The households, commune- and district authorities argue for reduced 
vulnerability to floods by developing hill land gardens for both cash crops and food 
security. The province level authorities have not yet enabled such a development 
strategy. Instead they put focus on intensification of paddy production and intensive 
production of one export product, rubber. Paddy, as we have seen in chapter 4, is at 
high risk to floods, and investment in one export product is at high risk to market 
failure. Households however follow the province investment policies as they are 
dependent on these for access to land and credit.  
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8.6 The role of local management for resilience 
 
The district and commune People’s Committees expressed an ambition to increase 
self-reliance in recovery from disaster. Dependence on outside support increases the 
feeling of stress in the disaster situation. The need for humanitarian assistance to 
cope with the immediate crisis is difficult to avoid. Local ‘insurance systems’ of 
different kinds could however be an important supplement to national support in the 
rehabilitation of production, (see next section).  
 
Hai Lang district People’s Committee documents (UBND 2005) recognise the role 
of the cooperative in village level services including drainage capacity, veterinary 
services, savings & credit services and seed production. Strong local services of this 
kind are expected to increase local resilience to stress and disaster. Local 
government organises training and capacity building to strengthen cooperative 
capacity for such services. 
 
The government is however reducing its back-up of the cooperatives in terms of 
credit guarantees, in order to reinforce the policy emphasis on the cooperatives as 
independent economic member organisations
291. Until 2000 seed supply to the 
cooperatives was organised by the Hai Lang Agriculture Section. From then on the 
cooperatives are responsible for the purchase of seed according to farmer 
requirements. Staff of the Agriculture Section expressed concern that the difference 
between the cooperatives in terms of contacts with research centres and seed 
producers may lead to inequalities between the villages
292.  
 
Local organisation of services in the mountains 
The physical distance between Hong Ha commune and the district centre results in a 
lower level of district services at commune level, compared to Hai Lang. The 
importance of commune and village level capacity in credit management, extension, 
veterinary services and input supply is even greater for Hong Ha. In principle this is 
supported in government policy through ‘program 135’(Govt of VN 1998). So far 
the ‘135’ funds have mainly been used for infrastructure in the commune. Hong Ha 
does receive support from international NGOs, partly through the Hue University of 
Agriculture and Forestry, to build up capacity for local services including a 
commune revolving credit fund. 
 
Commune managed credit funds are expected to increase access to credit for the 
poor, as the banks are reluctant to deal with the small loans that are relevant for the 
poor. District level bank staff do not have the capacity to monitor and follow-up 
credit to the poor
293. Community managed savings and credit schemes are more 
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flexible than the bank in adapting to the conditions of each household, according to 
the Hong Ha commune People’s Committee.  
 
8.7 Social protection and livelihood promotion 
 
Livelihood promotion involves measures to support poor households to get out of 
poverty, while social protection measures are meant to protect people from a decline 
in well-being, with the effect of reversing former gains. Conway and Turk (2002) 
differentiate between two types of social protection. The first being social assistance 
to the destitute and the second being social risk management for households who 
otherwise would suffer a decline in well-being as a consequence of risk.  
 
The disaster response of the Vietnamese government, (see chapters 5 and 6) can be 
seen as a combination of social security and livelihood promotion. The mobilisation 
of food relief was both social assistance and risk management. The credit for 
rehabilitation of production was meant to emphasise livelihood promotion, but as a 
major part went to covering losses, the character of risk management was more 
dominant. As argued in section 7.3 on poverty, the disaster response seemed to be 
adequate enough to prevent the non-poor becoming poor. However, the policies did 
not include additional social assistance to the chronically poor, which I argue have 
resulted in this group of people probably falling deeper into poverty as a 
consequence of the disaster.  
 
Christoplos et al. (2006) argue that synergies between the concepts of social 
protection and livelihood promotion potentially provide a means of achieving greater 
convergence of purpose across relief and development.  Social protection can 
promote growth in a number of ways including enabling risk-taking livelihood 
strategies, helping to correct market failures and facilitating investments in human 
and physical assets.  
 
Christoplos et al. argue that the synergies between social protection and livelihood 
promotion could be developed further, by for example, infusing agricultural 
development programmes with risk and vulnerability objectives, or advocacy for 
reforms that have the potential to address vulnerabilities. They refer to Devereux 
(2002) and Sabates-Wheeler (2004) who use the term ‘transformative social 
protection’ for addressing social risk and vulnerability through empowerment of the 
poor and transformation of the conditions in which they struggle to construct viable 
livelihoods.  
 
Examples of interventions which have both social protection and livelihood 
promotion functions are credit and insurance systems that allow people to take risks, 
and a buffer against the negative consequences of risk. This section looks at such 
means of combined social protection and livelihood promotion. 
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Informal insurance against risk is often insufficient.  
In Hai Lang and Hong the informal insurance mechanisms are often part of social 
relations, where generous contributions e.g. at weddings, bring an expectation of 
receiving help in times of need. Cook refers to studies by Morduch (1999), who 
finds that informal insurance mechanisms are a relatively costly and inefficient way 
for households to self-insure or deal with risk. They are unlikely to withstand 
covariate crises and recurrent shocks.  
 
The relief supplies covered basic needs for the population in the study area for the 
first few months after the disaster, while individual networks subsequently became 
more important. (See section 7.2) The interviews suggest that these informal 
insurance mechanisms were insufficient for poor households, especially on the low 
land, who resorted to taking expensive loans from money-lenders.  
 
Pantoja refers to a World Bank study (2000) which concludes that while informal or 
market-based risk management instruments are usually effective in dealing with 
idiosyncratic risks, they tend to break down in the face of covariate risks such as 
disasters. The study therefore argues for a strong state role in covering covariate 
risks, while idiosyncratic risks could be handled by private providers. Dercon (2002) 
is critical against informal risk-sharing arrangements, and idiosyncratic risk, from 
the perspective that they provide only limited protection, especially for the poor. 
There would thus be need for state involvement to reduce risk for the poor also in 
cases of idiosyncratic risk. Dercon finds that public safety nets are beneficial, but 
can have negative externalities on households not covered by the safety nets. 
 
This agrees with the findings in this thesis. I argue that the insufficient social 
security for idiosyncratic risk, like health problems, result in the reduced capacity of 
poor households to cope with covariate risk. Conway and Turk (2002) conclude that 
while improvements are possible, there are reasonably effective institutional 
arrangements for dealing with the covariant risk of natural disaster. They argue that 
it is most urgent to increase social protection against idiosyncratic risk.  
 
A fundamental issue concerns which risks should be carried by the community, and 
which by the individual household.  Twigg et al. (2001) raise the issue of the need 
for mechanisms to even out fluctuations and differences in vulnerability within the 
community. He discusses the possibilities of building up community funds for 
insurance purposes and refers to Conning and Kevane (2004) who argue for 
community funds that can be used as collateral to attract insurance or credit to the 
community. Community funds have not yet been discussed in the context of disaster 
response in Hai Lang and A Luoi, as the needs in these cases are considered to be 
too great for the villages or communes to cope with
294. Households however 
contribute 10 000 VND per year to a fund at province level for disaster response. 
There is also an expansion of savings- and credit schemes at village level, which can 
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be used in the context of lower levels of risk, according to staff of the Agriculture 
Section. 
 
Reducing the risk of taking credit 
Tim Conway (2001) emphasises the role of credit and insurance policies and 
conditions for reducing vulnerability. The risks of taking credit need to be reduced 
for the poor, as a production failure and thereby failure to pay back a loan may 
constrain the development of the household economy for a long time.  
 
Dercon et al. (2005) argues the case for state subsidised insurance for the poor, as 
shocks seriously undermine their ability to grow out of poverty. They also argue that 
the lack of insurance creates a risk aversion, which constrains household economic 
development. Dercon (2005) proposes the development of credit products with some 
insurance element, to allow people to take risks in areas of high climatic variation 
and risk.  
 
Dercon (2005) argues that it is important to recognise that the actions people take to 
avoid risk have poverty implications. He gives an example from a study in Ethiopia 
(Dercon and Christiansen 2005), which found that there would be a significant 
increase in fertiliser use, if some insurance was offered against risk of crop failure. 
This is a common view, especially among economists, that if only the poor had the 
opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial investments involving risk, their 
household economies would grow. The fieldwork results suggest however, that 
entrepreneurial risk has contributed to the indebtedness and difficulties in getting out 
of poverty for a number of households in Hai Lang and Hong Ha. The major 
investments in fertiliser, for instance, contributed to the debt burden after the floods. 
Even when the harvest is good, the input costs may outweigh the income from the 
rice if the sale price is poor.  I cannot see that people are risk averse, but agree that 
insurance against production failure would provide a well-needed buffer against the 
consequences of the risks that the poor take, (see section 8.5). 
 
Possible forms of insurance against major hazards 
The insurance market in Vietnam is limited, but growing rapidly, according to 
Caster (2005). Crop insurance is offered by the Vietnam Insurance Corporation (Bao 
Viet) but has so far a limited outreach. In 2000, 315 000 farming households had 
such an insurance (Conway and Turk 2002). Government policy documents mention 
the importance of developing local property insurance programs including the 
improved access to insurance for livestock and crops (CPRGS 2002).  
 
Most authors conclude that insurance against hazards like major floods is very 
difficult, because of its covariate nature. It would require too high premiums for an 
insurance company to insure large losses in one blow.  Dercon et al. (2005) sees a 
future possibility of an international reinsurance market, which may provide the 
back-up needed to allow for local insurance companies to be involved in the 
insurance of disaster risk.  
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Dercon et al. caution us that insurance for the poor would be difficult to sustain 
commercially, without subsidies, because of the relatively high transaction costs 
involved. Products for the poor require small and frequent instalments in order to be 
feasible for the economy of a poor household. Products must be flexible to the 
higher risks that the poor face. Group insurance may counter some of the problems. 
Insurance premiums would supposedly reflect the differential vulnerability of people 
in terms of exposure and susceptibility to hazard. It requires that the community is 
prepared to pay the higher costs of insurance for people at higher risk.  
 
Dercon et al. argue for a partner-agent model of providing insurance, where the 
direct contacts with the poor are handled by a local microfinance institution, with the 
financial back-up of a large-scale insurance company, or by public sector support. 
An option to reduce transaction costs is the use of so-called weather-indexed bonds, 
in which it is the source of loss, e.g. massive rainfall that is insured, not the loss 
itself. (Dercon, 2005) 
 
Wisner et al. (2004) refer to experience from An Hui province in China, where 
recovery was financed through a government-organised agricultural insurance 
scheme. Premiums were very low and took the form of a provincial tax. Experiments 
with insurance schemes in Chinese rural areas show that they have a potential when 
payments are made from collective funds rather than being a direct cost to the 
farmers.  
 
Insurance cannot be a full replacement for government support in a disaster, as it 
only focuses on the level of physical damage incurred by the hazard. My material 
suggests that capacity to cope and recover is not necessarily related to the level of 
loss. I argue that there will always be the need to supplement insurance by safety 
nets based on people's variable capacity to cope. It is important that an insurance 
system has the administrative capacity to insure even the small losses that may be of 
crucial importance to the poor.  
 
Even if the state does not choose the option of subsidised insurance for the poor, I 
argue that an insurance market for those who can afford it could still be positive also 
for the poor. In a disaster situation, the insurance system would replace losses for the 
better-off, which would free government capacity to focus on the poor. This would 
be in contrast to the situation after the 1999 disaster, when the government had to 
provide subsidised credit for the rehabilitation of the entire production system.   
 
Lewis (1999) ties together the concepts of relief, rehabilitation and development by 
arguing that resilience is strongly related to people’s normal livelihood- and 
production conditions. This agrees with the experience in my study area. As a 
consequence, the policies for disaster mitigation and adaptation involve a great deal 
of effort in order to reduce the ‘normal’ production risk and stimulate income 
generation. The focus can be said to be on livelihood promotion, rather than on 
social protection. The policies have been successful in that the general level of 
income in the study area has risen in recent years, but the level of risk continues to 
be high, especially in agriculture.  
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The need to expand the coverage of the social protection system is mentioned in 
government policy documents (CPRGS 2002). Conway and Turk (2002) 
differentiate between two types of social protection. The first being social assistance 
to the destitute and the second being social risk management for households who 
otherwise would suffer a decline in well-being as a consequence of risk. The policy 
documents stress the importance of developing local property insurance programs 
for e.g. livestock and crops (CPRGS 2002). My material supports the importance of 
insurance to reduce both idiosyncratic risk and covariate risk, especially for the 
transient poor.  
 
I argue however that social assistance to the chronically poor should play a greater 
role in the context of disaster mitigation, to avoid poor households falling ever 
deeper into poverty. The insufficient social protection against idiosyncratic risk, like 
health problems, also result in the reduced capacity of poor households to cope with 
covariate risk, like flood hazards.   156
9. Concluding discussion 
On November 2nd 1999 a tropical storm came in over central Vietnam and 
unleashed 2300 mm of rain in four days. In the mountains, the force of the rivers 
pulled away chunks of the riverbanks, bridges and houses close to the river, and 
uprooted trees. Sand and stone settled on the fields by the river and growing crops 
were destroyed. When the rivers reached the lowland the force of the water was still 
strong enough to sweep away houses and bridges. Belongings and food in storage 
were swept away and animals drowned. 592 people died. The 1999 flood was a 
major shock to the people in the seven provinces affected. It has been called the 
'flood of the century' and was given great attention in Vietnam. Massive support was 
mobilised for relief and recovery. In order to understand the consequences of these 
floods three villages were studied in Hai Lang district, Quang Tri province (low land 
and , hill land areas) and two villages in A Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue province 
(mountain areas). The villages studied have different geographical, socio-economic 
and institutional conditions, which influence vulnerability and resilience.  
 
During the fieldwork it became apparent that the Vietnamese society had great 
capacity to respond to the disaster and that a large proportion of the population were 
reached by the support which gradually enabled them to recover. Important factors 
for the communities and households to be able to ‘bounce back’ and recover from 
the shock include local organisations with the authority and credibility to organise 
collective action, an active local government with strong linkages to the villages and 
a relatively equitable distribution of resources. The homogeneity of the community 
is also an important factor for resilience. In line with Adger and Kelly (1999) it is 
argued that vulnerability to shocks is not just related to individually controlled 
resources, but also to the resilience of the community as a whole.  
 
Although the level of resilience in general is high, there are several ways in which 
people are vulnerable (see chapters 5 and 6). The first few years after the floods 
were difficult for the majority of households in the study area. According to the 
assessment of the interviewed households it took three years before most of them 
had recovered a standard of livelihood similar to before the floods. Some 
households, however, had not yet recovered in 2004. Constraints to recovery 
included production difficulties due to continued heavy rains, disease of livestock, 
limited access to land, reduced labour capacity due to health problems as well as the 
limitations of the social security system.  
 
Vietnamese society is changing from a situation where the state had a high degree of 
responsibility for production and livelihoods, to a market economy in which risk is 
increasingly borne by the household rather than the collective. This gives rise to new 
types of vulnerability, which require new types of mechanisms for social protection. 
Collective organisation of access to resources exists to a higher degree in the study 
area compared to the rest of Vietnam, and has played an important role in moulding 
the response to disaster. Long-term recovery, however, is influenced by the growing 
differences in the capacities and conditions of different households.    157 
The research question is concerned with how vulnerability can be understood in 
the context of a society with a high level of organisation and an active disaster 
response. How do we understand the vulnerability and resilience that is determined 
by conditions common for a village, compared to conditions that have a 
differentiating effect between households?  
 
This chapter ties together the findings of the study in chapters four to eight. In order 
to address the research question the following issues are discussed:  
•  Factors in the Vietnamese society that contribute to resilience. 
•  Factors that result in differences in capacity to cope and recover between 
the villages under study. 
•  The importance of different types of assets for coping and recovery. 
•  The role of institutionalised collective access to resources. 
•  The relation between poverty and vulnerability. 
•  Measures of adaptation and risk reduction by the households, the villages 
and the government. 
 
The study draws on several disciplines including, agriculture economy, human 
geography, sociology and political science. It is recognised that there are a wide 
range of factors and conditions that influence the vulnerability and resilience of 
individuals, households and communities. All of these have not been addressed in 
this thesis. The emphasis is on household livelihood conditions, mainly from the 
perspective of agricultural production and household access to resources. The 
diversification of livelihoods is discussed, but deserves to be further investigated. 
The analysis of the institutional context also reflects the focus on production 
conditions. One of the conclusions of the study is that too much of the disaster 
response was focused on production, which suggests a broader focus for further 
research. While recognising that for example socio-cultural institutions strongly 
impact on resilience, this aspect has not been incorporated in the study.  
 
The study focuses on the household as the lowest unit of analysis. Household 
conditions are discussed in the context of the village, commune and district they 
belong to. This means leaving out an analysis of the individual differences within 
households, while it is acknowledged  that such differences, e.g. those related to 
gender, are important. The delimitations of the study are elaborated in section 1.2. 
 
The concepts of vulnerability and resilience 
As in Hewitt (1997) the study distinguishes between hazard and disaster. The results 
of the present study show a high degree of resilience despite the devastating 
magnitude of the flood hazard, which reinforces Hewitt’s argument that there is not 
necessarily a relation between exposure to hazards and vulnerability. The definition 
of Wisner et al. (2004) is incorporated, in which vulnerability is ‘the characteristics 
of a person or group and their situation that negatively influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of a hazard’. The focus is 
on the vulnerability of households, in the context of the geographical, socio-
economic and institutional environment at local level.   
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For the concept of resilience, the definition by Carl Folke et al. (2002) is followed 
here, where resilience is the capacity to ‘maintain the functionality of a system, when 
it is disturbed. To maintain the elements needed to renew or reorganise the system in 
order to maintain its main functions. It is partly the opposite of vulnerability and is 
used in the sense of the capacity of households and communities to ‘bounce back’ 
and recover after shock or disaster. The term also includes an aspect of adaptation, 
i.e. capacity to reorganise in order to reduce vulnerability to future hazards.  
 
A resilient society 
The response to the 1999 disaster was massive. The entire Vietnamese society 
including schools, industries, all kinds of organisations and individuals contributed 
relief to the people in the affected areas. Local level government played an active 
role in coordinating the response to the disaster. The interviews suggest that 
households perceived the distribution of relief as adequate and that basic needs were 
addressed during the first three months. The Red Cross, the Farmers’ Association, 
the Women’s Union and other local organisations are well anchored in the villages, 
and many village volunteers worked through these organisations in the distribution 
of relief and the re-construction of houses. In Hai Lang district the cooperatives 
organised the village repairs of damaged infrastructure with the help of the army 
sections at province, district and commune level. The district government provided 
guarantees which enabled the cooperatives to arrange for drainage pumps, draught 
power and production inputs on bank credit. The national government provided 
resources for bank credit to the households for the rehabilitation of production.   
 
Protection against hazards has a prominent role in Vietnam as the country is exposed 
to frequent storms and floods. This involves dike protection, drainage capacity, early 
warning systems and the organisational capacity to respond with relief and 
rehabilitation when floods occur
295. The efficiency of society in mobilising forces in 
response to disaster may partly be credited to a legacy of the war and the experience 
of joint action in response to crisis. The structure of authority and cooperation 
between local government, cooperatives, mass organisations and households was 
crucial for the disaster response to function smoothly.  
 
Peter Evans (1996) argues that close state-society cooperation can result in 
synergetic effects in raising the capacity for collective action. Such synergy, he 
argues, may arise in societies with equitable distribution of resources, a strong role 
of the state in providing and coordinating resources and strong state-private 
relations. These are conditions that to a large extent can be seen to be characterizing 
the study area. The relatively equitable distribution of land in Hai Lang and A Luoi 
means that income differences in the villages are limited, compared to the urban 
areas, and the village population have relatively common interests. It can be argued 
that the homogeneity of the communities is an enabling factor for the strong 
collective action of the disaster response.  
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The strong roles of the state and the local collective institutions in Hai Lang and A 
Luoi appear to be mainly positive in coping with the floods, but with some aspects 
that may affect resilience in a negative way. The limited development of private 
actors in market relations may reduce access to resources that can be important for 
some aspects of recovery. Many households were hesitant about where and how to 
access inputs for production if these were not supplied through the cooperatives. The 
availability of private employment opportunities is limited, which reduces the 
possibilities for households to generate additional income in aid of coping and 
recovery.   
 
In conclusion: The massive disaster response in society provided broad conditions 
for coping in the immediate disaster situation. The experience of the study suggests 
that community norms in Hai Lang and A Luoi supported attention to the well-being 
of all households during this phase. For long- term recovery, however, the 
households appear to be more dependent on their own resources and family 
networks. This emphasises the importance of the time perspective when discussing 
capacity to cope with and recover from disaster.   
 
Differences in government support between the study villages  
Initially, state disaster response in Hong Ha commune in the mountains seems not to 
have been quite as efficient as in the case of Hai Lang district. This was partly due to 
greater distances and fewer routines for flood response (see chapter 6). The 
government’s preparedness to deal with disaster was mainly focused on low land 
conditions as can be seen by documents from the Centre for Flood and Storm 
Control (Govt of VN 2001). The interviews show however, that the commune level 
authorities and organisations in Hong Ha played an even greater role in mobilising 
support and relief compared to in Hai Lang. The attention paid by the province level 
government to aid recovery in the mountains, picked up and led to major 
investments in repairing and expanding infrastructure in Hong Ha in the years 
following the floods.   
 
The state credit support for flood recovery that was provided in Hai Lang district 
was provided to households in Hong Ha to only a very limited degree. The 
justification was that Hong Ha has less market oriented production. The main 
household losses consisted of land, food crops and wood for construction. There 
were however losses of pigs and cattle reared for sale, and the destruction of fish 
ponds, which all failed to receive credit support. There was no support to recover the 
inundated fields, which constituted major flood damage for the households who 
spent months in manually recovering their land. The government did however 
support seed and fertiliser for the re-establishment of crops.  
 
The impact of the 1999 floods on production in the mountain areas was greater than 
during previous floods partly because of changes in the production system. The 
cultivation in Hong Ha commune has been transferred from the hill slopes to the 
river valleys during the past 10-20 years, which means that it is more exposed to 
flash floods. There seems to have been a delay in government realisation of the   160
needs for support to recovery in these areas, but attention to the impact of flash 
floods has increased in more recent policy documents. 
 
The government support for rehabilitation of production also differed between the 
low land and hill land villages in Hai Lang district. The government credit for this 
purpose was distributed to households according to acreage of allocated paddy land. 
This of course meant a bias towards the low land villages. The majority of people in 
Vietnam are low land paddy rice producers, and historically the state has ‘always’ 
prioritised securing paddy rice production (Kerkvliet 2005). This perspective 
appears to have dominated also in the disaster response. Hill land production has 
recently developed strongly in terms of perennial crops, including fruit trees and 
pepper, which constituted a major part of the losses in these areas. The support for 
rehabilitation of production, however, did not address these losses. The hill land 
population do have some allocated paddy land, which entitled them to at least some 
of the flood recovery credit. The fishermen do not have paddy land at all and were 
therefore unable to access the credit.  
 
In conclusion: The thesis suggests that while policies focused on the support for the 
needs of the majority, the part of the population who do not have paddy rice as their 
basic means of livelihood got less attention. The importance of adapting policies for 
disaster response to the varying conditions in and between the villages leads to 
questions for further research. Such an area of research concerns the importance of 
the level of decision-making and its consequences for adaptation of policies to local 
conditions. This conclusion is reinforced by the circumstance of differences in 
means of coping as discussed below.  
 
Differences in conditions for coping between the study villages 
Government relief and credit support was not enough to prevent the poor households 
in the low land villages from taking informal loans at high interest rates for basic 
food needs. The food relief organised by the state lasted three to four months after 
the floods. In Hong Ha, in the mountains, the commune leaders continued to 
mobilise food relief for the whole commune population until the rice harvest in June. 
In Hai Lang the households depended on individual resources and social networks to 
secure food needs between March and June. The ways in which this period of food 
shortage was handled was critical to how households managed to continue the 
recovery process.  It seems to have been more difficult for low land households than 
for people in the hill land villages. The latter had more access to income from minor 
forest products, day labour and small trading. In the low land economy there are 
fewer alternative sources of income during the months before the rice harvest. Poor 
households took informal food loans under conditions in which the loan should be 
paid back after harvest at 130-150 percent of the loan value. In many cases this 
caused debts that continued to burden the household economy for many years. 
 
The period of recovery was prolonged by repeated seasonal stress and production 
risk in the crop seasons following the floods. The disaster which happened in 
November was in Hai Lang followed by continued rains, which led to high 
production costs for drainage and the loss of seed and fertilisers that were washed   161 
away. The spring crop of 2001 was again reduced due to heavy rains just before 
harvest, as was the autumn crop of 2002. 
 
Almost all interviewed households immediately reinvested in pigs and poultry to 
replace the animals lost in the floods, but the environment had become polluted by 
excrement, which resulted in a high degree of animal disease. Many of the newly 
purchased animals perished. This problem was greater on the low land, as the water 
inundation lasted longer there. Income from animal husbandry was crucial to pay 
back the ‘flood-recovery-credit’. As the credit was used to cover losses rather than 
for new income generation it took at least two years before households were able to 
repay the loans.  
 
The hill land households had a disadvantage, as they lost sources of long-term 
income generation like fruit trees and pepper, while government support focused on 
recovery of short-term production for the immediate coping requirements. Many hill 
land households faced several difficult years before they could recover a livelihood 
situation similar to that before the floods.  
 
In the mountain commune, the months after the floods were dominated by efforts to 
recover the fields for food production, which required very hard work. This involved 
the manual clearing of deep layers of sand and stone from the paddy and dry land 
fields, uprooting the sugarcane to make way for food crops, clearing old swidden 
fields and grass land. Replanting cassava, which is the main food crop, takes 7-9 
months to mature, resulting in a long period of ‘coping’ before food production was 
stabilised.  
 
In conclusion: The experience of the study suggests that conditions for coping were 
more difficult on the low land compared to the hill land village. This highlights the 
vulnerability of households who depend mainly on one source of income for their 
livelihood. This, however, is not necessarily the case for long-term recovery, where 
the loss of perennial crops had long-term negative impact for the hill land 
households. The results also suggest the importance of attention to ‘non-economic’ 
losses, i.e. losses that ‘only’ affect consumption and not income generation.  
 
The impact of the floods not only involved the immediate losses, but also the long-
term negative impact on the productivity of the land and deteriorated sanitary 
conditions, which contributed to the difficulties in coping and recovery. This 
emphasises the importance of attention to post-disaster production conditions.  
 
The importance of different types of assets for coping and recovery 
In the Sustainable Livelihoods framework (see section 2.2) the household’s assets 
are central to their livelihood possibilities. These are both tangible and non-tangible 
and include physical, financial, human, natural and social capital. Some authors add 
‘institutional capital’, which is important in my analysis. Following Twigg (2003) 
the Sustainable Livelihoods approach is useful for analysing the role of different 
types of assets for coping and recovery. Also the ‘access model’ by Wisner et al. 
(2004) is helpful in analysing access to assets and livelihood opportunities which   162
may enable them to reduce their vulnerability (see sections 7.2 and 7.4). Both this 
model and the Sustainable Livelihoods framework focus on the agency of the 
household. They acknowledge that household decisions are made in an environment 
of policies, institutions and social and economic relations. Household access and 
livelihood decisions in the study area appear to be strongly influenced by this 
environment, which here leads to emphasising this more than household agency. 
 
The focus on household access to resources for coping means that the analysis is 
different from the discussion of the ‘normal’ livelihood context of the households, as 
the latter often emphasises income generation. The assets required for coping require 
short-term, immediate outputs. For example, the collection of minor forest products 
was of great importance for coping in the hill land and mountain villages, while it 
was considered as demanding too much labour to be relevant in a non-disaster 
situation. The present development trend whereby forest land is individually 
allocated to households may have negative impact on the coping capacity of the 
households who lose common access to this resource.  
 
Government support for recovery was specifically oriented towards agricultural 
production. The assets, capacities and opportunities required to make a living in the 
post-disaster situation, however, also involve other areas of importance. On the one 
hand, a support for paid labour opportunities in re-construction works may have 
enabled poor households on the low land to manage without taking informal loans. 
On the other hand, the interview results suggest a correlation between being poor 
and the lack of labour capacity in the household, which means that all poor 
households cannot be supported by increasing the opportunities for labour income.  
   
Non-tangible assets, like human, social and institutional capital were important for 
coping in the study area. Labour capacity was a vital resource in the mountains in 
order to recover the land that was inundated with sand and stone, and clearing new 
land. Labour capacity was required for the collection of minor forest products and as 
day labourers for other farmers, which were important coping strategies in the hill 
land village. Households with surplus labour have family members migrating to 
other areas in Vietnam in order to supplement household income. The interviews 
show that households with only a small workforce, e.g. due to health problems, have 
greater difficulties in coping with shocks. 
 
The above means of coping did not only require labour but also social and 
institutional capital. In Hai Lang, the access to minor forest products and day labour 
was mainly available to the hill land households. They had previous contacts for 
such access, as it is part of their ‘normal’ way of making a living, as a supplement to 
their farm income. Low land households also supplement their income through day 
labour for other farmers during rice harvest, but such opportunities were obviously 
not available during the critical coping period before the harvest. Young people in 
the mountains did day labour for other households in the commune, but such 
opportunities were limited as few households had resources to pay for labour. There 
are few people from Hong Ha who migrate for work to other areas. They belong to 
the ethnic minorities, and as such perceive more difficulties in making a living in the   163 
‘majority’ areas of Vietnam (see section 8.3).  Belonging to the majority can in itself 
be seen as a type of ‘social capital’. 
  
Start and Johnson (2004) stress the importance of the type of assets that are easily 
convertible into cash whereby households are in a position to solve urgent needs. 
Unlike the rice farmers in the plains, the households in the hill land village had more 
access to assets that provided a small daily income. This was important in order to 
avoid taking expensive loans, as was frequently done on the low land. According to 
the interviews, households did not sell productive assets in order to cope with the 
difficulties and their future possibilities of income generation were therefore not 
undermined. The better-off households interviewed had savings and support from 
relatives to a higher degree than other households. They also have a larger 
proportion of their income from business and trading, which was less affected by the 
floods, and contributed to better conditions for coping and recovery.  
 
The economy in the mountain commune is not so monetised. The focus was not on 
assets that could be turned into income. Instead it was access to land for food 
production that was perceived by both households and local authorities to be the 
most important resource for coping and recovery (see chapter 6). Land however, is a 
limited resource, as large areas that could have been used for food production, 
according to the commune People’s Committee, have been planted with trees in the 
efforts to protect the watershed.  In order to solve their food needs, households 
therefore had to cultivate marginal areas with low productivity and high risk. 
 
Access to common property resources sometimes fall outside of the analysis of 
assets.  This is classified as institutional capital, which is an addition to the five 
‘capitals’ normally mentioned in the Sustainable Livelihoods framework. Access to 
minor forest products was an important resource for the hill land households. The 
on-going formalisation of tenure rights to the forest may lead to reduced access for 
the poor. Policies on allocation of forest land in Hai Lang favours better-off 
households with resources to invest. Access to forest land is becoming a 
differentiating factor among hill land households. This also means increased 
differentiation in exposure to floods, as the forest land is higher and less risk prone. 
Devereux (1996) points to the tendency to formalise the control and management of 
natural resources in a way that can reduce the access for already marginalised 
groups. He argues that the individualisation of common property rights may destroy 
social cohesion and be economically stratifying. 
 
In Hai Lang the role of credit was vital for recovery. The fact that the distribution of 
credit was based on household tenure of paddy land meant that poor households 
which normally had difficulties getting credit received it this time. Apart from the 
credit for rehabilitating production, the extension of the period in which households 
were obliged to pay back old debts, provided them with the space to recover. The 
extensions were granted on an individual basis, and could be for several years in the 
case of some households. From 2002 state allocation of credit increased significantly 
and the households interviewed reported an improved access. The establishment of 
the Bank for Social Policy in 2004 (replacing the ‘Bank for the Poor’) reinforced the 
state policy of subsidised credit as a tool for poverty reduction. In 2004 the manager   164
of the Hai Lang branch of the Bank for Social Policy reported that 20 percent of 
households who had old loans from before the floods had not yet been able to repay 
them, but were still allowed to take new loans for income generation (see section 
5.4). By providing additional funding for the banking system, the state avoided a 
bank crisis such as the one which occurred in the case of the Bangladesh Floods in 
1998, where the micro-finance institutions suffered a severe shortage of funds when 
their clients failed to repay their loans as a result of the floods (del Ninno et al. 
2001).  
 
According to the vice chairman of the Hai Lang People’s Committee and the Hai 
Lang bank manager, it was seen as an important principle that state support should 
be provided as credit, rather than as grants, in order to maintain a discipline of 
repayment. The same argument applied to the principle that old credit should be 
prolonged rather than cancelled. This policy appears to have counteracted the risk of 
the credit system being undermined as a result of generous disaster response.   
 
A stable house appears to be an asset that is highly valued in the study area. Almost 
all the interviewed households have invested in a stronger house since the 1999 
floods. The investments have largely been made with informal loans which are now 
constraining the economic recovery for several households. They argue that official 
bank credits for house construction ought to be part of disaster mitigation policies.   
 
In conclusion, the experience of the study points at the importance of non-tangible 
assets for coping with crises, especially labour and social and institutional ‘capital’. 
The results highlight that the assets needed for coping may be different from what 
the households normally  rely on for their livelihood. The demands put on the 
institutions for access to e.g. land, forest resources and labour opportunities are 
different in disaster response compared  to during normal circumstances. The 
capacity of the ‘normal’ institutions for access to resources to adapt to situations of 
coping with disaster is an important issue for further analysis. The institutions for 
micro-finance did adapt as a consequence of the disaster, which appears to have 
been important for recovery.  
 
The role of institutionalised and collectively organised access to resources 
In Hai Lang a number of services are institutionalised through the cooperatives. It is 
argued that the cooperative organisation of resources for paddy production is more 
accessible to the poor, compared to resources for other lines of production, which 
are dependent on individual market contacts. Other authors have seen similar 
patterns in other contexts. For example, Bebbington’s (1999) experience from the 
Andes suggests that institutionalised access to knowledge, credit, irrigation etc is an 
advantage for the poor farmers compared to access through the market and kin 
networks. 
 
Adger (2001), who has studied areas in the north of Vietnam, is concerned about 
what he sees as an erosion of organisational culture, which in turn leads to an 
erosion of community capacity for disaster preparedness and response. Adger and 
Kelly (1999) argue that there is the risk that increasing disparities in wealth and   165 
increasing levels of indebtedness and landlessness may weaken kin and community 
support mechanisms and put pressure on local institutions and cooperative 
structures. On the other hand he refers to authors like Malarney (1997) who sees a 
re-emergence of local level institutions associated with local collective action. In Hai 
Lang and A Luoi districts the economic reforms have not led to erosion of collective 
organisation, but the cooperatives in Hai Lang are likely to face challenges when the 
economy becomes more and more diversified. Their central role is in the 
management of irrigation and drainage, which seems likely to remain important. In 
the interviews the households emphasised the importance of a functioning collective 
organisation of water management in order to reduce stress. The cooperatives also 
focus on strengthening village level capacity for self-reliance with increased seed 
production, storage facilities, and savings- and credit schemes. These services, as 
well as input supply and marketing, are likely to face more competition from private 
actors in future. The cooperatives in Hai Lang are being encouraged by the 
government to change from being broad community organisations to be more 
specialised member organisations focused on village level business development. If 
the cooperatives become more business oriented there may be an increasing need for 
other forms of village organisation capable of attending to all households.  
 
In conclusion:  The thesis argues that institutionalised access to resources often 
improves access to resources for the poor, as compared to private market options. 
The cooperatives, however, are so intimately bound to rice production that they may 
have difficulties in establishing a role in facilitating diversification. While the 
cooperatives facilitate community resilience to shocks  according  to the existing 
pattern of production, the household resilience may be dependent on the extent to 
which these can be changed. 
 
Linkages between poverty and vulnerability 
Hulme et al. (2001) discuss in terms of the 'transient poor' as distinct from the 
‘chronically poor’. Transient poverty is when people fluctuate above and below the 
poverty line and occasionally dip into poverty due to an extreme decline in income. 
A large number of people in the study villages are transient poor in that sense. The 
1999 floods pushed them below the poverty line for 2-3 years after the floods, but 
since then they have improved their situation. I argue that government policies and 
community level action in the 1999 disaster response addressed the whole 
population as if they were transient poor. The insufficient insurance system meant 
that the government provided resources for rehabilitation of production for the entire 
population, in order to avoid households declining into poverty. While on the one 
hand this meant an ‘over-supply’ of resources to better-off households with more 
individual buffers, on the other hand it meant that there was a lack of resources for 
the chronically poor. The needs of the chronically poor are different from the needs 
of the transient poor as they struggle with additional difficulties, like health 
problems and debts, which constrain their capacity to recover. The interviewed 
households who said that they were worse-off in 2002 compared to before the 
floods, were most of them poor even before the floods, and would have required 
additional support to avoid descending deeper into poverty. I argue that neither the   166
system for humanitarian assistance nor the social security system was adapted to 
their needs.  
 
In conclusion the study  suggests that there is a linkage between poverty and 
vulnerability in that the factors which  are impediments to recovery for the 
chronically poor are frequently the same as those causing poverty under ‘normal’ 
conditions. Some of these factors need to be addressed simultaneously with disaster 
response for the latter to be effective. An improvement of the health insurance 
system and a micro-finance system that can constrain the practice of high-interest 
money lending are important such factors. 
 
Disaster mitigation and adaptation 
A common critique against interventions in support of relief and rehabilitation is that 
they tend to lead to the reconstruction of pre-existing systems thereby risking the 
rebuilding of a livelihood context in which people continue to be vulnerable and 
exposed. (Christoplos et al. 2004).  
 
This may be the case for the mountain commune (see section 8.5) where investments 
continue to be focused on production in the river valleys, despite the flood risk. 
Integrated agro-forestry production on the lower slopes would be a more resilient 
strategy, according to commune and district authorities. On the low land it is more 
difficult to avoid the exposure to disastrous floods, unless the whole population 
resettles, which is not feasible. A limited number of low land households have 
moved to the mountain district of Huong Hoa, in Quang Tri province, and are 
receiving government support to start up a new life there. The resettled households 
face a difficult trade-off between the risk of staying put in their exposed location or 
the risks involved in starting a new livelihood in an unfamiliar environment. 
Resettlement may also involve the risk of social conflict over resources, as has 
occurred in other contexts (N.V.Chinh 2001). 
 
Investments in dikes cannot prevent major flood hazards in the study area, nor are 
the policies geared towards building dikes high enough to stop the autumn flooding. 
Drainage structures are however vital to reduce the impact of floods. Disaster 
mitigation investments also involve the strengthening of safe refuge for people and 
their belongings, through housing, boats, storage and preparedness (Govt of VN 
2001). In the mountains there have been big investments in concrete covering of the 
hill slopes close to the road to avoid landslides.  
 
Resilience to disaster is strongly related to people’s normal livelihood- and 
production conditions. Mitigation of ‘normal’ stress during the crop season helps to 
speed up recovery. This principle seems to guide Vietnamese policy in that disaster 
mitigation and adaptation strategies also involves a high degree of effort which aims 
at reducing the ‘normal’ production risk and stimulate diversification and income 
generation. The approach to risk reduction is to a large extent focused on 
infrastructure in order to safe-guard production. Investments in infrastructural 
protection of the crop, however, involves the risk of high costs of repair when the   167 
structures are damaged. During the autumns of 2004, 2005 and 2006 there were 
heavy storms damaging collective infrastructure.  
 
The interview results show that people perceive both on-farm and off-farm 
diversification as a way of strengthening of resilience. According to the Hai Lang 
Agriculture Section the diversification has increased strongly since 2002. This is not 
only a risk reduction strategy, but a result of gradually higher household income and 
scope for more investment. Diversification is stronger among the better-off 
households as the investments are often associated with a significant risk. The 
interviews showed that some households had become worse-off, at least temporarily, 
because of failed investments e.g. in animal husbandry. Diversification thus needs to 
go hand in hand with measures to reduce and mitigate production risk. 
 
Concerning non-agriculture diversification, the better-off households diversify more 
into business and trading, while the middle-income and poor households often 
migrate for work during shorter periods. As production risk is high, this is an 
important way of household ‘self-insurance’. The district authorities have strategies 
to expand rural employment opportunities by attracting industries to their district 
(UBND 2005). 
 
The so called diversification policies for Hong Ha commune are focused on the 
export production of rubber. Although there are chances of income generation, 
which reduces vulnerability, there are also the risks of flood damage and market 
failure. The mountain population have particular difficulties in diversifying as they 
are remote from markets and services. The access to land and production inputs are 
partly tied to participation in the government production ‘campaigns’. There is 
concern that the strong policy influence may limit household responsibility in 
making risk assessments. Poor households tend to focus production according to 
which resources are supplied, rather than according to their individual assets and 
capabilities.  
 
In conclusion, there may be a tension between a situation where diversification leads 
to a broader range of options in coping and recovery, and a situation in which the 
reduced homogeneity of the community has a negative impact on the motivation for 
collective action. Folke et al. (2000) emphasise that diversity is not just an insurance 
against uncertainty. The mix of experiences stimulates adaptation and learning, helps 
people to cope with change and facilitates innovation following disturbances and 
crises. The fact that the better-off are in a stronger position to diversify may lead to 
shifts in the priorities of the community. As in Adger (2000), it is argued here that 
adaptation and flexibility requires control over resources. If such control is 
concentrated within a smaller part of the community, the modes of adaptation may 
not necessarily be in the interests of the poor.  
 
’Pressure and Release’ 
Wisner et al. (2004) use the ‘Pressure and Release’ (PAR) model to analyse 
household vulnerability. In PAR they trace the unsafe conditions back to what they 
call dynamic pressures and root causes. The latter must be addressed in order for the   168
pressures causing disaster to be ‘released’, i.e. removed. The 1999 floods was of 
such magnitude that it is difficult to imagine a society where it would not have 
caused disaster, but the concepts of pressures and root causes can be used in the 
discussion of how best to reduce the disaster, in terms of flood impact and the 
capacity to cope and recover. 
 
In Hong Ha commune such pressures include the focus of production in the river 
valley, the limited access to land, the limited access to markets and labour 
opportunities and the limited access to health care. The root causes of these 
pressures include a policy discourse, and the structure of influence in Vietnamese 
society centred on the low land paddy economy. This leads to a development in the 
mountain district that focuses on forest protection to reduce low land flooding, on 
the introduction of paddy rice cultivation, and on export oriented crops which 
benefit the province economy. This development perspective may increase living 
standards for the mountain population, but it also involves increased risks. 
Commune and district authorities in Hong Ha and A Luoi argue for the development 
of the land and forest resources in a way that combines food security, income 
generation and environmental protection objectives, at the same time as spreading 
risks. This would be possible, they argue, through allocation of forest land to 
households and groups of households to develop forest gardens and enrich the forest 
with fruit trees, valuable species and food crops.  
 
In Hai Lang district, the pressures include the insufficient social security system, 
especially the high costs of health care, which have resulted in that many poor 
households are indebted and thereby increasingly vulnerable to shocks. The 
dominance of only one crop, rice, in the economy of many households on the low 
land, especially the poor, increases their vulnerability as they have few other sources 
of income whenever the rice is lost. The frequent crop losses cause strain to the 
economy of most households in the district, which reduces the margins to cope with 
disaster. The root causes behind these pressures relate to high levels of health 
problems in both Hai Lang and A Luoi, believed to be related to the US chemical 
bombing (Agent Orange) of the area during the ‘American War’. The limitation in 
the state budget for social security is also related to the war, as a large part of that 
budget goes to compensation to war invalids (see section 3.2). 
 
Poor households who are dependent on rice production easily get stuck in a pattern 
where all resources go to ensuring rice production for food security and nothing is 
left to diversify in order to spread the risk. The protection against the risk of 
production losses is vital in enabling households to gradually build a surplus for 
supplementary forms of income generation.  
 
In conclusion: Resilient society, vulnerable people 
The title of the thesis suggests that society in Hai Lang and A Luoi has a high level 
of resilience to flood disaster. Relating to the terminology of Folke et al. (2002) ‘the 
social system’ has ‘maintained its functionality’ and the ‘elements needed to renew 
or reorganise the system in response to the shock were maintained’. In general the 
living standard in the study area is higher today than it was in 1999, before the   169 
floods, according to district People’s Committee reports, and the level of poverty has 
decreased (see discussion in 5.4, 6.2 and 7.3). The general opinion of those 
interviewed was that resilience to floods is increasing gradually as society develops. 
As this happens, more people will have houses that can resist floods and more 
people will have assets and savings to bridge difficult times. The state and the local 
communities are also expected to have more resources to support coping and 
recovery.  
 
The argument of the thesis is in line with Lewis (1999) who finds that the condition 
of a person, structure or community before a disaster has significant bearing on the 
capacity to recover. I argue that resilience to disaster is very much linked to the 
socio-economic and institutional conditions and capacities of households to improve 
their livelihood during ‘normal’ years. There are recent policy developments in 
Vietnam, which supports such capacities. Both agricultural and non-agricultural 
diversification of production and livelihood opportunities are being stimulated, in 
order to raise income and spread risks (CPRGS 2002). The infrastructure for 
drainage has been significantly improved in Hai Lang, which is important both to 
reduce the impact of major floods, but also to reduce seasonal stress and crop failure 
during ‘normal’ years. The thesis argues that reduced production risk during 
‘normal’ years significantly increases resilience to disaster. The Comprehensive 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy expresses the government ambition for a 
universal social security system. Since 2003 the health insurance for poor 
households has been improved and insurance against production failure has started 
to develop (Castel 2005), although these had not yet reached Hai Lang and A Luoi 
to any major extent at the time of the study.  
 
The definition of resilience by Folke et al. emphasises reorganisation and adaptation 
in order to reduce vulnerability to future shocks. The above policy efforts represent 
adaptation, even though it does not involve reorganisation, as they are 
reinforcements of previous policy directions. Policies of forest protection have been 
adapted to allow for the allocation to households and communities, in order to 
increase household benefits from the forest (revised Land Law 2003). This, 
however, has not yet been implemented in Hong Ha commune. While households in 
Hong Ha argue for such allocation as a way to increase resilience, the allocation of 
forest in Hai Lang is perceived by villagers as more complicated, as it may reduce 
the access of poor households to minor forest products and grazing land (see 
sections 7.2 and 8.4).  
 
‘Vulnerable people’ in the title of the thesis refers to the vulnerability of a majority 
of the population in the study area who face the continuous risks of crop losses and 
damage to property and lives, with the frequent storms. The thesis emphasises the 
specific vulnerability of chronically poor households. The material suggests that 
poverty is often connected to the lack of labour and to high health costs. The lack of 
labour and poor health reduces the capacity of these households to mobilise 
‘emergency income’ to cope and recover. Instead they feel obliged to take informal 
loans with high interest in order to secure their basic needs. It is argued that this 
increases the risk of those households sinking deeper into poverty. As Davies and 
Hossain (1997) I also stress that vulnerability to hazards needs to be understood as a   170
downward spiral of increasing vulnerability rather than a one-off event. It is argued 
here that the measures of reducing vulnerability to disaster are very much linked to 
poverty alleviation and the improvement of social security.   171 
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Appendix 
 
1. Tables of number of interviews and some results 
 
1.1 Number of households interviewed in each location:  
Number of households 
Location 
May 
2000 
Sept-Oct 
2000 
Nov-Dec 
2001 
Nov-Dec 
2002 
June 
2004 
Van Tri (low land)  16  10  12  5  3 
Phuoc Dien (low land)    11  5  5   
Xuan Loc (hill land)  16  16  11  5   
Hong Ha (mountain)  5  19  14  7  3 
 
 
1.2 Number of households interviewed in each wealth group: 
  Poo
r 
Middle 
income 
Better-
off  
Van Tri  5  7  2 
Phuoc 
Dien 
8 3   
Xuan Loc  6  8  2 
Hong Ha  7  9  3 
 
 
1.3 Interview results in Hong Ha commune: 
Means of coping  Number of 
households 
Of 
which  
poor hh 
Collecting minor forest products  6  3 
Cultivating old swidden fields  3  1 
Forest work (planting, tending)  6  3 
Have state pension due to war 
injuries 
6 2 
Borrowed money from relatives  2  1 
Government credit  3  0 
Food relief  19  7 
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1.4 Interview results in Hai Lang district: 
Means of coping  Number of hh  Van Tri  Phuoc Dien  Xuan 
Loc 
Number of households interviewed  16  11  16 
Collecting minor forest products  0  0  9 
Working as day labourers  0  0  4 
Income from tree planting  0  0  6 
Took loans to repair the house  6  0  7 
Remittances from son/daughter in 
HCMC 
2 2  7 
Small trade  0  1  2 
Successful pig raising  2  2  13 
Loan from relatives  3  1  6 
Seasonal migration  1  4  2 
Food loans  6  6  0 
Government credit  12  11  16 
Food relief  16  11  16 
Rent extra paddy land  5  4  1 
 
 
1.5 Difficulties to recover  
(poorer now than before the floods according to household’s own 
estimation) 
Number of households  Van Tri  Phuoc Dien  Xuan 
Loc 
Hong Ha 
Not yet recovered 
in 2004 
3 4  2  0 
Poor also before 
the floods 
5 8  6  7 
Health problems  5  6  2  7 
Informal debts  3  8  0  2 
Have migrated  1  2  1  0 
 
 
 
2. List over fieldwork meetings and interviews 
 
Hai Lang district: 
May 2000: 
8: Meeting with Hai Tan commune People’s Committee and representatives of the 
mass organisations. 
8-10: Household interviews Van Tri village. 
10: Meeting with the Hai Tan commune PC and mass organisations. 
11: Meeting with Hai Chanh commune People’s Committee. 
11-13: Household interviews in Xuan Loc village. 
13: Meeting with Hai Chanh commune PC and mass organisations. 
15: Meeting with Hai Lang district People’s Committee and branch organisations.   179 
October 2000:  
10: Meeting with Hai Lang district branch of the Red Cross. 
11: Household interviews in Xuan Loc village. 
12: Meeting with Hai Chanh commune People’s Committee and mass organisations. 
13: Household interviews in Van Tri village. 
13: Meeting with Van Tri village head and cooperative leaders. 
14: Meeting with Hai Tan commune People’s Committee and mass organisations. 
17: Interviews with household in Phuoc Dien village. 
19: Meeting with Hai Lang district People’s Committee and branch organisations. 
20: Meeting with Hai Thanh commune People’s Committee 
 
April 2001: 
3: Meeting with Hai Lang district Agriculture Section and Extension Station. 
November 2001: 
21: Meeting with Hai Chanh commune People’s Committee. 
22: Meeting with Xuan Loc village cooperative leaders. 
22: Meeting with Van Tri village cooperative leaders. 
23: Meeting with Hai Thanh commune People’s Committee and Phuoc Dien village 
cooperative leaders. 
December 2001: 
10: Interviews with households in Xuan Loc village. 
11: Interviews with households in Phuoc Dien village. 
14: Meeting with Hai Lang district Agriculture Section. 
14: Meeting with Hai Lang district Section for Labour and Organisation. 
 
November 2002: 
13: Household interviews Xuan Loc village. 
14: Household interviews Van Tri village. 
15: Household interviews Phuoc Dien village. 
 
April 2004:  
28: Household interviews Van Tri village and meeting with Van Tri cooperative 
leaders. 
May 2004:  
25: Meeting with cooperative leaders in Xuan Loc village. 
28: Meeting with cooperative leaders in Phuoc Dien village. 
29: Meeting with the head of the Hai Lang district branch of the Bank for Social 
Policy. 
June 2004:  
6: Meeting with staff of the Quang Tri province Union of Cooperatives. 
 
 
A Luoi district: 
May 2000: 
17: Meeting with A Luoi district People’s Committee. 
18: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee. 
September 2000:   180
15: Meeting with A Luoi district People’s Committee and Agriculture Section. 
16: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee and mass organisations.  
16: Meeting with the village heads of Pa Rinh and Con Tom villages. 
17: Group discussion with 12 people in Pa Rinh village. 
18-19: Household interviews in Pa Rinh village. 
20: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee and mass organisations. 
22: Meeting with A Luoi district PC and branch organisations. 
26: Meeting with Hong Ha commune PC. 
26: Meeting with commune staff of the Bo River Watershed Management Board. 
27: Meeting with Hong Ha commune organisations. 
28: Meeting with A Luoi district level organisations.  
 
October 2000: 
23: Meeting with A Luoi district People’s Committee 
24: Meeting with staff of the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry. 
27: Meeting with Hong Ha commune PC and village heads. 
 
February 2001: 
21: Meeting with the A Luoi branch of the Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development, with the Agriculture Section, the Forest Station and the Land 
Management Section of A Luoi district. 
22: Group discussion with households in Pa Rinh village. 
23: Group discussion with households in Con Tom village. 
24: Meeting with the Hong Ha commune PC and Land Management staff. 
March 2001: 
4: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee 
28:   ditto 
29: Workshop in A Luoi district town with representatives of all related 
organisations plus Hong Ha commune leaders. 
30: Meeting with staff of the Hue University of Agriculture and Forestry. 
 
December 2001: 
18: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee. 
 
November 2002:  
24: Household interviews Pa Rinh and Con Tom villages. 
 
June 2004:  
9: Meeting with A Luoi district People’s Committee. 
10: Meeting with Hong Ha commune People’s Committee. 
11-12: Household interviews Pa Rinh and Con Tom villages. 
                  
 
 